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PREFACE 
 
The path that led me to pursue a PhD in Wageningen and particularly in Management Studies 
was largely a matter of luck and social contacts. I had finished my Master in Environmental 
Science in Brazil and had other plans. Meanwhile, Prof. Decio Zylbersztajn, whom I hadn’t 
met personally but who knew my previous supervisor, indicated my name to a PhD position 
in a WOTRO project. I went to his office to meet him personally and I was told that 
Wageningen University is incredibly international and where interdisciplinary collaboration is 
common. I would study the interface between collective action and the new challenges of 
vertical coordination in value chains. I was definitely hooked. That is why I must first thank 
Prof. Decio for indicating me and incentivizing me to come to the Netherlands. All in all, it 
was an amazing experience! 
I acknowledge WOTRO/NWO for providing all the financial support for this research through 
the integrated program “Cooperatives and chains: linking smallholders to agricultural 
markets”. It will be hard to have such a support for research in Brazil, even in the most 
optimistic scenario of scientific development.  Most importantly, being part of this integrated 
program gave me the opportunity not only to share and get important feedback from the other 
PhD candidates and the postdoc coordinator, but especially to have them - Amsaya Anteneh, 
Claire Chagwiza, Qiao Liang and Roldan Muradian - as new good friends.  
 
Supervision of one’s PhD is very important and even determinant of how motivating or how 
miserable will be the four years. I was very lucky to have Jos Bijman as my daily supervisor. 
Since the beginning Jos told me our relationship would be a horizontal one, in which we 
would collaborate. It turned out that Jos was very open to new ideas, and very dedicated as a 
supervisor. But most importantly, we always had a very good relationship and I feel 
comfortable talking about my life plans with him. I can say we became friends. I also thank 
my promoter, Prof. Onno Omta, for giving me very important feedback on methods and on 
the quantitative part of the research, but also for motivating me and respecting my decisions 
during the whole process.  
 
Even though the manufacturing of the papers is largely a solitary endeavour, it is crucial to 
have colleagues and Professors commenting and criticizing one’s work in progress. I thank 
George Hendrikse, Jerker Nilsson, Petri Ollila and Feng Li for valuable feedback on two 
papers of this thesis. I thank Chiara Cazzufi whom I met in Helsinki and was so kind in 
reading one of the papers and giving me very important feedback. Stefano Pascucci became a 
co-author in a number of papers in this thesis and is always very stimulating to talk with, 
since he is a brainstorm himself. Stefano usually made the research I was doing look and 
sound way more interesting, important and general than I would initially perceive. Finally, I 
thank Christos Kolympiris, who helped me a lot with technicalities of the statistical and 
econometric procedures, but mostly for sharing very good moments of laughter in the 
Leeuwenborch!  
 
It was a pleasure to have Annie Royer, Djala, Gumataw, Zen, Katja, Eva, Etrya, Janne (thanks 
for driving us safe back home), Mersiha (sorry for the wine in your carpet), Domenico 
(Bonobos to be continued) and Verena as MST colleagues, and Willem and Agata as ORL 
colleagues. Thank you so much Ina, Johnnatan (laga mi konosé kuandu abo bini na Brazil) 
and Anne for being so helpful in absolutely everything I needed. Leonie, your help in 2009 
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was crucial for our quality of life in Wageningen; particularly for finding a place for me and 
Candi to live even before we arrived. We liked so much to live there that in 2012 we lived 
there again! Thank you! 
 
I thank the good friends I have made in Wageningen, which made my life there so more 
interesting and fun. People whom I feel comfortable enough to ask for a couch and whom I 
would love to receive in my own couch in Brazil. Thank you Rossi, Dimitris, Andrea, Maraki, 
Theo de Vries, Petra Dwerkzen, Mads Florin, Henrique, João, Pedro, Mariana and Vanja for 
sharing foods, drinks, farms, smiles and fun with me, and Cafe De Zaaier for putting us all 
together. A special thanks to Alex & Anastasia, best neighbours and cooks ever (papoi papoi). 
Whenever I started taking the PhD life too seriously and worrying too much, I just had to 
remember that we are talking monkeys on an organic spaceship flying through the universe. I 
would then enjoy the pleasures of life with these friends without any guilt. 
 
This research was conducted in Brazil, where I spent half of the PhD time. A lot of people 
helped me. I thank Thiago Jesus for teaching me how to input data through Access, Amorim 
from Unicamp for helping me with the sampling strategy, Zé Paulo from UEM for giving me 
important information on broiler industry and contracts, Rúbia Rinaldi from Unioeste for the 
contacts in the rural workers’ union, and Sylvia Saes for giving me very good tips, for 
teaching a very useful course at USP and for her friendship. 
 
The empirical research wouldn’t be possible if I hadn’t the crucial openness of cooperative 
LAR, and the help from its managers Clédio Marschall, Reinaldo Fiuza and Carmem Reis. 
Applying the survey wouldn’t be possible without the very dedicated group of young students 
from Medianeira, sons and daughter of rural producers themselves, who carried out the 
interviews with the members: Atilano Candio, Dinéia Finger, Edio Welter, Gelson Loch, 
Giovanni Camana and Jaffer Besen. 
 
During this PhD I had the pleasure to be a colleague of Kassia Watanabe both in Wageningen 
and in Brazil. Always laughing, optimistic and going with the flow, Kassia really values 
human connections. Thank you for your friendship and for the countless Japanese sashimi & 
sushi banquets! 
 
Finally, I thank Candi, my partner, lover and friend, not only for supporting and being very 
patient with me, which is obvious, but above all for having the courage to join me in the 
Netherlands, in the first place, and making our life there really gezellig!  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Problem statement  
Cooperatives play an important role in the agri-food sector. In the European Union (EU), the 
average market share of all agricultural cooperatives is 40%. In non-EU OECD countries 
sharing similar cultural characteristics with Europe (such as Switzerland, Norway, Canada, 
USA, New Zealand and Australia) cooperatives also play an important role in the food chain. 
Large cooperatives are present in all of these countries, especially in the USA. Cooperatives 
are particularly important in the dairy sector, but also in olives, wine, cereals, and fruits & 
vegetables (Bijman et al., 2012).  
Agricultural cooperatives are organizations jointly owned and controlled by farmers. A key 
difference between cooperatives and other business forms is that the cooperative has 
members, and that these members are simultaneously users, owners and decision-makers of 
the organization. That is, the relationship between members and cooperative organization has 
traditionally been divided into three dimensions (Dunn, 1988): ownership (or financing), 
control (or decision-making), and use (or transaction). 
Cooperatives are pooled interdependence organizations in the sense that each member renders 
a discrete contribution to the cooperative and each member is supported by the cooperative. 
When there are mutual dependencies (or interdependencies) between different activities and 
different transactions, coordination is needed. Coordination has been defined as managing 
dependencies between activities (Malone and Crowston, 1994). The traditional coordination 
role of the agricultural cooperative has been mainly a horizontal one - organizing the 
collection and sales of the members’ products, and informing members about the minimum 
quality requirements. Horizontal coordination in cooperatives already presents collective 
action problems (Cook, 1995), mainly in the form of free-riding behavior.  
Recent events in the agri-food sector increased the demand for guarantees of healthy and safe 
products, but also for sustainable agricultural practices (Grunert, 2005). Increasingly 
important attributes of food quality are linked to production process characteristics (Luning 
and Marcelis, 2006). Particularly challenging is the connectedness of transactions between 
farmers, traders, processors, retailers and final customers in order to comply with quality 
requirements, which implies a need for value chain coordination. Quality requirements can be 
in the form of public or private standards, where the latter is becoming predominant (Reardon 
and Henson, 2005). 
These changes in the agri-food sector, combined with increased consumer demand for variety 
and convenience, have led to stronger sequential interdependencies, in which the output of 
one part is the input for another part. The increasing connectedness between farmer–
cooperative transactions and cooperative-buyer transactions demands more vertical 
coordination. A major challenge for the agricultural cooperative is to combine horizontal 
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coordination among the members with vertical coordination in the value chain (Bijman 2009; 
Hanf, 2009). Since they are member-oriented, agricultural cooperatives traditionally buy the 
farm products of its members regardless of its quality. Increasingly, however, cooperatives 
need to guarantee product quality towards their customers, and thus assure that members 
supply products of the right quality. Some authors argue that stricter contracts between the 
cooperative and its members are necessary for the cooperative to cope with this challenge 
(e.g., Hanf, 2009; Bijman, 2010). This perspective, however, neglects the role of non-
hierarchy mechanisms used in governing the cooperative-member relationship, such as social 
capital and democratic decision-making. Several socio-psychological factors beyond pursuing 
(short term) economic benefit affect members’ commitment to the cooperative in general 
(Fulton, 1999), and to the quality strategy and customer-orientation of the cooperative in 
particular. Empirical research has shown that social identity (Borgen, 2001), trust and 
perception of participation (Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009) all have a positive effect on 
commitment.  
Therefore, the central research objective of the thesis is to understand the governance 
mechanisms that can be used by the cooperative to strengthen the member-cooperative 
relationship, and understanding the effects of the different governance mechanisms on the 
coordination of members’ adjustments to higher quality levels. 
1.2 Theoretical approach  
In the organizational economics literature the agricultural cooperative has been characterized 
as a hybrid governance structure, placed between market and hierarchy, since farmers pool 
some resources at the processing firm level while maintaining autonomy at the farm level 
(Ménard, 2007). However, by defining a cooperative only as a hybrid governance structure, 
Menard (2007) and Chaddad (2012) provide only a limited perspective on the organizational 
characteristics the cooperative. A more recent characterization by Nilsson et al. (2012) has 
departed from the ‘markets and hierarchies framework’ (Williamson, 1975) by proposing that 
social capital is the base of the cooperative both in terms of resources and in terms of 
governance. Establishing a jointly owned firm, usually on a small scale with its members 
living in the same village, is risky since everybody becomes dependent on each other. If one 
or a few of the members shirk, the whole community suffers. High levels of trust are, 
therefore, needed within the membership, particularly in the initial phase of the development 
of the cooperative. The cooperative’s financial capital originates from the members, often 
because they have voluntarily abstained from patronage refunds. Therefore, according to 
Nilsson et al. (2012), the financial capital would ultimately be a kind of conversion of social 
capital. Social capital is also important for the governance of the member-cooperative 
relationship, for the way decisions are taken and implemented. However, social capital is not 
the same ‘equal voting rights’ (Nilsson et al., 2012, p. 190), which is a democracy 
mechanism. The importance of social capital for internal governance lies in the norms that 
arise to coordinate the interaction of people being part of a particular community. That is why 
it has also been called ‘community governance’ (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Hayami, 2009). 
14 
 
Democracy and community mechanisms, however, have not yet been integrated in the 
Transaction Costs framework, where market and hierarchy are still the dominant governance 
mechanisms. 
Like all empirically observed firms and markets, cooperatives are institutions employing a 
wide range of governance mechanisms. Our approach to governance mechanisms is different 
from the concept “the mechanisms of governance” as developed by Williamson (1996). 
Often, “governance structure” and “governance mechanism” are used as synonyms in the 
Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) literature. However, most governance structures are 
neither pure markets nor pure hierarchies. Nor can they be considered as discrete pure 
hybrids. According to Grandori and Furnari (2008), all governance structures use four 
mechanisms: market, hierarchy, democracy and community. Market refers to highly powered 
incentives and the capacity of coordinating action with minimal communication; hierarchy 
refers to predictability, transparency and accountability through formal rules, procedures and 
evaluation systems; democracy implies infusing voice and integrating different interests 
through diffusion of ownership, decision and representation rights; finally, community means 
infusing cohesion and homogenizing interests through knowledge and value sharing. This 
thesis adopts Grandori and Furnari’s (2008) perspective. The agricultural cooperative 
embodies varying mixes of these four archetypical mechanisms to govern transaction 
relationships between cooperative firm and farmer-member.  
Organizational economics, with TCE and Agency Theory as its dominant strains, does not 
take into account individuals’ ability to change their attitudes with changes in time and place. 
Context is believed not to have any effect on the individuals’ attitude towards opportunism, 
even if it might reduce or increase the scope for opportunistic behaviour (Goshal and Moran, 
1996: 20). While it is argued by Agency Theory that the scope for opportunistic behaviour 
can be reduced with incentive alignment (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and by TCE that the 
scope for opportunistic behaviour can be reduced with sanctions (Williamson, 1996), the 
common assumption in both approaches is that opportunism as an attitude is not open to 
management.  This is another limitation of the standard organizational economics approach to 
cooperatives. However, opportunism and commitment, understood as attitudes, might vary 
with the quality of the relationship between parties of a transaction and might be open to 
management. To understand the dynamics of agricultural cooperative governance, we suggest 
that the unit of analysis be shifted from the member-cooperative transaction to the member-
cooperative transaction relationship.  
Studies on agricultural cooperatives that take an organizational economics perspective often 
conclude with the suggestion for future research of looking more closely at social capital and 
community aspects (Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Ménard, 2007; Chaddad, 2012). However 
community and democracy mechanisms are seldom integrated into these studies themselves. 
Not including these two important governance mechanisms is a clear limitation of the 
organizational economics approach to cooperatives, especially because they might be an 
important source of competitive advantage of cooperatives over alternative arrangements 
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(Davis and Bialoskorski, 2010). Central to sustaining any stable arrangement is the 
“willingness of trading partners to exert effort on behalf of the relationship” (Mohr & 
Spekman, 1994: 137), which might be understood as commitment (Joshi and Stump, 1999). In 
our theoretical approach, based not only on organizational economics but also on economic 
sociology, social psychology and organization theory we aim to show that both community 
and democracy mechanisms are crucial for strengthening commitment.  
Cooperatives depend on the commitment of their members to supply the right quantity and 
quality of agricultural products. Nevertheless, there are very few empirical studies on member 
commitment in agricultural cooperatives, (Borgen, 2001; Bijman & Verhees, 2011; Hansen et 
al., 2002; Osterberg & Nilsson, 2009; Trechter et al., 2002). Furthermore, it is common to see 
conceptual confusion between commitment and loyal behaviour (Pascucci et al., 2012). 
Commitment, however, is better understood as an antecedent attitude of loyal behaviour, 
which might or might not determine actual loyal behavior. Our approach follows the more 
recent organizational commitment literature (Solinger et al., 2008) in defining member 
commitment as an attitude. We define member commitment as the willingness to make a 
sacrifice to contribute to the organization’s success and to the long-term stability of the 
relationship. 
Transaction costs can be distinguished into transactional risks and coordination costs (Grover 
and Malhotra, 2003). Transactional risks, or exchange hazards, relate to the potential 
opportunistic behavior of the contract parties. TCE focuses almost exclusively on the 
minimization of transactional risks. The main solution to high transactional risks is, according 
to TCE, choosing a hierarchical governance structure for the transaction (Williamson, 1991). 
When applied to cooperatives, the prediction is that as asset specificity at the cooperative firm 
level increases (relative to asset specificity at the farm level), more hierarchical governance 
will be needed, because of the need to control potential opportunistic behavior (Hendrikse and 
Bijman, 2002; Ménard, 2007). This is a limitation of the TCE approach to cooperatives, 
because the increase in the use of hierarchical mechanisms might be needed for coordination 
purposes rather than for control of opportunism. Our approach, borrowing from inter-firm 
network literature (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati et al., 2005; Nooteboom, 2004) recognizes 
the possibility that control problems might be solved with informal social mechanisms. Still, 
community mechanisms might reduce transactional risks but might not be enough to 
coordinate efficiently in a situation of strong interdependencies in the food value chain. 
Moreover, authority in the form of standards, rules and procedures, might be more effective 
when compared to democracy in reducing cognitive heterogeneity, and might be needed when 
there is uncertainty about the actions of others (Gulati et al, 2005) as well as when the need 
for information exchange increases. It is our key assumption that the use of different and 
different combinations of governance mechanisms is contingent on the particular control and 
coordination requirements of the transaction relationship between members and the 
cooperative firm. 
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1.3 Empirical context 
Empirical research has been conducted in one large multi-product processing agricultural 
cooperative in Southern Brazil. The studied cooperative, Lar, is engaged in soy, broiler, 
vegetables, milk, swine and cassava, where soy and broiler are its leading businesses. The role 
of empirical research in this thesis is to test hypotheses regarding: (1) the effect of governance 
mechanisms on member commitment; (2) how relationship characteristics might affect quality 
performance; (3) that motivations for continued membership might be drivers of pro-active 
participation in the governance of the cooperative. Brazilian agricultural cooperatives are 
interesting to examine these theoretical insights for three reasons. 
First, cooperatives are important in the agricultural economy and play a leading role in 
exporting agricultural goods. The economic importance of agricultural cooperatives in Brazil 
goes beyond the number of cooperatives and jobs created; these organizations contributed 
38.4 % of agricultural GDP and hold about 7.5 % of the total capacity of soybeans handlers in 
the country (OCB, 2009). The South region of the country is known for its history of 
successful cooperatives. In the state of Paraná (in the South) agricultural cooperatives are a 
case of economic success, leading Brazilian exports of agricultural goods. Paraná has 80 
agricultural cooperatives, which account for 55% of agricultural GDP of Paraná. Agricultural 
cooperatives are major players also in the broiler business. From a list of 25 largest chicken 
meat exporters, in 2009, six of them were cooperatives, of which four are from the state of 
Paraná (Abef, 2009). There is a significant market concentration in the broiler industry of 
Paraná, with a high participation of cooperatives among the largest slaughterhouses. 
Second, agricultural cooperatives in the south of Brazil experienced in the last two decades 
similar developments as agricultural cooperatives in North Europe. They went through a 
process of vertical integration towards the consumer markets, operating in the processing, 
retailing and branding stages of the chain. Like most cooperatives in Paraná, the studied 
cooperative - Lar - was founded in the 1960s by a small number of farmers. Until the 1980s it 
was commercializing soy and wheat. In the 1980s it began with a diversification process, 
starting to produce soy oil, building an animal feed unit, establishing its first supermarkets, 
and setting up its transport fleet. Similar to other agricultural cooperatives in Brazil, Lar was 
forced to reorganize and set new focuses in the early 1990s because of the increasingly 
competitive market. From 1998, Lar built processing units for hogs, broilers and vegetables. 
In the broiler, vegetables and soy businesses, Lar operates in all stages of the value chain: 
coordinating production and selling of inputs, crop and animal production at the farm level, 
processing and distribution in wholesale and retail. In the case of broilers, more than 80% of 
the production is sold in international markets. 
The 1990s were characterized by the administrative modernization of Lar, with the 
introduction of practices such as strategic planning, reducing managerial costs, and placing 
emphasis on business performance. Lar was ranked in 1990 for the first time among the 500 
biggest companies in the country, in terms of turnover, and the fifth largest agricultural firm 
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in the south of Brazil (Marschall, 2009). In 2012, Lar’s turnover was of 894 million dollars 
placing the cooperative in the 316
th
 position in the ranking of biggest companies in the 
country, in terms of turnover. 
Third, southern Brazilian agricultural cooperatives, which have shown to be economically 
successful, continue being traditional in the sense of ownership and control rights (Costa et 
al., 2013). In Brazil, ownership rights are defined by federal law 5764/71, which closely 
follows traditional cooperative principles. Different from North American, North European, 
and Oceanian cooperatives, where the most common model is of complete separation of 
decision control from decision management functions (Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013), and 
management has been delegated to professionals who are appointed by the Board of 
Directors, in Brazilian cooperatives the Chief Executive Officer is usually also the president 
of Board.  
1.4 Research topics  
Structural changes in agri-food markets have led to a greater need for vertical coordination in 
value chains. The attempt to organize the participating farmers and firms along the food value 
chain generates transactional risks and coordination costs in the relationship between 
agricultural cooperative and farmer-member. Most theory on cooperatives stemming from 
organizational economics overlooks the importance of strengthening commitment and 
reducing cognitive heterogeneity in order to reduce those costs and risks. Moreover, the 
organizational economics perspective on cooperatives often neglects the role community and 
democracy mechanisms which, besides market and hierarchy mechanisms, may be used in 
governing the member-cooperative relationship. Therefore, the first research topic of this 
thesis is about the mechanisms for governing the member-cooperative relationship, and how 
they affect transactional risks and coordination costs. 
As quality requirements from downstream customers become stricter, cooperatives also have 
to strictly coordinate the transactions with their suppliers, their members, accordingly. 
Strengthening vertical coordination might be necessary for a customer-orientated strategy. It 
is important that members of an agricultural cooperative are committed to customer 
orientation; otherwise vertical coordination can be costly. Member commitment prevents side 
selling, in particular, and free-riding behaviour in general. In other words, commitment 
supports collective action. The second research topic is on the disentangling of commitment 
into collective action and customer orientation and on the implications of the four governance 
mechanisms - market, hierarchy, community and democracy - for both types of commitment.  
When cooperatives become larger and/or more diverse in their activities, and when different 
activities of the cooperative cater to different groups of members, membership heterogeneity 
may become a problem (Hansmann, 1996; Fulton and Giannakas, 2001). The basic 
assumption in most of the literature on the impact of member heterogeneity on the process 
and outcomes of decision-making is that farmers pursue individual or subgroup interests when 
participating in the decision-making of the cooperative. If members primarily pursue 
18 
 
individual economic interests, there might be a relationship between the economic reasons for 
becoming a member (and maintaining membership) and the motivation to participate in the 
governance of the cooperative. If the assumption that members pursue individual interests 
when participating in the governance of the cooperative is correct, one should expect an 
empirically observable correlation between economic motivation for association and 
participation in the governance of a cooperative. The third research topic is about the 
economic motivations for association as drivers of participation in the governance of a 
cooperative.  
Fulton (1995) questions whether cooperatives can adapt to a rapidly changing environment 
characterized by technological change and industrialization of agriculture. However, a higher 
degree of centralized decision-making enables cooperatives to define and effectively apply 
quality norms for their supply, control the quality of delivered products, monitor members’ 
production processes and, on the limit, exclude a non-complying member of further 
deliveries. On the one hand, cooperatives may be mimicking Investor-Owned Firms (IOFs) in 
applying more hierarchical coordination mechanisms. On the other hand, cooperatives have 
unique organizational characteristics that could provide them with competitive advantage, 
such as the tight relationship between members and cooperative, which may enable less costly 
coordination of the transaction (Sykuta and Cook, 2001). The fourth research topic is, 
therefore, about the differences in quality performance between a cooperative and an IOF, 
and whether these differences can be explained by relationship characteristics. 
1.5 Methodological approach 
The empirical foundation of this thesis lies in one large multi-product cooperative from 
Brazil. With the exception of Chapter 2, which is conceptual and has as its main purpose the 
development of propositions, Chapters 3 to 5 are based on a survey among the members of 
cooperative Lar. Therefore, the main methodological approach is quantitative. 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are based on data collected, between December of 2010 and April of 
2011, through a questionnaire distributed among 148 members of the cooperative. The 
questionnaire used a five point Likert scale of importance or agreement for the constructs 
commitment and for the four governance mechanisms - market, hierarchy, community and 
democracy – and for participation. Since the type of commodity was expected to influence our 
dependent variables, a non-proportional stratified random sample was taken from broiler, 
vegetables and soybeans producers in seven (of the eleven) towns.  
In Chapter 3 data are analyzed with separate Principle Component Analyses (PCA) for 
member commitment and for the governance mechanisms variables, and with an Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression to test the relationships between governance mechanisms and 
member commitment. In Chapter 4 a multinomial logit regression was undertaken for the 
different categories of participation.  
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Chapter 5 deals with the difference between a cooperative and an IOF in their relationship 
with broiler producers. From our sample of members of the cooperative, only the 55 members 
who were broiler producers would answer the questions of Part 2 of the survey. The same 
questions in Part 2 of the questionnaire were presented to 42 IOF suppliers between April of 
2011 and June 2011. The data analysis of this study was done with nonparametric tests that 
compared the conditions of being an IOF supplier or a member-supplier of the cooperative. 
1.6 Thesis outline 
The structure of the thesis is described in Figure 1. In Chapter 2 we propose a conceptual 
framework to understanding governance in cooperatives. We go beyond the transaction by 
focusing on the transaction relationship and we add community and democracy mechanisms 
to market and hierarchy. Moreover, we propose that these mechanisms not only have a role in 
affecting commitment, and thereby transactional risks, but also in affecting cognitive 
heterogeneity, and thereby coordination costs.  
We address the mechanisms used by the cooperative to govern the member-cooperative 
relationship and their effect on commitment, in Chapter 3. We empirically disentangle two 
types of commitment, commitment to collective action and commitment to customer-oriented 
strategy, and assess the effect of market, hierarchy, community and democracy mechanisms 
on both types. 
In Chapter 4 we address the issue of participation. We first categorize participation into four 
types - passive, occasional supporters, involved pro-active. Second, we elect a number of 
motivations for continued membership to assess whether they also have a role in driving 
participation in the General Assembly and in any board or committee. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 we start describing the broiler industry in Brazil and compare quality 
performance of cooperatives and IOFs. Data collected from 97 broiler suppliers of one 
cooperative and two IOF’s were used to understand whether relationship characteristics are 
significantly different between the two conditions. Then we explore the potential of a number 
of relationship characteristics that could explain quality performance. 
We present the main conclusions and the discussion and added value of putting these four 
research topics together in Chapter 6, where we also present possible institutional and policy 
implications and suggestions for further research. 
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2. Decomposing the governance of the member-cooperative relationship 
2.1 Introduction 
Food and agricultural commodity markets have undergone tremendous changes in the past 
decades (Reardon and Barrett 2000; Swinnen and Maertens 2007). Supermarkets have 
become major actors in the domestic food value chain worldwide (Reardon et al. 2003), and 
private food standards have become increasingly important in response to consumers’ 
concerns about food safety, quality and the socio-economic and environmental conditions of 
production (Henson and Reardon, 2005). Moreover, agricultural products, previously traded 
as standardized commodities, are increasingly valued for specific traits and are differentiated 
according to their inherent quality attributes (Hobbs and Young 2000). Thus, quality has 
become one of the main factors influencing the governance of food value chains, leading to 
more vertical coordination. Previous studies indicate that though increasing vertical 
coordination is ensuring more value creation for all involved actors, it is also increasing their 
interdependency. These changes in the agri-food value chains have also implications for 
agricultural cooperatives, which need to adapt their operations and standards to the new 
requirements of national and international customers. 
There are two types of challenges when organizing the participation of farmers and firms 
along the food value chain. The first is cooperation among the different actors with potentially 
conflicting interests (Granovetter, 1985; Williamson, 1975). The second challenge is 
coordination of activities among the different actors (Gulati et al, 2005). These challenges can 
be understood in terms of reducing transaction costs, which can generally be represented in 
terms of two major components, transactional risks and coordination costs (Grover and 
Malhotra, 2003). Transactional risks, or exchange hazards, relate to the potential opportunistic 
behavior of the contract parties. Their origin is in the conflicting interests in a transaction, 
thus can be understood as costs that arise with the potential of opportunistic behaviour. These 
costs have also been called “appropriation concerns” (Gulati and Singh, 1998). They include 
the risk that other parties in the transaction will shirk their agreed upon responsibilities. For 
instance, the farmer might deliver a product with an inferior quality if it knows the processor 
is not able to identify and measure the violation (Raynaud et al., 2005), or the risk of hold-up 
when specific investments have been made by the processing firm (Williamson, 1991).  
Coordination costs arise when actors are unaware that their actions are interdependent and 
when there is uncertainty about the others’ actions (Gulati and Singh, 1998; Gulati et al, 
2005). A firm must process information, take decisions taking new information into account 
and communicate these decisions, and all these actions are costly. Even if all appropriation 
concerns are addressed, that is, in the case of joint interest, coordination problems may still 
remain (Hodgson, 2004; Gulati et al., 2005). In the case of a supplier-processor transaction, 
coordination costs include costs of exchanging information on products, price, availability, 
demand, as well as the costs of adapting the quality of the product or production process 
(Grover and Malhotra, 2003). The costs of information exchange, and thereby coordination 
costs, are increased when people interpret information differently. 
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Reducing the risk of opportunistic behavior and the costs of information exchange are an 
important challenge for every processing firm in food value chains consisting of independent 
suppliers. Agricultural cooperatives, however, are more affected than other organizations by 
transactional risks and coordination costs because they are collective action organizations 
(thus pursuing a common interest among the members), and they have to combine members’ 
interests with the interests of their customers (thus building vertical coordination throughout 
the supply chain from farmer to customer (Feng and Hendrikse, 2008; Bijman, 2009; Bijman, 
2010; Bijman et al., 2011). 
An agricultural cooperative has been defined as an inter-organizational configuration 
consisting of two types of economic entities: independent farmers as the members, and a 
jointly owned processing/marketing company as the cooperative firm (Hendrikse and Bijman, 
2002). In other words, a cooperative consists of farmers who pool some resources at the 
processing firm level while maintaining autonomy at the farm level (Ménard, 2007). This 
complex organizational structure implies that the cooperative faces both bilateral transactional 
risks at the level of the processing firm, and a systemic risk of free-riding behavior by 
members. In efficiently dealing with these risks, cooperatives depend on the commitment of 
their members to supply the right quantity and quality of agricultural products. 
Cooperatives cannot directly decide on member commitment. Neither can they directly decide 
on the degree of uncertainty regarding the interdependency of members’ actions. However, 
cooperatives have various governance mechanisms available for managing the transaction 
relationship between the processing firm and the independent farmer-members. Different 
governance mechanisms have different effect on transactional efficiency by reducing 
transactional risks and coordination costs (Mesquita and Brush, 2008). 
The objective of this chapter is to propose a conceptual framework on how different 
governance mechanisms determine, individually and collectively, transactional efficiency by 
affecting transactional risks and coordination costs. We pose that the relationship between 
governance mechanisms and transactional risks is mediated by the parties’ willingness to 
sacrifice short term gains for the sake of the relationship, here called commitment, and that 
the relationship between governance mechanisms and coordination costs is mediated by the 
variety in parties’ interpretation frameworks, here called cognitive heterogeneity. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2, we present our two major 
assumptions, which are that both commitment and cognitive heterogeneity affect transaction 
costs. Thus, we present the concepts of commitment and cognitive heterogeneity and how 
they relate to transactional risks and coordination costs. In Section 2.3, we differentiate 
governance structures from governance mechanisms, and describe the mechanisms used by 
the cooperative to governance the member-cooperative relationship. In Section 2.4, we 
develop a number of propositions on the relation between each governance mechanism and 
both types of commitment, while in Section 2.5 we develop a number of propositions on the 
relation between each governance mechanism and cognitive heterogeneity. Finally, we 
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summarize the main ideas, discuss the main contributions and put forward a number of topics 
for further research in Section 2.6. 
2.2 Commitment, cognitive heterogeneity and transaction costs  
Markets are imperfect, and therefore transactions are costly. The Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) framework begins with this general observation. Assuming bounded rationality and 
opportunism leads to TCE’s key message: characteristics of a transaction determine the 
magnitude of exchange hazards, which determine the magnitude of the direct transaction costs 
of crafting safeguards, monitoring and enforcing the agreement, and the indirect transaction 
costs of failure to invest in productive assets, which determine the efficiency of a particular 
governance structure (Williamson, 1996).  
2.2.1 Transactional risks and commitment  
The “willingness of trading partners to exert effort on behalf of the relationship” (Mohr & 
Spekman, 1994: 137), which might be understood as commitment (Joshi and Stump, 1999), is 
central to sustaining any stable arrangement. We define member commitment as the 
willingness to make a sacrifice to contribute to the organization’s success (Solinger et al., 
2008) and to the long-term stability of the relationship (Joshi and Stump, 1999). 
While TCE considers the effect of governance mechanisms on opportunistic behaviour, 
through their control of the individual’s scope of action, it does not consider their effect on the 
individuals’ opportunistic attitude (Goshal and Moran, 1996: 20). However, opportunism and 
commitment, understood as attitudes, might be open to management. We do not consider 
members of a cooperative as benevolent cooperators, nor as necessarily opportunistic agents. 
Member commitment to the cooperative is affected by how the member-cooperative 
relationship is governed. In inter-organizational configurations where the transactions 
between the parties are more frequent and the relationships are more stable than in the spot 
market, it is the quality of the relationship (Goshal and Moran, 1996) the appropriate unit of 
analysis (Nooteboom, 2004). Our unit of analysis is, therefore, the transaction relationship 
rather than the transaction per se.  
There are two potential problems regarding the transaction relationship between members and 
cooperative firm that need to be distinguished: a multilateral problem of free riding and a 
bilateral problem of the inability to properly measure the effort of the individual member. In 
cooperatives the most fundamental transactional risk is a systemic risk, namely free-riding 
(Cook, 1995). This multilateral problem becomes more severe when the social group becomes 
larger and more heterogeneous (Ostrom, 2000). Members of an agricultural cooperative may 
choose to sell their farm products to alternative buyers when those offer a better price. This 
entails idle capacity and thus economic costs for the cooperative. Furthermore, in the current 
context of private quality standards, members of an agricultural cooperative have a common 
interest to deliver products complying with quality requirements and build up a collective 
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reputation through the cooperative. However, individually, they might not be willing to 
assume the implied costs (Cechin et al., 2013).  
That is why, in cooperative studies, commitment has been defined as “the preference of 
cooperative members to patronize a cooperative even when the cooperative’s price or service 
is not as good as that provided by an IOF” (Fulton, 1999: 423). We define this type of 
commitment as commitment to collective action, which is internal to the relationship among 
members, and between members and cooperative. In this sense, committed members are less 
likely to exit the cooperative, or to sell outside when alternative buyers offer better prices or 
services. If the risk of free-riding is considered as a systemic transactional risk, then 
members’ commitment to collective action has the important function of reducing this 
systemic risk. 
The second potential problem regarding the transaction relationship between members and 
cooperative firm is the bilateral problem of the inability to properly measure the effort of the 
individual member at the farm level. In the context of differentiated products and high 
interdependencies among economic actors in a value chain, the extent to which the individual 
member puts effort in improving quality at the farm level is an increasingly important 
transactional risk. A more customer-oriented strategy implies less freedom for members at the 
farm level (Bijman et al., 2011). However, the individual farmer might shirk the agreement on 
the quality attributes, particularly if they are related to the production process in addition to 
those intrinsic attributes of the delivered farm products. This bilateral transactional risk 
between supplier and buyer is more close to that which TCE focuses on.  
It is important that the individual member is committed to the customer-orientated strategy 
with its quality requirements. We define this type of commitment as a commitment to 
customer-orientation, which is external to the relationship with cooperative. That is, 
commitment to customer orientation is an attitude towards the requirements of other actors in 
the chain. In this sense, member commitment to customer orientation reduces the 
transactional risk of members not complying with quality requirements.  
Overcoming the free-rider problem is, therefore, at the core of the collective action dilemma 
in cooperatives, and it is argued that the glue of commitment mitigates this problem (Fulton, 
1999). Furthermore, given a situation of interdependency in food value chain, commitment 
reduces transactional risks in the bilateral dealings between the cooperative and its members, 
since it reduces the likelihood of members’ shirking in the production of quality attributes. In 
sum, the higher the level of member commitment, the lower will be the transactional risks 
between cooperative firm and its suppliers.  
2.2.2 Cognitive heterogeneity and coordination costs 
Following Nooteboom (2000) we define cognitive heterogeneity as differences in peoples’ 
interpretation, understanding and evaluation of the world. Assuming categories of cognition 
are constructed from action in the world, heterogeneity results from different life paths and 
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different environments people develop. Nooteboom et al. (2007) have approached this in 
terms of ‘cognitive distance’ between people.  
Gathering and processing information, making decisions that take this information into 
account, and communicating these decisions are at the core of the coordination tasks. In case 
of strong interdependencies between transactions in food chains, more information exchange 
is needed. The lack of knowledge about the interactions between different actors’ decisions is 
an important constraint on coordination. Problems inherent in language use are also 
constraints for coordination. Therefore, a common ground (or low cognitive heterogeneity) 
among people enables coordination because it allows people to accurately anticipate and 
interpret each other’s actions. A shared cognitive framework consists of mutual, common or 
joint knowledge, beliefs and suppositions (Clark, 1996) and it includes codes, classifications 
and categories (Gulati and Puranam, 2011). 
When there is strong cognitive heterogeneity, that is, when people interpret information 
differently, the implementation of interdependent activities between procuring and supplying 
units can involve costly and time consuming negotiations (Gulati et al., 2005). The more 
dissimilar is the cognitive framework among members, the more information exchange is 
needed to make sure that a task is understood. The more homogeneity in cognitive 
frameworks among the membership, the more likely individuals are able to anticipate each 
other’s actions, thereby minimizing the need for communication while still enabling 
coordination (Gulati and Puranam, 2011). 
Although, strictly, a cooperative is not one firm but an inter-organizational configuration, 
membership within the cooperative might lead to the creation of shared understanding of the 
task environment and the interdependence it embodies (Weick, 1995), as well as shared 
values and norms that serve to make the actions of others more predictable (Kogut and 
Zander, 1996). A shared cognitive framework enables actors to follow rules in an automatic 
and non-calculative way, as if it was the ‘program’ or ‘software’ of their own mind (Hofstede, 
1991) established through socialization and orientation. It reduces cognitive complexity by 
setting a frame of knowledge ‘out of discussion’ within which current action problems can be 
considered and solved (Grandori, 1997). The lower the cognitive heterogeneity among 
members, the more confident one member is about how others will behave and how one 
should behave in a given situation. This leads to lower coordination costs in the dealings 
between cooperative firm and suppliers. 
2.3 Cooperative governance structure and its mechanisms 
2.3.1 Governance structures and mechanisms 
Transaction cost economics has been an influential approach to governance. Initially only two 
generic governance structures were distinguished: market and hierarchy (Williamson, 1975). 
Later the idea of a hybrid governance structure was introduced as if it were an intermediate 
form in the continuum between market and hierarchy (Williamson, 1991). Powell (1990) 
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proposed that network form was a form distinct from the market and the hierarchy, as it used 
reciprocity norms and reputation as coordination mechanisms. 
Several authors, however, have emphasized that governance structures use a combination of 
different governance mechanisms to align interests and actions. Ouchi (1980) distinguished 
between the mechanisms market, bureaucracy and clan. “Markets, bureaucracies, and clans 
are therefore three distinct mechanisms which may be present in differing degrees, in any real 
organization” (Ouchi, 1980: 132). Bradach and Eccles (1989), for example, emphasized that 
any governance structure combines, in different degrees, the instruments of price, authority 
and trust. Hennart (1993) argues that it is necessary to distinguish between methods for 
organizing transactions (hierarchy and the price system), each with particular costs and 
benefits, and institutions (firms and markets). According to him, although markets rely 
predominantly on prices and firms rely predominantly on hierarchy, there is not a one-to-one 
correspondence between prices and markets or between hierarchy and firms.   
Grandori and Soda (1995) have argued that inter-firm networks are neither an entirely 
different ‘third’ pure type of governance with respect to pure markets and pure hierarchies, 
nor ‘intermediate’ hybrids combining some traits of markets and some of hierarchies. Inter-
firm networks are institutions employing a wide range of coordination mechanisms. 
According to Grandori and Furnari (2008), empirically observed governance structures 
embody varying mixes of four ideal-type mechanisms (elements): market, hierarchy, 
community and democracy. Market relates to high-powered incentives and the capacity of 
coordinating action with minimal communication. Hierarchy implies predictability, 
transparency and accountability through formal rules, procedures and evaluation systems. 
Community means infusing cohesion and homogenizing interests through knowledge and 
value sharing. Finally, democracy mechanisms infuse voice and integrate different interests 
through diffusion of ownership, decision and representation rights. 
2.3.2 Cooperative governance structure 
When it comes to categorizing cooperatives, organizational economics has largely focused on 
the attributes that distinguish cooperatives from markets and hierarchies. Ménard (2007) 
characterizes cooperative as a hybrid governance structure, in which participants pool 
resources, the cooperative firm contracts with its members, and members compete among 
each other, maintaining autonomous property and decision rights regarding most assets while 
sharing some strategic resources.  
A hybrid governance structure, however, is not necessarily an intermediate between market 
and hierarchy (Makadok and Coff, 2009). Chaddad (2012) argues that the cooperative blends 
particular market mechanisms with hierarchy mechanisms for particular dimensions and thus 
may be viewed as a distinct hybrid mode rather than an intermediate between market and 
hierarchy governance structures. Extending Chaddad and Cook’s (2004) positioning of 
alternative cooperative ownership models in a continuum between ‘traditional’ cooperatives 
and investor-owned firms, Chaddad (2012) considers other governance attributes besides 
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ownership and places market at one end of the spectrum. This is an advance in disentangling 
governance mechanisms within cooperatives. Even if new generation cooperatives exhibit 
formal authority, administrative control, common staff, coordinated adaptation, and high 
degrees of formalization and centralization, which are all hierarchy mechanisms, they still 
retain some market mechanisms including separated ownership, high powered incentives, and 
autonomous adaptation. More importantly, Chaddad (2012) recognizes that democratic 
control is a unique mechanism adopted by the cooperative governance structure that cannot be 
placed in a market-hierarchy continuum, and that embeddedness in social interactions often 
results in greater confidence in the predictability of the transaction partner’s actions. If the 
members of a cooperative form a social community with strong ties, informal coordination 
and control mechanisms can work as ‘lubricants’, mitigating conflicts of interest and reducing 
transaction costs. 
Organizational economics, however, has largely overlooked the features that give the 
cooperative governance structure a unique form: its democratic management model in which 
each member has one vote, and its bidimensionality as a social community and an enterprise 
(Bonus, 1986; Borgen, 2004; Valentinov, 2004). Nilsson et al. (2012) approach the social 
community aspect by providing a social capital framework for understanding why 
cooperatives often suffer from problems in the current market environments. However, 
democracy and community mechanisms have not yet been, so far, integrated in a Transaction 
Costs Economics framework, next to market and hierarchy mechanisms. Following Grandori 
(1997) and Grandori and Furnari (2008) we shift the level of analysis from the description and 
categorization of the governance structures to the modeling of the constitutive governance 
mechanisms, by analyzing the effect of different mechanisms on member commitment and 
cognitive heterogeneity, which we assume impacts transactional risks and coordination costs. 
Using Grandori and Furnari’s (2008) framework for understanding organizations, we 
conjecture that agricultural cooperatives are a good example of organizations that combine the 
four ideal mechanisms: market, hierarchy, community and democracy. Agricultural 
cooperatives are formally democratic in decision-making and ownership. Farmers always 
remain independent from the cooperative firm responding at some degree to market signals. 
Hierarchy is difficult to conceptualize in cooperatives, since, on the one hand, members are 
the formal owners of the cooperative firm (thus hierarchy ‘flows’ from members to 
managers), and on the other hand managers tell the members what to do regarding supply 
operations (thus, here hierarchy ‘flows’ from manager to member).  In this chapter, we are 
only interested in hierarchy mechanisms flowing from managers to farmer-members. Finally, 
at least when they are formed, agricultural cooperatives are tight communities with strong 
social ties among its members. Almost all cooperatives start on a small scale, with a small 
number of founders living in the same village. The task of establishing a jointly-owned firm 
was a risky one because everybody would then be dependent on each other. If one or a few of 
the members were shirking, the entire community would suffer. Therefore, the level of social 
capital had to be high (Nilsson et al., 2012). In Table 1, we present the control and 
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coordination principles of each governance mechanism, relating them to some practices in 
cooperatives. 
 
Table 2.1 Mechanisms, principles and practices 
Governance 
mechanisms  
Principles of 
control 
Principles of 
coordination 
Practices in Cooperatives 
Market High powered 
monetary incentives 
Autonomous decisions 
based on minimal 
communication 
Competitive prices; pay for performance 
(productivity or quality); premium for 
member loyalty 
Hierarchy  Authority to inflict 
penalty or sanction 
Command and 
predictability 
Formal rules and standards; formal 
contracts with members; monitoring 
members at farm level; input control 
Community  Homogenizing 
interests through 
shared moral norms 
Homogenizing 
judgements through a 
shared cognitive 
framework 
Competence sharing committees; 
leadership training committees; family 
involvement; diffusion of Coop 
ideology and values 
Democracy  Integrating different 
interests through 
‘voice’ giving 
Integrating different 
judgements in decision 
making 
Opportunities for member participation 
in decision-making; opportunities for 
member representation; opportunities 
for member suggestions and complaints 
Source: adapted from Grandori and Furnari (2008) 
 
2.4 Governance mechanisms affecting commitment 
Governance mechanisms have a function of aligning interests and generating credible 
commitments, as most of the research in Organizational Economics has emphasized (Ouchi, 
1980; Bradach and Eccles, 1989; Hennart, 1993; Williamson, 1991; 1996; Ménard, 2004; 
Maste,n 2006; Masten and Prufer, 2011). This cooperation-enhancing function of the 
governance of any collaboration (Gulati et al., 2012) is about reducing the risks associated 
with opportunistic behaviour. In this section we will develop a number of propositions 
regarding the effect of each governance mechanism on commitment. Since member 
commitment in agricultural cooperatives has been disentangled into two dimensions - 
collective action and customer-orientation -, we will put forward propositions for both. 
Market 
The market mechanism is here understood as a high powered incentive system rather than “a 
completely defined governance form” (Grandori, 1997). It includes the use of prices as 
informational devices that signal the direction of the autonomous adjustments of production 
decisions. Participants take independent decisions about their own investments and activities, 
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mainly based on the incentives they receive, that is, decision making is decentralized. Pay-for-
performance schemes that reward producers according to their efficiency and/or quality are 
market practices because they work as high powered incentives. Monetary incentives induce 
reliable behavior from members, where actions are elicited by rewards (Nooteboom, 2007).  
The market mechanism individualizes the relationship between cooperative and members 
allowing for some degree of autonomous adaptation. However, in cooperatives with strong 
social ties among members who are intrinsically motivated, monetary incentives might 
damage the quality of exchange outcomes by discouraging individuals’ voluntary willingness 
to cooperate. It has been argued that commitment is reduced when extrinsic rewards are 
increased and the weakening of commitment is not restored even after the extrinsic rewards 
are taken away (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988). Some external interventions might damage 
the quality of exchange outcomes by discouraging individuals’ voluntary willingness to 
cooperate, that is, member commitment. The effect is especially important when monetary 
incentives are applied to an activity that has been intrinsically motivated before, possibly 
reducing the total available motivation to engage in the activity. As the outcome, engagement 
in the activity might well be reduced rather than increased (Frey, 1997; Frey and Jegen, 
2001). Therefore, if monetary incentives are used to foster member compliance to an 
agreement or even loyalty to the cooperative, they might have counterproductive effects if 
they weaken commitment. Because commitment is the attitude towards sacrificing short term 
economic benefits for the sake of the relationship and of the organization’s success, and not 
the actual loyal behavior, we can still pose that the market mechanism weakens commitment 
to collective action. 
P1a: The market mechanism negatively affects members’ commitment to 
collective action  
On the other hand, it might happen that when the membership of the cooperative becomes 
larger and more heterogeneous, and social ties become weaker, farmers begin to require more 
of the market mechanisms to be committed to the cooperative. Also if members have fewer 
opportunities to influence the cooperative’s decisions, through informal or formal processes, 
they might request more of the market mechanism in their individual transactions (Bijman et 
al., 2011). More importantly, market mechanisms are a good way to align members’ interests 
with a customer oriented strategy. Members need to feel that their effort to maintain or elevate 
the quality of their products and production processes as a response to customer demands is 
being rewarded. 
P1b: The market mechanism positively affects members’ commitment to 
customer orientation 
Hierarchy 
The hierarchy mechanism is understood as the execution of authority, in the sense of decision 
and/or control rights exercised legitimately by a central agent (Grandori, 1997), rather than 
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the centralization of ownership and residual rewards rights within one party (Coase 1937; 
Williamson 1975). Hierarchy as the consolidation of ownership does not imply that the 
dominant coordination mechanism should be authority. The ability to use authority as a 
mechanism is not limited to intra-firm settings, since authority can also be used between 
organizations by means of contractual provisions, which  essentially "produce  the effects of 
hierarchies" (Stinchcombe 1985, p. 165). Authority implies the allocation of resources 
through formal rules and plans but it varies in degree of formalization and centralization of 
decision-making. As put by Ménard (2004; 2007), authority on some decisions may be with 
the cooperative board of directors and managers, when the membership has delegated to these 
governing bodies specific rights such as coordinating activities, allocating resources, and 
solving disputes. When we study the degree of authority in cooperatives we focus on the 
strength of surveillance and fiat used by the cooperative board of directors and managers to 
promote certain types of behaviours and deter others with member-suppliers. 
Research on intra-organizational relationships has shown that too much authority weakens the 
incentives of subordinates to invest in relationship-specific assets (Williamson, 1985) and in 
acquiring information needed to make informed decisions (Aghion and Tirole, 1997). Even if 
sanctions can promote certain types of behaviours and deter others, surveillance and fiat 
might have negative effect on individual attitudes toward the specific behaviour that is 
required (Enzle and Anderson, 1993). As argued by Goshal and Moran (1996), hierarchical 
control does not necessarily decrease opportunistic behaviour. In fact it might have precisely 
the opposite effect. When the relationship between principal (manager) and agent (farmer) is 
personal, the agent perceives increased monitoring as an indication of distrust and this induces 
him or her to reduce effort (Frey, 1993). 
Hierarchical mechanisms do not seem to combine well with the democratic and participatory 
norms in cooperatives, as they seem inherently contrary to cooperative principles such as 
voluntary membership, joint interests, and participatory decision-making. Strengthening the 
hierarchy mechanism in a cooperative may eventually increase members’ opportunistic 
attitude because, first, farmers do not want to be controlled (Hogeland, 2006), and second, 
members might perceive that they are not trusted to behave appropriately. Therefore, we 
expect that the more hierarchical is the cooperative relationship with its member-suppliers, the 
more the latter will develop a negative attitude towards their cooperative. 
P2a: The hierarchy mechanism negatively affects members’ commitment to 
collective action  
Advantages of hierarchy, compared to the market mechanism, are a higher capacity to control 
performance of the other party in the transaction and to mitigate the costs associated with the 
holdup problem that arises when one party in the transaction has non-redeployable assets. In 
other words, it facilitates the control of opportunism when specific investments were made. 
The cooperative needs to safeguard its investments at the processing (firm) level, and it could 
do so by introducing more of the hierarchy mechanism, such as production contracts for 
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individual members or even excluding members that are not able to comply with the standards 
that are needed to protect the brand (Bijman, 2009). 
Given a situation of interdependency in the food value chain, and the increasing importance of 
private quality standards, the cooperative is seeking more control over members’ inputs, 
outputs and production processes. Hierarchy mechanisms can be considered as a guarantee for 
members, because the latter know what to expect from the cooperative. Formalization 
represents not only duties but also rights, such as the cooperative’s commitment to reward the 
quality of delivered products. If members feel their investments are more safeguarded with 
more control and formalization, they will recognize that following consumer trends and 
delivering high quality will determine the value of their production in the long-run. Moreover, 
if the cooperative has the authority to act unilaterally and decisively (Masten, 2006) upon 
members’ production processes in response to unfolding events in the market, members might 
have no option but to commit to the cooperative’s customer-oriented strategy. 
P2b: The hierarchy mechanism positively affects members’ commitment to 
customer orientation 
Community 
A community is a social network in which people have repeated interactions, and where 
norms arise to coordinate their interaction (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Hayami, 2009). The 
frequency of interactions and presence of shared knowledge or interests of its members, are 
defining characteristics of a community (Masten and Prufer, 2011). Shared moral norms are 
informal rules that facilitate, motivate and govern joint action of concrete people with whom 
one shares common identity feelings (Coleman, 1988), as they substantiate the expectation 
that others will not behave opportunistically (Ostrom, 2000).  Cooperatives have been defined 
as social-capital-dependent organizations (Valentinov, 2004; Nilsson et al., 2012), because in 
addition to being an enterprise, the cooperative is a social community where trust, moral 
norms, beliefs and the internalization of cooperative values are important. 
While rational control based on information and the use of formal administrative mechanisms 
can limit deceptive behaviour, social control, based on the use of informal mechanisms to 
build motivation and commitment, can also limit deception (Ouchi, 1980). Furthermore, 
social control induces individuals to internalize values and goals of the organization and 
therefore it implies a change in attitudes. As recognized by Relational Exchange Theory 
(Macneil, 1978; Joshi and Stump, 1999), relational norms are a unique class of governance 
mechanism, based on internalization of moral norms that prescribe commitment in exchange 
relationships. 
As Hogeland (2006) indicates, without applying the term social capital, social networks based 
on norms of reciprocity and trust can be seen as the most essential asset of cooperatives, in 
comparison to the investor-owned firm (IOF). In fact, the strength of cooperatives in effecting 
coordination resides, in principle, in their tendency to involve lower information asymmetries 
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and greater trust in their relationships with farmers than would be the case with IOFs (Sykuta 
and Cook, 2001). The most important consequence of the community mechanism is to 
enhance members’ commitment to the cooperative, their generalized attitude towards serving 
and enhancing the organization’s interests (Solinger et al., 2008). We pose that the 
community mechanism positively affects members’ willingness to make a sacrifice for the 
sake of the continued relationship with the cooperative. 
P3a: The community mechanism positively affects members’ commitment to 
collective action 
However, there is also research showing that too much community governance might lead to 
sub-optimal results. There is a risk that members will be locked-in into a low innovative or 
inefficient situation. Cooperative members might be subject to the ‘paradox of embeddedness’ 
(Uzzi, 1997), which means that an organization (the farm) has difficulties to access new 
information and to learn new skills because it is too embedded in one network (the 
cooperative). For instance, if farmers trust only the community of members from the 
cooperative but do not trust other actors in the value chain, they might develop a negative 
attitude towards the cooperative’s customer-orientation. Successful vertical coordination in 
value chains requires complying with a number of quality requirements from customers. 
Therefore, a negative attitude towards downstream partners in the chains might result in 
member opportunistic behavior towards shifts in customer’s preferences and quality 
requirements. If members have strong social ties among the community of members and weak 
ties to other actors in the value chain, reinforcing community mechanisms might hinder 
members’ commitment to customer orientation. 
P3b: The community mechanism negatively affects members’ commitment to 
customer orientation  
Democracy 
Inter-firm arrangements and collective ventures as consortia, associations, partnerships and 
cooperatives, which have joint action interdependences, cannot be understood without looking 
at the democracy mechanism that is used to regulate collective action (Grandori, 1997). 
Equally distributed decision rights and ‘voice-giving’ procedures are typical ingredients of 
democratic governance, aimed at integrating different judgments and interests of multiple 
actors through representative devices (Harrison & Freeman, 2004). Democracy offers a 
simple, relatively verifiable criterion by which to judge the legitimacy of executive actions, 
namely, that decisions receive the explicit consent of designated individuals or groups before 
being implemented (Masten, 2006). Menard (2011) has shown, using a stylized case of a 
millers’ alliance, that members of a collective venture endorse a voting procedure to exercise 
their control rights. Despite the uneven distribution of shares across members of the alliance, 
decisions are made according to a ‘one member, one vote’ rule, like in most cooperatives. 
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Recent theories of political governance view the establishment of credible commitments as 
the principal function of democratic governance (Masten, 2006). Fenwick (2005) argues that 
increasing employees’ voice, i.e., the possibility to complain about a relationship and try to 
work things out, would lead to greater level of organizational commitment, which would 
further improve decisions’ implementation rates and reduce dysfunctional behavior of 
employees. We assume this equally applies to member-cooperative relationships. In 
cooperatives, the principle of democratic member control assumes that members will 
participate in setting policy and giving broad direction to cooperative activities in a way in 
which no member has greater voice than any other member. It has been shown that the 
perception among members that they are participating, that they are given ‘voice’, is likely to 
strengthen their commitment to the cooperative (Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009). A 
participatory decision framework and the opportunity to voice complaints, concerns and ideas 
strengthen the development of common interests, and this is probably the greatest advantage 
of the democracy mechanism. 
P4a: The democracy mechanism positively affects members’ commitment to 
collective action  
Members are often interested in selling all of their products to the cooperative, no matter the 
quality, whereas the cooperative puts in place a strict quality control system to meet buyers’ 
requirements. Democratic decision-making in cooperatives might hinder value chain 
coordination if the latter involves innovation and adjustments to stricter quality requirements. 
In this type of decision-making structure the majority rules. However, the majority is usually 
rather conservative, that is, opposing change and refusing to agree to volume contracts and 
rigorous quality standards (Bijman et al., 2011). It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that the 
more members can voice complaints and concerns, and the more they perceive the 
cooperative as a democratic organization in decision-making the less they are willing to lose 
productive autonomy at the farm level and commit themselves to customers’ demands.  
P4b: The democracy mechanism negatively affects members’ commitment to 
customer orientation 
In Figure 1 the conceptual model relating governance mechanisms and both types of 
commitment – to collective action and to customer orientation - is presented and the eight 
arrows stand for the propositions that were put forward in this section. 
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 Figure 2.1 Governance mechanisms and commitment 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
2.5 Governance mechanisms affecting cognitive heterogeneity 
Governance mechanisms also have a cognitive function (Grandori, 1997; Nooteboom, 2004). 
In fact, a stream of research in Organizational Economics has considered the idea of 
institutionally-sustained shared cognitive frameworks a central point in explaining ‘the nature 
of the firm’ (Kogut and Zander, 1996; Nooteboom, 2000; 2004; Hodgson, 2004). Because of 
cognitive variety, “there is always greater or lesser cognitive distance between people” 
(Nooteboom, 2004, p.512). However, in order to achieve common goals in an organization, its 
members need a certain degree of shared perception, interpretations and values (Weick, 
1995). In this section we will develop a number of propositions regarding the effect of each 
governance mechanism on cognitive heterogeneity. 
Market 
The market has been conceived as a highly efficient mechanism for coordinating large 
systems of similar agents through structured quantified information available to everybody 
and without further communication (Hayek, 1945). The market mechanism allows actors to 
greatly simplify economic decisions through the use of a particular set of heuristics, thus, it is 
capable of economizing on bounded rationality (Grandori, 1997). However, the market 
mechanism limits the quality of information and availability of information on other actors 
(Grandori, 1997). Therefore, actions are not concerted and the market mechanism is not 
efficient in coordinated adaptation. Situations involving specific investments, interdependent 
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tasks, and the transmission of non-codified information would imply high transaction costs if 
the market mechanism was the only available. 
Agricultural cooperatives generally pay market prices to their members for the products 
delivered. Thus, the production activities of the farmer and the processing and marketing 
activities of the cooperative firm are to some extent coordinated through the price mechanism. 
Pay-for-performance schemes where the farmer receives a price according to the quantity and 
quality of delivered products, might have the effect of allocating too much of members’ 
attention to easily measured activities and efforts. From intra-organisational studies, we know 
that high-powered incentives allocate individual attention away from important, but hard to 
measure, asset values (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991). Therefore, despite being a simple 
coordination mechanism, we do not expect the market or the price system to build a shared 
cognitive framework. 
P5: The market mechanism preserves cognitive heterogeneity among members 
Hierarchy 
When interdependence increases in food value chains, the need for coordination also 
increases. This means more information needs to be exchanged and processed, and decision-
making becomes more dependent on constant information updates because of shifts in market 
circumstances or in customers’ quality requirements. It is necessary for the governing body of 
the cooperative to enhance the predictability of other’s actions, and to increase knowledge 
about how actions are interdependent (Thompson, 1967). The hierarchy mechanism implies a 
higher capacity to process information, to take this information into account in decision-
making and to communicate the decisions. A centralized decision-making body is able to use 
authority (Thompson, 1967) and standard operating procedures that allow quick decisions 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998) by clarifying decision-making procedures and anticipating issues 
before they arise (Stinchcombe, 1985).  
Because hierarchy allows the efficient transmission and processing of information as well as 
centralized decision-making, it definitely has its advantages. In terms of decision-making, 
ultimately autocrats have the authority to act unilaterally and decisively in response to 
unfolding events, in contrast to democracy (Masten, 2006). Authority and centralized 
decision-making allow a small group of individuals to be informed about and decide how 
different interdependent actors should behave. An authority can figure out the optimal pattern 
of actions by interdependent individuals, and simply direct them to take such actions through 
appropriately stated rules (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). The ability to give orders rather than 
to persuade reduces the levels of information exchange (Demsetz, 1988). Authority exercised 
in the form of widely known plans, rules, standards and procedures (Grant, 1996) and used to 
legitimize and widely propagate terminology (Arrow, 1974) contributes directly to reducing 
cognitive heterogeneity (Gulati and Puranam, 2011). 
  P6: The hierarchy mechanism reduces cognitive heterogeneity among members 
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Community 
An agricultural cooperative can be understood as a community of practice, since its members 
are a collection of people engaged in a common endeavour (Lave and Wenger 1991; Wenger 
and Snyder, 2000). They are not just a group of farmers having a contract with the same 
organization. The social group of cooperative members can be considered a community of 
practice because in the course of regular joint activity, the membership develops common 
ways of doing things, views, values, power relations and ways of talking. The cooperative 
engages its members in mutual sense-making about the collective organization, about their 
respective forms of participation, and about their orientation to other organizations and 
institutions around them (Eckert 2006). 
The community mechanism as a managerial instrument is about diffusing values and beliefs 
to create a common ground of understanding. Diffusing cooperative ideology, i.e., the set of 
ideas and values as expressed by cooperative principles is a practice which can be 
conceptualized as a community mechanism. Because ideologies may function as pre-
packaged units of interpretation (Jost et al., 2008), and the community mechanism aims at 
members’ internalization of specific values and beliefs, we expect that it builds a shared 
cognitive framework which reduces misunderstanding and allows for easier exchange of tacit 
knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1996). 
P7: The community mechanism reduces cognitive heterogeneity among members. 
Democracy  
In terms of informational requirements, the democracy mechanism, of which voting is a core 
practice, resembles the market mechanism since it involves “unilateral expected value 
maximizing decision-making over a set of well-defined alternatives” (Grandori, 1997, p.34). 
The point of democracy mechanisms is precisely to ensure that individuals with highly 
diverse ways of interpreting the world have the opportunity to express their views and to 
influence collective choices (Landemore, 2013). As this type of decision-making structure 
aims at integrating different interests and judgements, and gives members the possibility of 
‘voice’, i.e., to complain about the relationship with the cooperative and try to work things 
out, we expect it to hinder the building of a shared cognitive framework.  In this sense 
democracy preserves the diversity of cognition among people. 
P8: The democracy mechanism preserves cognitive heterogeneity among 
members. 
In Figure 2 the conceptual model relating governance mechanisms and cognitive 
heterogeneity is presented and the four arrows stand for the propositions that were put 
forward in this section. 
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Figure 2.2 Governance mechanisms and cognitive framework 
 
Source: own elaboration 
2.6 Conclusions and further research 
Summary 
Agricultural cooperatives face collective action challenges that are related to the 
predominance of strict private quality standards, the concentration of the retail sector, and the 
strong interdependencies in food value chains. These structural changes in agri-food markets 
have also resulted in new transactional risks in the member-cooperative relationship. If 
cooperatives are to follow customer-oriented strategies, member commitment to these 
strategies reduces the transactional risks of member shirking in quality compliance. 
Furthermore, upgrading quality implies coordinating interdependent activities, which, in turn, 
requires complex information exchange. To reduce the implied coordination costs, the 
agricultural cooperative might want to reduce cognitive heterogeneity among members. This 
common ground of values, beliefs and knowledge can prevent the need for additional (costly) 
communication.  
In this chapter we argued that both commitment and cognition are open to management. Four 
governance mechanisms affect commitment and cognitive heterogeneity. Moreover, in the 
context of food value chain interdependencies and customer orientation, there are two types of 
commitment, which are affected in different ways by the four governance mechanisms. If 
both commitment to collective action and commitment to customer orientation are enhanced, 
control is facilitated, while if cognitive heterogeneity is reduced coordination is facilitated. 
However, strong interdependencies and strict quality requirements in food value chains 
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generate a number of trade-offs between these mechanisms. While market and hierarchy 
might be needed to strengthen commitment to customer orientation, and thereby reduce short 
term transactional risks, these mechanisms might have a negative effect on commitment to 
collective action. That is, market and hierarchy mechanisms might increase the risk of future 
collective failure, by generating hidden social costs that accumulate and only appear in the 
long-run.  
Contributions 
This chapter has three main contributions to the organizational economics discourse on the 
cooperative governance structure. First, it acknowledges that agricultural cooperatives employ 
a wide range of governance mechanisms, as empirically observed firms, hybrids and markets 
do. Although we argue that the cooperative uses the market, hierarchy, community and 
democracy mechanisms simultaneously to manage the relationship between cooperative firm 
and farmer-member, the governing body of the cooperative can chose to increase the relative 
strength of a particular mechanism in seeking to enhance commitment and reduce cognitive 
heterogeneity.  
Second, this chapter acknowledges the crucial role of community and democracy mechanisms 
in enhancing commitment to collective action in cooperatives. It is not rare that cooperative 
studies using an organizational economics perspective conclude with the suggestion for future 
research of looking more closely at social community aspects. However community and 
democracy mechanisms are never integrated into these studies. It is likely that these 
mechanisms are stronger in cooperative configurations than in other types of inter-firm-
networks and investor-owned firms. Furthermore, it has been argued that these mechanisms 
are the very source of competitive advantage of cooperatives over alternative arrangements 
(Davis and Bialoskorski, 2010).  
Third, this chapter acknowledges the coordination function of governance mechanisms, in line 
with Gulati et al. (2012). Governance of any inter-firm collaboration has at least two 
functions: maintaining partners’ commitment and aligning interests on the one hand, and 
aligning and adjusting partners’ actions on the other hand. Since the democracy mechanism 
might preserve rather than reduce cognitive heterogeneity, it is likely to increase the 
coordination costs for the cooperative. Therefore, the main function of hierarchy in 
cooperatives might be to reduce cognitive heterogeneity through formal rules and standards, 
thus increasing predictability and facilitating coordination, than to mitigating opportunistic 
behaviour. 
Further research 
An approach to the governance of the member-cooperative relationship which looks at the 
four mechanisms and their effect on commitment and cognition opens three main areas for 
further research. First, by decomposing the governance of the member-cooperative 
relationship into four mechanisms, future research might focus on the evolution of the relative 
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importance of each mechanism. How does the mix of governance mechanisms evolve when 
cooperatives adapt to changing market circumstances? How does the evolving mix of 
governance mechanisms affect commitment and cognition over time?  
Second, an underexplored topic in general, and particularly in cooperative studies, is 
crowding effects. Cooperative members’ compliance to an agreement regarding a specific 
transaction has to be managed in a way that the required commitment is not crowded out. If 
commitment, understood as an attitude, is open to management as motivation is (Osterloh and 
Frey, 2000), it might be crowded in or out (Frey, 1997), depending on the mix of governance 
mechanisms and on how members perceive each mechanism. Stronger hierarchical controls 
and monetary incentives do not necessarily align interests and make individuals respond with 
more motivation to cooperate and less motivation to free ride, shirk or breach a contract. They 
might even have the opposite effect if they crowd-out intrinsic motivation (Frey and Jegen, 
2001). For further empirical studies, we suggest to focus on the interaction between 
governance mechanisms, and on the dynamic, possibly non-linear, effects of these 
interactions on commitment.  
Third, our disentangling of the mechanisms used to govern the member-cooperative 
relationship can open new research on the role of these mechanisms in promoting innovation 
and learning of individual farmers and of the collective enterprise. In this chapter we only 
considered the efficiency enhancing functions of governance mechanisms, not looking at 
innovation and learning functions. The notion of cognitive heterogeneity is useful for 
understanding coordination costs, and we assumed that the lower the cognitive heterogeneity 
among members the lower the coordination costs for the cooperative. However, when it 
comes to innovation the relationship might not be linear. This is an important limitation of our 
conceptual framework. Nooteboom (2000) and Nooteboom et al., (2007) proposed that there 
is an inverted-U shaped relationship between cognitive distance and innovation performance. 
As cognitive distance increases, there is a positive effect on learning by interaction because of 
the opportunities for novel combinations of complementary knowledge. At a certain 
threshold, however, cognitive distance becomes so large that it prevents the mutual 
understanding needed to realize the complementarities. Therefore, if mutual understanding 
might reduce coordination costs, too much of it may preclude innovation opportunities 
(Nooteboom, 2000; Nooteboom et al., 2007) and effective solving of complex problems 
(Landemore, 2013). The implication is that democracy mechanisms might foster innovation. 
This is an important direction for future empirical research on cooperative innovation and 
collective entrepreneurship in general (Cook and Plunkett, 2006; Bijman and Doorneweert, 
2010).  
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3.   THE IMPACT OF GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS ON MEMBER 
COMMITMENT
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1 A version of this chapter was published as Cechin, A.; Bijman, J.; Pascucci, S.; Omta, O. Decomposing 
member-coop relationships in agricultural cooperatives: implications for member commitment. Agribusiness: 
an international journal, Volume 29, Issue 1, pages 39–61,Winter 2013.  
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3.   The impact of governance mechanisms on member commitment 
3.1 Introduction 
As quality requirements from downstream customers become more strict, cooperatives also 
have to strictly coordinate the transactions with their suppliers, their members, accordingly. 
Strengthening vertical coordination might be necessary for a customer-orientated strategy, but 
it might also have a negative effect on commitment. Member commitment is crucial in 
agricultural cooperatives. How can leaders of cooperatives imply customer-oriented strategies 
in a smooth way, while maintaining member commitment? To answer this question one must 
first disentangle commitment. Then, one must have a framework that links governance 
mechanisms to the alignment of interests and actions, that is, to commitment.  
In response to consumers’ concerns about food safety, quality and the socio-economic and 
environmental conditions of production, there has been a shift from public to private food 
standards (Henson and Reardon, 2005). Production process attributes are also becoming 
increasingly important in defining food quality (Luning and Marcelis, 2006). When process 
quality requirements by customers become more strict suppliers must be able and willing to 
shift and improve production processes at the farm level. That is the case with delivering 
credence quality attributes in the agri-food sector, especially for those products where even 
the consumption does not bring information on the quality. Animal welfare and food safety 
issues, like the use of antibiotics and hormones, are important examples in livestock supply 
chains. The problem is that the supplier has an information advantage over the buyer and can 
gain from withholding this information (Barzel, 2000). Overcoming this type of problems and 
complying with quality requirements are important for any organization that coordinates 
activities in the supply chain. 
A major challenge for cooperative organizations in agriculture is to combine members’ 
collective action with vertical coordination in the supply chain. Cooperatives face a collective 
action problem, more specifically a “free-rider” problem (Cook, 1995), which is more severe 
when the social group is larger (Ostrom, 2000). Members of an agricultural cooperative have 
a common interest to deliver products complying with quality and safety requirements and 
build-up a collective reputation through the cooperative. However, individually, they might 
not be willing to assume the implied policies’ short-term costs. Each individual might think 
that “somebody else” should invest in improving quality at the farm level. In fact, the 
organizational structure of a cooperative presents some disadvantageous implications for its 
quality management (Mérel et al., 2009): Members can deliver to the cooperative the 
commodities that alternative buyers do not accept; there is often a failure to adequately 
reward high-quality producers, causing their exit from the cooperative and reduction in 
product quality; and cooperatives are not likely to exclude ‘marginal’ members (Mérel et al., 
2009). In an environment where quality requirements of final customers (e.g., retailers) are 
becoming stricter, however, cooperatives are forced to strengthen the coordination of 
43 
 
member-cooperative transactions to cope with more intense competition in the supply chain, 
as well as to comply with stricter quality requirements from their customers (Bijman, 2009; 
Hanf, 2009). Some authors argue that in these circumstances stricter contracts between the 
cooperative and its members (Hanf, 2009) and monitoring at the farm level are necessary to 
have more control over the suppliers’ opportunistic behavior.  
The need to be competitive and to assure quality explains the growing importance of 
management control over the transactions between members and the cooperative, and the use 
of control mechanisms that resemble those used by an investor-owned firm (IOF) (Bijman and 
Wollni, 2009). Members, however, do not want to be controlled. Such “hierarchical” 
mechanisms might, therefore, lead to a negative attitude towards their cooperatives 
(Hogeland, 2006). This in turn has been shown to have a negative effect on trust, solidarity, 
social cohesion and identity among the members (Hogeland, 2006; Nilsson et al. 2009; 
Nilsson et al., 2012) and has a negative effect on member commitment (Fulton, 1999; Fulton 
and Giannakas, 2001). In sum, strategies of vertical coordination such as enhancing customer 
orientation, which implies controlling members input, monitoring farm activities, and 
sometimes increasing formalization of agreements with members, have invisible social costs 
that might affect the member’s commitment negatively and thereby the cooperative’s 
economic performance (Nilsson et al., 2012).  
Commitment has been defined by Fulton (1999:423) as “the preference of cooperative 
members to patronize a cooperative even when the cooperative’s price or service is not as 
good as that provided by an IOF”. Committed members are less likely to exit the cooperative, 
or to “sell outside” when alternative buyers offer better prices or services. Commitment also 
reduces transaction costs in the dealings between the cooperative and its members (Fulton, 
1999), because it lowers free riding behavior among members, such as shirking in production 
and delivery of quality products.  Furthermore, because commitment incorporates a 
willingness to make a sacrifice to contribute to the organization’s success (Solinger at al., 
2008), committed members are more likely to make an effort towards customer orientation, 
such as investing in quality improvement at the farm level. The managerial problem for the 
cooperative’s leadership is, therefore, how to strengthen members’ commitment to customer 
orientation without undermining commitment to collective action, that is, without increasing 
exit, side selling and free riding behavior. If one wants to strengthen member commitment 
one needs to look at the mechanisms that are used by the cooperative to align members’ 
interests and actions.  
The cooperative governance structure has been categorized, in the Transaction Costs 
Economics (TCE) framework, as a ‘hybrid’ form, because it is characterized by a mix of 
autonomy and interdependence with three defining pillars: they pool resources, they 
coordinate through contracts that provide a framework, and they combine competition with 
cooperation (Ménard, 2004, 2007). In addition to bureaucratic structures within firms and 
formal contractual relationships (Williamson, 1991), informal social institutions can also 
reduce transaction costs (Jones et al., 1997; Zenger, Lazzarini and Poppo, 2002; Lazzarini, 
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Miller and Zenger, 2004, Masten and Pufer, 2011), by reducing the cost of safeguarding 
against opportunism, diffusing information about reputation and facilitating collective 
sanctions.  
There is a missing link in the literature on cooperatives. One the one hand, cooperatives have 
been categorized as ‘hybrids’ in the TCE framework (Williamson, 1991; Ménard, 2004; 
2007), or, alternatively, as organizations dependent on ‘social capital’ (Valentinov, 2004; 
Nilsson et al., 2012). On the other hand, empirical work on commitment (Borgen, 2001; 
Hansen et al., 2002; Trechter et al., 2002, Österberg and Nilsson 2009; Bijman and Verhees, 
2011), has neither been explicitly related to a theoretical categorization of the governance of 
the cooperative, nor has it disentangled commitment to collective action from commitment to 
customer orientation. This is so, because there has been no attempt to empirically decompose 
the governance of member-cooperative relationship. Furthermore, potential complementarities 
between formal incentive and control mechanisms and informal social norms (Lazzarini, 
Miller and Zenger, 2004), democratic ‘voice’ (Six, 2007; Osterberg and Nilson, 2009), and 
the role of these mechanisms in aligning interests and actions, i.e., in generating commitment, 
have been underexplored in cooperative studies. Our theoretical approach looks beyond 
governance structures as discrete structures, as is common in the TCE tradition (Williamson, 
1991; Ménard, 2004; 2007). Following Grandori and Furnari’s (2008) work on the ‘chemistry 
of organizations’, we decompose the governance of member-cooperative relationship into 
four ideal-type governance mechanisms: hierarchy mechanisms, market mechanisms, 
community mechanisms, and democracy mechanisms.  
The objective of this chapter is two-fold. First, to disentangle commitment to collective action 
from commitment to customer orientation. Second, to provide and test a framework that links 
commitment to the governance mechanisms used to govern the member-cooperative 
relationship. We assumed that “commitment to collective action” prevents side selling, which 
entails economic costs for the cooperative because of idle capacity, reduces free riding 
behavior, and increases the willingness to make an effort towards the organization’s success, 
whereas “commitment to customer orientation” enables a less costly vertical coordination of 
the member-cooperative transaction. A more general scientific contribution of this study was 
applying the “chemistry of organizations” framework (Grandori and Furnari, 2008), originally 
conceived for intra-organization governance, to an inter-organizational relationship between 
the farmer and the cooperative firm. 
As an empirical strategy a survey among 148 farmers was used to collect data. These farmers 
are members of the same cooperative in southern Brazil. A principal component analysis and 
an econometric approach were used to check whether indicators could be clustered and to 
assess the relations between governance mechanisms and commitment. Our results showed 
that both types of commitment are positively correlated with the member’s experience of 
market incentives and hierarchy control within the cooperative. We also found that members 
who experience community involvement and the cooperative as a democracy are more 
committed to collective action.  
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes our theoretical framework on 
commitment and governance mechanisms and formulates hypotheses on the expected 
relationships. Section 3.3 describes the measurement of the concepts, specifies the model, and 
explains the methods for data collection and analysis. We present our results in Section 3.4 
and discuss the limitations and implications of our findings in Section 3.5, before the 
conclusion in Section 3.6.  
3.2 Theoretical framework 
3.2.1 Commitment 
Organizational Commitment 
Commitment has been traditionally considered to have at least an affective, a normative and a 
continuance component (Meyer et al., 1993; Meyer et al., 2002; Solinger et al., 2008). The 
affective component corresponds to an emotional attachment, a feeling of belonging and a 
wish to remain a member of the organization. The normative component refers to employees’ 
feelings of obligation to remain with the organization. The continuance component 
corresponds to a lack of choices other than to remain a member of the organization when 
leaving it would entail costs and the loss of acquired advantages (Meyer et al. 2002). 
Following the more recent organizational commitment literature (Solinger et al., 2008), we 
define member commitment as an attitude towards the organization or towards a behavior 
involving the organization, reflected in a combination of affect, cognition and action readiness 
(i.e., a generalized behavioral pledge to serve and enhance the organization’s interests).  
Intrinsic rewards have been shown to be more powerful determinants of commitment than 
extrinsic rewards (Mottaz, 1988). It has also been shown that relational norms increase 
commitment and decreased opportunism (Joshi and Stump, 1999).  
Member commitment in agricultural cooperatives  
Members of an agricultural cooperative do not hesitate to sell their farm products to 
alternative buyers when the economic climate is uncertain (Barraud-Didiera, et al., 2012). 
There is, however, a conceptual confusion regarding commitment and loyal behavior 
(continued patronage). Commitment is better understood as an antecedent attitude of loyal 
behavior, which might or might not determine actual loyal behavior. Overcoming the free-
rider problem is at the core of the cooperative’s collective action dilemma, and the “glue” of 
commitment (Fulton, 1999) mitigates this problem. Furthermore, if the cooperative is to 
engage successfully in strictly coordinated value chains (Zylbersztajn and Farina, 1999), more 
vertical coordination of the member-cooperative transaction is needed. Usually a strategy that 
is more oriented towards the customer implies less freedom and more control over the 
members’ activities at the farm level (Bijman et al., 2011). Therefore, it is important that the 
membership is committed to this (re)orientation (Borgen, 2001).  
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What factors determine member commitment to cooperatives? On the one hand, cooperatives 
are business organizations. Fulton and Giannakas (2001) argue that market considerations as 
the “right” price of product or service provided by the cooperative and a perceived connection 
between the cooperative’s success and members’ own individual success affect commitment. 
Indeed, agricultural cooperatives have a utilitarian objective because they are organized to 
support farmers in their business aims.  
On the other hand, cooperatives were founded on principles of solidarity and egalitarianism, 
applied by equal voting rights and equal rates of return on investment (Barton, 1989). In his 
study on social mechanisms in cooperatives, Borgen (2001) has posited that the more 
members identify with the cooperative, the more they trust the cooperative’s leadership 
cooperative, and the more they are willing to commit themselves to the cooperative’s 
strategies. Hansen et al. (2002) found that trust among members and trust between members 
and the agricultural cooperative’s management are important predictors of group cohesion, 
which is a measure of the strength of members’ desires to remain in a group and, thus, their 
commitment to it. 
Organization factors related to democratic governance also influence member commitment in 
cooperatives. For instance, Österberg and Nilsson (2009) showed that members’ perception of 
participating in the governance of a cooperative enhances member commitment. Trechter et 
al. (2002) found that a member who has served on a board of directors, served on a 
cooperative committee, or received cooperative education, tends to be more committed to the 
cooperative. The same authors also found that a good communication with the managers of 
the cooperative is strongly related to member commitment in a positive way. Finally, 
commitment can be influenced by different preferences. Kalogeras et al. (2009) showed that 
members of the same cooperative differed with respect to the intra-organizational attributes of 
control and management. 
3.2.2 Governance mechanisms  
In seeking the lowest transaction costs, transacting firms choose particular organizational 
configurations (or governance structures) (Williamson, 1991). Empirically observed 
governance structures use a combination of different governance mechanisms (Hennart, 
1993). For instance, Ouchi (1980) distinguished between the mechanisms market, 
bureaucracy and clan. “Markets, bureaucracies, and clans are therefore three distinct 
mechanisms, which may be present in differing degrees, in any real organization” (Ouchi, 
1980: 132). Adler (2001) distinguished between market, hierarchy and trust, where, in fact, 
trust is a mechanism and not a structure as market or hierarchy. Bradach and Eccles (1989) 
emphasized that any governance structure combines, in different degrees, the instruments of 
price, authority and trust. In sum, it is the combination of, at least, market, hierarchy and 
community mechanisms that determines the efficiency enhancing function of a governance 
structure (Bijman et al., 2011).   
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In a recent study, Grandori and Furnari (2008) included democracy as the fourth mechanism 
(element) to the typology, by distinguishing between market, hierarchy, community and 
democracy mechanisms. Their framework was developed and applied empirically with the 
objective of showing that these mechanisms (mechanisms) are not discrete options but instead 
complementary, and most real organizations combine them in the proportion they consider 
appropriate to achieve their coordination goals.  
The contribution of Grandori and Furnari (2008) is important in the domain of “organizational 
design”, because it specifies the nature of ‘building blocks’ to be combined in any 
organization and answers how they can be linked to each other to produce different results. 
They showed that different combinations of governance mechanisms can determine efficiency 
or innovativeness (Grandori and Furnari (2008). Including the democracy element is 
conceptually important in the case of cooperatives because they are member-based, 
democratically governed organizations. By decomposing the organizational configuration into 
‘building blocks’ of principles and practices, this approach can be linked to the ultimate 
managerial problem of an agricultural cooperative, mitigating free riding behavior and 
strengthening commitment. Moreover this integrative approach acknowledges the 
complementarity between the mechanisms used to govern the member-cooperative 
relationship. 
Market   
Pay-for-performance schemes that reward producers according to their efficiency and/or 
quality are practices related to the market mechanisms because they work as high powered 
incentives. Monetary incentives induce reliable behavior from members, where actions are 
elicited by rewards (Nooteboom, 2008).  
On the one hand, market mechanisms are a good way to align interests and get members to be 
committed because they need to feel that their effort to maintain or elevate the quality of their 
products and production processes as a response to customer demands is being rewarded. 
Members of large heterogeneous cooperatives might perceive their importance in the 
democratic decision making as limited or even null. If members have fewer opportunities to 
influence the cooperative’s decisions, through informal or formal processes, they might 
request more market governance in their individual transactions (Bijman et al., 2011). 
H1.1.: The more members experience market mechanisms the more committed they are to 
customer orientation. 
On the other hand, some external interventions as monetary incentives might undermine 
intrinsic motivation. In other words, they might damage the quality of exchange outcomes by 
discouraging individuals’ voluntary willingness to cooperate, that is, member commitment. 
This substitution effect has received the name of ‘motivation-crowding out’ in economics 
(Frey 1997; Frey and Jegen, 2001). The effect is especially important when monetary 
incentives are applied to an activity that has been intrinsically motivated before, possibly 
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reducing the total available motivation to engage in the activity. As the outcome, engagement 
in the activity might well be reduced rather than increased. 
H1.2.: The more members experience market mechanisms the less committed they are to 
collective action 
Hierarchy 
To be competitive the cooperative must have more control over members’ inputs, outputs and 
production processes. The ability  to use authority as a mechanism is not limited to intrafirm 
settings, but also can be achieved between organizations by means  of contractual provisions, 
which  essentially "produce  the effects of hierarchies" (Stinchcombe 1985, p. 165). On the 
one hand, hierarchy mechanisms can be seen as giving farmers more security, because they 
know what to expect from the cooperative. Formalization represents not just duties but also 
rights, the cooperative’s commitment to reward the quality of delivered farm products. If 
members in fact feel their investments are more safeguarded with more control and 
formalization, they probably recognize that following consumer trends and delivering high 
quality will determine the value of their production in the long-run. Moreover, if the 
cooperative has the authority to act unilaterally and decisively (Masten, 2006) upon members’ 
production processes in response to unfolding events in the market, members might just not 
have options but to commit to whatever decision was made.  
H2.1.: The more members experience hierarchy mechanisms the more committed they are to 
customer-oriented strategy 
Members, however, do not want to be controlled. They can, therefore, develop a negative 
attitude towards their cooperative (Hogeland, 2006). Ghoshal and Moran (1996) have argued 
that making provisions against opportunism might destroy intrinsic motivation and thereby 
result in increased, rather than decreased, opportunism. When the relationship between 
principal (manager) and agent (farmer) is personal, the agent perceives increased monitoring 
as an indication of distrust and this induces him or her to reduce effort (Frey, 1993). 
Furthermore, too much authority has the drawback of weakening the incentives of 
subordinates to invest in relation-specific assets (Williamson, 1985) and to acquire 
information needed to make informed decisions (e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1997). Therefore, 
strengthening hierarchy mechanisms in a cooperative might eventually erode the commitment 
of members and thereby even jeopardize the cooperative’s existence (Bijman et al., 2011).  
H2.2.: The more members experience hierarchy mechanisms the less committed they are to 
collective action 
Community  
Confidence in the other’s cooperation depends on knowledge that the other’s behavior is 
based on the same norms. Wherever there is a community of people, norms arise to coordinate 
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their interaction (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Hayami, 2009). The frequency of interactions and 
shared knowledge or interests of its members are its most important characteristics (Masten 
and Prufer, 2011). Community mechanisms integrate actors by homogenizing judgments and 
interests through identity building and knowledge-sharing practices (Kogut and Zander, 
1996). The strength of cooperative in inducing members’ commitment to the organization 
resides, in principle, in the tendency to involve lower information asymmetries and greater 
trust in the relationship with farmers than would be the case with IOFs (Sykuta and Cook, 
2001).  
H3.1.: The more members experience the cooperative as being a community the more 
committed they are  to collective action. 
However, there is also work showing that too much community governance might lead to sub-
optimal results. There is a risk that members will be ‘‘locked-in’’ into a low innovative or 
inefficient situation. Cooperative members might be subject to the ‘paradox of embeddedness’ 
(Uzzi, 1997), which means that an organization (farm) has difficulties to access new 
information, to learn new routines and skills, because it is too embedded in one network 
(cooperative). Successful vertical coordination in value chains requires more information 
exchange and more centralized decision-making. Community governance might work well to 
generate commitment to collective action, whereas it might be less suitable for commitment to 
customer orientation (Bijman et al., 2011). 
H3.2.: The more members experience the cooperative as being a community the less 
committed they are  to customer orientation.  
Democracy  
Recent theories of political governance view the establishment of credible commitments as 
the principal function of democratic governance (Masten, 2006). Equally distributed property 
and decision rights, participation and representation of different knowledge and interests in 
decision making and ‘voice giving’ procedures are typical ingredients of democratic 
governance, aimed at integrating different judgments and interests of multiple actors through 
representative devices (Harrison and Freeman 2004). Fenwick (2005) argues that increasing 
employees’ ‘voice’ would lead to greater level of organizational commitment, which would 
further improve decisions’ implementation rates and reduce dysfunctional behavior of 
employees. We assume this equally applies to member-cooperative relationships. 
H4.1.: The more members experience the cooperative as being democratic the more 
committed they are to collective action. 
Members are often interested in selling all of their products to the cooperative, no matter the 
quality, whereas the cooperative puts in place a strict quality control system to meet buyers’ 
requirements. Democratic decision-making in cooperatives might hinder value chain 
coordination if the latter involves innovation and adjustments to stricter quality requirements. 
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In this type of decision-making structure the majority rules. However, the majority is usually 
rather conservative, that is, opposing change and refusing to agree to volume contracts and 
rigorous quality standards (Bijman et al., 2011). It is reasonable to expect, therefore, that the 
more members perceive the cooperative as a democratic organization in decision making and 
ownership the less they are willing to lose freedom at the farm level and commit to stricter 
vertical coordination strategies. 
H4.2.: The more members experience the cooperative as being democratic the less committed 
they are to customer oriented strategy. 
Table 3.1 Summary of the hypotheses 
Governance mechanism Expected relationship with 
Commitment to collective action 
Expected relationship with 
Commitment to customer 
orientation 
Market - + 
Hierarchy - + 
Community + - 
Democracy + - 
 
3.3 Methods and data 
3.3.1 Background 
The economic importance of agricultural cooperatives in Brazil goes beyond the number of 
cooperatives and jobs created; these organizations contributed 38.4 % of agricultural GDP and 
hold about 7.5 % of the total capacity of soybeans handlers in the country (OCB, 2009). 
Cooperatives in the state of Paraná (in the South) are a case of economic success, leading 
Brazilian exports of agricultural goods. The analyzed cooperative, Lar, from the state of 
Paraná, is a large multi-product processing agricultural cooperative. There are 6,779 members 
spread in eleven towns in the west of Paraná. Most of them are soybean producers. About half 
of the membership has at least one extra activity besides soybeans, such as hogs, broilers, 
vegetables, manioc or milk. There are 474 broiler producers and 40 vegetable producers 
spread among these eleven towns (Lar, 2008). Like most cooperatives in that state, Lar was 
founded in the 1960’s initially by a very small number of farmers. Similar to other 
agricultural cooperatives in Brazil, Lar was forced to reorganize and set new focuses in the 
early 1990s because of the increasingly competitive market. That decade was characterized by 
the administrative modernization of the analyzed cooperative, with the introduction of 
practices such as strategic planning, reducing managerial costs, and emphasis on business 
performance. Lar was ranked in 1990 for the first time among the 500 biggest companies in 
terms of turnover in the country (Marschall, 2009). By the end of the 1990’s the cooperative 
became definitely a food producer, with its own brand for frozen poultry meat and canned and 
frozen vegetables (Lar, 2008). After consolidating its processing units, the turnover jumped 
from US$ 55 million to US$ 900 million over a period of sixteen years (1995-2011). In 2011, 
the cooperative had over six thousand employees and owned thirteen supermarkets. About 
600 members attended the General Assembly in 2011, which aimed to approve the balance 
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sheets of that year and the allocation of the surplus (US$ 4.7 million) between investment 
(US$ 2.8 million) and patronage refund (US$ 1.9 million) to the members according to the 
volume of their transactions with the cooperative (Lar, 2011). 
3.3.2 Data gathering process 
A survey method was used to collect data on organization elements and commitment. A 
questionnaire using a five point Likert scale (anchored between “Totally disagree” and 
“Totally Agree”) was distributed among members of a cooperative between December of 
2010 and April of 2011. Since the type of product that farmers deliver to their cooperative 
was expected to influence commitment, a disproportionate stratified sample was taken from 
broiler, vegetables and soybeans producers in seven (of the eleven) towns. The total sample of 
148 producers consisted of 27 vegetable producers, 58 broiler producers, and 63 specialized 
soybeans producers. There is some overlapping because some vegetable producers also 
produce broiler and many vegetable and broiler producers also produce soybeans. For 
instance, from the 148 farmers, 105 produce soybeans, but 42 of these soybeans producers 
also produce either broiler or vegetables. In every county there is a cooperative unit for 
general purposes, such as for pre-assembly and committee meetings, selling inputs, mainly for 
soybean production, and serving also as a base for the technical advisors.  
3.3.3 Measures 
The dependent variables refer to two types of commitment. Member commitment is an 
outcome variable and some authors treat it as the visible dichotomous farmer behavior: 
continued patronage or defection (Pascucci et al., 2012). There is, however, a growing 
consensus that commitment is an attitude instead of behavior (Solinger et al., 2008). In 
cooperative studies (e.g. Österberg and Nilsson, 2009) member commitment has not always 
been measured as a multi-dimensional construct. Constructs as commitment, trust, and 
identification, however, are multidimensional and are usually not measured in a direct way 
(Solinger et al., 2008). Recent empirical studies on commitment in cooperatives (Foreman and 
Whetten, 2002; Barraud-Didiera et al., 2012) have been applying two of the three constructs 
developed by Allen and Meyer (1990) and revised by Meyer et al. (1993): affective, 
normative and continuance commitment. As it is hard to separate normative commitment 
from affective commitment empirically (Solinger et al., 2008) the former has been dropped in 
the empirical studies. However, within the cooperative, the farm is an independent entity. 
There is a transaction between the member’s farm and the cooperative firm, that is, an inter-
organizational relationship, and not an intra-organizational (employee-firm) relationship. Any 
measurement of commitment within agricultural cooperatives must consider that even if 
farmers continue being members they might eventually sell their products outside the 
cooperative because of higher prices. It is what Pascucci et al. (2012) called ‘soft 
membership’, members who do not necessarily deliver to their own cooperative. 
In cooperative studies a common construct for commitment is “loyalty”, which relates to 
retention and the farmer’s willingness (or the actual behavior) to patronize the cooperative 
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(Bijman and Verhees, 2011). We added to this members’ effort, the willingness to invest in 
the continuation and the cooperative’s success (Bijman and Verhees, 2011). Together with the 
mitigation of exit and side selling, the members’ effort towards the cooperative success, 
constitute what we called ‘commitment to collective action’. Regarding ‘commitment to 
customer orientation’, the authors found only one study that attempted to operationalize this 
dimension of commitment. Borgen (2001) measured this dimension with indicators that 
gravitated around members’ perceived importance and positive attitude towards quality 
control and pull based deliveries. 
Our variables for commitment (see Table 2) were intended to capture two main attitudes from 
members: 1) positive attitude towards customer orientation and increased vertical 
coordination of the member-cooperative transaction; 2) willingness to make an effort and 
sacrifice short-term economic gains for the sake of the cooperative’s long-term success.  
Table 3.2 Measuring Commitment 
Dimensions Indicators Sources 
Commitment to 
customer 
orientation 
(1) Perception that quality control will be increasingly important in the future 
(2) Perception that it is good to shift quality standards in accordance to 
customer preferences  
(3) Perception that it is good that the cooperative increasingly monitors 
members’ processes  
 
Borgen 
(2001) 
Commitment to 
collective action 
(1) Sells to the cooperative even if other firm offers better price  
(2) Better price is better than relationship with the cooperative  
(3) Willingness to invest if the cooperative requires  
(4) Willingness to receive lower price temporarily  
(5) Concern with the cooperative’s future  
Bijman 
and 
Verhees, 
(2011) 
 
The measurement of the explanatory concepts (see Table 3) was largely based on Grandori 
and Furnari (2008), specifically on their table of correspondence between types of 
mechanisms and observable practices.  
Market mechanisms were measured by focusing on the predominant practices and 
coordination devices of the ideal-type market structure: farmers’ autonomy and incentives. 
Hierarchy mechanisms were measured by focusing on the predominant practices and 
coordination devices of the ideal-type hierarchy structure: formalization of agreements and 
control (Vlaar et al., 2007; Grandori and Furnari, 2008). 
Democracy mechanisms were measured by focusing on members’ perception of their 
participation in the governance of the cooperative (Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009), perception 
of ownership and trust in the cooperative’s representative democracy. Diffusion of ownership, 
diffusion of decision and income rights, diffusion of representation rights are predominant 
organization practices embodying the democracy mechanisms (Grandori and Furnari, 2008). 
We looked at only one cooperative. Ownership, decision and representation rights are, 
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therefore, the same. The operationalization of principles and practices was, consequently, 
adapted to one cooperative organization.  
Community mechanisms were measured by focusing on the following predominant practices 
and coordination devices of the ideal-type community: involvement and communication. 
Knowledge and value sharing and community building are predominant organization 
practices embodying the community mechanisms (Grandori and Furnari, 2008), which were 
measured as members’ involvement with the cooperative’s community and communication. 
Although communication is present in any organization, knowledge and value sharing and 
informal exchange are practices typical of communities (Grandori and Furnari, 2008).  
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Table 3.3 Measuring Governance mechanisms 
Mechanism Dimension Indicators Sources 
 
 
Market 
Autonomy (1) Autonomy to decide how much to produce (2) 
Autonomy to choose farm technology (3) Autonomy to 
choose plant/animal variety  
Grandori 
and 
Furnari, 
(2008) 
 
Incentives (1) Perception that payment is proportional to effort (2) 
Satisfaction with price the cooperative pays for the product 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hierarchy 
 
 
 
Formalization  
 
(1) Determination of quality standards in contract (2) Pre-
determined deliverance dates (3) Formal rules and 
procedures for agreements (4) Written documents from the 
cooperative to inform about expected quality  
 
 
Lu (2007) 
 
Control 
(1) Perception that the cooperative controls rigorously 
quality of delivered product (2) Perception that the 
cooperative controls rigorously used inputs (3) Perception 
that the cooperative monitors rigorously productive activity 
on-farm (4) Perception that received value depends on 
quality control of delivered products 
Hueth et al 
(1999) 
 
 
 
 
 
Democracy 
 
 
 
 
Voice 
(1) Perception of influence on the cooperative's path when 
member participates (2) Perception of influence on own 
economic benefits when member participates (3) Perception 
that Strategic decisions are made by members (4) Perception 
that members can vote in every important decision 
Osterberg 
and 
Nilsson 
(2009).  
 
Trust in 
representative 
democracy 
  
(1) Perception that Board of directors considers members 
interests in their decisions  (2) Acceptance of Board of 
directors deciding strategic issues without consulting 
members (3) perception of corruption in cooperative 
 
Perception of 
ownership 
(1) Perception of being the cooperative’s co-owner  Borgen, 
2001). 
 
 
 
 
Community 
 
 
Involvement  
 
(1) Participation in general assemblies (2) Participation of 
son in activities of youth committee (3) Participation of wife 
in activities of women committees (Always/Sometimes/ 
Never) (4) Performing  any function in the cooperative’s 
governance (Yes or No)  (5) Perception that members share 
same cooperative values 
 
Borgen, 
(2001) 
 
 
Communication 
(1) Frequency of information exchange on quality 
improvement between farmer and the cooperative (2) 
Informal means of (personal interaction) informing farmers 
about expected quality  
Grandori 
and 
Furnari, 
(2008); 
Paulraj et 
al. (2008) 
 
Finally we introduced some control variables to check their influence on the type of 
commitment. Members with a large farming operation are less dependent on the cooperative, 
and therefore might be less committed (Ollila, 1985; Ollila et al., 2012). Size of farm was 
included as a control and measured in hectares of own farm land. Members past experience 
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with the cooperative could also have an impact on commitment and is usually a control 
variable (Trechter et al 2002). Our variable for past experience was measured simply as the 
number of years of membership up to 2009. It has been found in the literature that the 
commitment level declines as the level of formal education of a member increases (Trechter 
et al., 2002). In our study, the variable “Education” was measured in a categorical way: (1) no 
formal education; (2) incomplete primary; (3) complete primary; (4) high school; (5) technical 
school; (6) college. Finally, a multi-productive cooperative might enter different types of 
agreement with its members depending on the commodity. Some transactions are governed 
through spot market, such as soybeans, in contrast with others, such as broiler, which are 
governed through quasi-vertical integration. If there was any correlation between members’ 
productive activity and commitment it would be captured by the dummy variables for 
soybeans producer and broiler producer. 
3.3.4 Empirical strategy 
The dimensionality and reliability of organization element constructs were examined using 
principal component analysis with varimax rotation and Cronbach’s alpha reliability analysis 
(Field, 2005). An Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression tested the relationships between 
organization element components and member commitment, according to our model:  
(1)  Yj = β1 + β2*Mj + β3*Hj + β4*Dj+ β5*Cj + β6*Kj + εj , 
where Yj representing Commitment variables, both to collective action and to customer 
orientation, Mj representing Market governance mechanisms variables, operationalized 
through the two factors, incentives and autonomy; Hj representing Hierarchy governance 
mechanisms variables, operationalized through the two factors control and formalization; Dj 
representing Democracy governance mechanisms variables, operationalized through the only 
factor voice, Cj representing Community governance mechanisms variables, operationalized 
through the two factors involvement and communication, and finally, Kj representing the 
Control variables (Size of Farm, Past experience, Level of Education and Productive activity), 
with j = 1...148. 
3.4 Results 
The descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our study are summarized in 
Appendix 1. From our sample, 66 members (44.6% of the sample) had one activity and 82 
(55.4%) had more than one activity, where soybeans, corn, wheat are considered one activity, 
and broiler and vegetables are the other activities. Size of the farm was assessed combining 
the size of members’ own farmland and the size of rented farmland. The minimum size was 
two hectares, the maximum size was 580 hectares, and the average size was 36 hectares 
(standard deviation of 66 hectares). Regarding members past experience with the cooperative, 
some had joined that year (2009) while some had been members for 39 years (since 1970). 
The average length of membership was 17 years (standard deviation of 10 years). The 
cooperative was founded in 1964. The level of education of the members in our sample was 
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distributed in the following way: 0.7% had no formal education, 30.4% had incomplete 
primary school, 28.4% had complete primary school, 29.7% had high school, 2.7% had 
technical school, and 7.4% had been to college.” 
Separate Principle Component Analyses (PCA) were conducted for the dependent and for the 
independent variables. Factors with Eigenvalues greater than one were extracted (Appendix 
2). Rotation optimizes the factor structure, equalizing the relative importance of the factors 
(Field, 2005). After rotation, all items had the greatest loading on the expected component 
(Table 4). Therefore, looking at the content of the questionnaire items that load onto the same 
factor we could identify the underlying commitment constructs. The PCA indicated that 
commitment can, in fact, be separated into two types of commitment. The first type is 
commitment to customer orientation. The second type is commitment to collective action, 
which captures a member’s willingness to sacrifice short-term economic gains and make an 
effort towards the cooperative’s long-term success. The item “Sells to cooperative even if 
another firm offers a better price”, however, had a loading of 0.341 on the ‘commitment to 
customer orientation’ component and of 0.495 on the ‘commitment to collective action’ 
component. Even with a rather low loading we chose to keep the item as part of the 
‘commitment to collective action’ factor. To be sure, we did a reliability analysis which 
showed that the Cronbach's Alpha would decrease if the item was deleted.  
Table 3.4 Factor Structure for Commitment 
Rotated Component Matrix* 
 
Component 
1 2 
Perception that it is good to shift quality standards in accordance to customer preferences 0.856   
Perception that it is good that  cooperative increasingly monitors members processes 0.829   
Perception that quality control will be increasingly important 0.730   
Willingness to invest if cooperative requires   0.682 
Willingness to receive lower price temporarily   0.654 
Future of cooperative is part of concerns   0.638 
Better price is better than relation with the cooperative(-) 
Sells to cooperative even if another firm offers a better price 
 
0.341  
0.548 
0.495 
* All of the omitted item loadings on the components were lower than 0.3. 
For the independent variables, initially factors with Eigenvalues greater than one were 
extracted (Appendix 3). With the exception of three items, all the others had the greatest 
loading on the expected component (see Table 5). The item “Perception of corruption in the 
cooperative” which was expected to have greater loading on (one of) the democratic 
component (‘Trust in representative democracy’), actually had a greater loading in the 
‘market incentive’ component (both loadings were lower than 0.5, see Table 5). There was no 
theoretical reason to believe it could be part of a ‘market element’ factor and deleting it from 
the ‘market incentive’ factor would increase reliability (Cronbach’s alpha from 0.71 to 0.80). 
This item was dropped from the analysis. The other two items that did not correspond to our 
expectation were “Perception that Members share same Cooperative values”, and 
“Acceptance of Board of directors deciding strategic issues without consulting members”. 
The first was expected to have the greatest loading on the ‘community involvement’ factor, 
57 
 
whereas the second was expected to have the greatest loading on (one of) the democratic 
components (‘Trust in representative democracy’). These two items formed a factor of their 
own, instead. The results of the PCA suggest that they are measuring some other unknown 
latent construct. Because the reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) of this unknown factor (the eighth 
component in Table 5) was lower than 0.6 (0.433), the whole factor was dropped in the 
subsequent econometric analysis. 
Therefore, looking at the content of the questionnaire items that loaded onto the same factor 
we could identify the underlying governance mechanisms constructs. Instead of three 
components for ‘democracy’, only one component emerged. That is, all the items supposed to 
measure different aspects of ‘democracy element’ were actually measuring the same latent 
construct (the first component in Table 5). There was at least one component for every 
organization element (Appendix 3 and Table 5). Table 6 relates the retained factors – which 
were used in the econometric analysis - with the number of corresponding items and the 
factor’s reliability.  
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Table 3.5 Factor Structure for Governance mechanisms 
*Factor loadings lower than 0.4 were omitted from the table 
 
TABLE 3.6 Factor reliability  
Factors Items Cronbach's Alpha 
Commitment to customer orientation  3 .770 
Commitment to collective action  5 .607 
Democracy voice  6 .803 
Hierarchy formalization  4 .830 
Hierarchy control  4 .710 
Community involvement  4 .652 
Market autonomy  3 .757 
Market incentives 2 .795 
Communication 2 .680 
Data showed no multi-collinearity. This was checked using the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF). The individual values are lower than 10 and the average is not substantially greater 
Rotated Component Matrix
 
* 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Perception that Members can vote in every important decision 0.731               
Perception that Strategic decisions are made by members 0.728               
Perception that Board of directors considers members interests  
in their decisions 
0.636               
Perception of influence on own economic benefits when  
member participates 
0.615               
Perception of  being a co-owner of the Coop 0.570               
Perception of influence on coop's path when member participates 0.500               
Deliverance in made in  pre-determined dates   0.821             
Agreements follow formal rules and procedures   0.787             
Quality standard is determined in contract   0.783             
Cooperative informs about expected quality through written docs   0.711             
Perception that the cooperative controls rigorously quality of delivered 
product 
    0.746           
Perception that the cooperative controls rigorously used inputs     0.724           
Perception that received value depends on quality control of delivered 
product 
    0.696           
Perception that the cooperative monitors rigorously productive 
activity on site 
    0.538           
Participation of wife in activities of women committees        0.776         
Occupation of any function in the cooperative governance?       0.755         
Participation in general assemblies        0.573         
Participation of son in activities of youth committee        0.561         
Perception of Autonomy to choose technology         0.860       
Perception of Autonomy to choose variety   - 0.420     0.734       
Perception of Autonomy to decide how much to produce         0.686       
Satisfaction with price the cooperative pays for the product           0.853     
Perception that Payment is proportional to  effort           0.826     
Perception of corruption in the cooperative 0.421          0 .466     
Cooperative informs about expected quality in informal way/ 
(personal interactions) 
            0.851   
Information exchange on quality improvement with the cooperative is 
frequent 
            0.708   
Perception that Members share same cooperative values               0.650 
Acceptance of Board of directors deciding strategic issues without 
consulting members 
              0.640 
         
59 
 
than 1, which indicates that there is probably no cause for concern. Furthermore, none of the 
values for the Tolerance statistics were below 0.2, which would have been reason for concern 
(Field, 2005). Individual correlations among variables are also important to check. Pair-wise 
correlations were not a concern because the matrix (Appendix 4) shows relatively safe 
correlations (Wooldridge, 2009), the highest one (0.447) being between the broiler production 
dummy and market autonomy. 
The results of the regression analysis (Table 7) indicate that members who experienced 
greater community involvement and democracy representation were more committed to 
collective action. Members who experienced greater market incentives were more committed 
both to collective action and to a customer oriented strategy. Members who experienced 
greater hierarchy control were also more committed both to collective action and to a 
customer oriented strategy. Finally, members who experienced frequent and informal 
communication with cooperative were more committed to a customer oriented-strategy. 
Table 3.7 Results of Regression Analysis of Commitment on Governance mechanisms
2
 
                                                                                            
  
 
 
 Independent Variables 
Commitment to 
Customer Orientation 
 
Commitment to  
Collective Action 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Sig. 
Unstandardized   
Coefficients 
 
 
        Sig. Beta                  Std errors   Beta                   Std errors 
 Governance mechanisms 
 
 
   
Democracy representation  0.128                  0.094  0.238                       0.078 ** 
Hierarchy formalization -0.088                  0.087  0.040                       0.072  
Hierarchy control  0.212                  0.090 * 0.188                       0.074 * 
Community involvement 
Market autonomy  
-0.023                  0.093 
 0.137                  0.102 
 
 
0.286                       0.076 
0.042                       0.083 
** 
 
Market incentives  0.173                  0.087 * 0.284                       0.072 ** 
Community communication  0.223                  0.086 * 0.082                       0.069  
 
Control variables 
Broiler Producer 
 
 
 0.169                  0.195 
 
 
 
 
 
 0.073                      0.158 
 
 
              
Soybeans Producer -0.138                  0.235  -0.475                      0.193 * 
Past Experience  0.005                  0.009  -0.002                      0.007  
Level of Education  0.178                  0.075 *  0.055                      0.061  
Farm size  0.000                  0.001  -0.002                      0.001 * 
 R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
 0.301 
 0.226 
 0.564 
 0.518 
 
 * p < .0.5, ** p < .01; All significance levels are based on 2-tailed tests 
                                                 
2 Given the relative lack of theoretical guidance from the literature, we tested for the potential presence of 
interaction effects and of non linearities in the relationship between our main independent variables and the 
dependent variable. In these robustness checks we built empirical specifications which included variables that 
represent the interactions between pairs of governance mechanisms as well as non-linear relationships. The 
results of these robustness check revealed that our estimates are neither sensitive to the inclusion of interactions 
nor to the inclusion of non-linear relationships, and are not reported here for parsimony. Along the same lines, 
the newly included variables did not exhibit statistically significant influence on the dependent variables. 
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Regarding the control variables, members who were soybeans producers or had larger farm 
size were less committed to collective action, whereas members with a higher education level 
were more committed to customer orientation.  
3.5 Discussion  
In the present chapter, our objectives were two-fold: First, we attempted to disentangle the 
two dimensions of commitment; second, to answer how governance mechanisms used to 
govern the member-cooperative relationship relate to commitment. We have captured some 
insightful correlations that do not enable us to identify causal effects or impacts between 
governance mechanisms and commitment. Nevertheless, these correlations are useful to 
understand the complexity of governing the member-cooperative relationship.  
Theoretically, members could be unwilling to change buyer not because of the “glue” of 
commitment but because the option they know is preferable to the unknown, or because they 
are risk averse or because of a lack of credible opportunities. However, so-called ‘status quo 
bias’ and risk aversion are not likely to be a problem in our study because ‘soft membership’ 
(Pascucci et al., 2012) - members who do not necessarily deliver to their own cooperative – is 
part of the story, especially among soybeans producers. They will not be forced to exit the 
cooperative just because of side selling.  
Table 3.8 Expected and observed relationships 
Governance 
mechanisms 
Commitment to 
collective action 
(Expected) 
Commitment to 
collective action 
(observed) 
Commitment to 
customer orientation 
(expected) 
Commitment to 
customer orientation 
(observed) 
Market - + + + 
Hierarchy - + + + 
Community + + - NS 
Democracy + + - NS 
 
As expected, market governance mechanisms correlate positively, as expected, with 
commitment to customer orientation. Farmers who perceive they are being adequately 
financially rewarded are more committed to customer orientation. In our case, market 
incentives might be increasing commitment to voluntarily lose some autonomy at the farm 
level. However, contrary to what we expected, there is also a positive correlation between 
market incentives and commitment to collective action. This suggests that the perception of 
being adequately rewarded for effort and satisfaction with the offered price are not “crowding 
out” intrinsic motivation. 
Hierarchy governance mechanisms correlate positively, as expected, with commitment to 
customer orientation. Members who experience more control from the cooperative, in product 
quality measurement, on-farm monitoring and direct control of inputs, have a more positive 
attitude towards customer orientation. Members might recognize that following consumer 
trends and delivering high quality will determine the value of their production in the long-run. 
However, contrary to what we expected, hierarchy control also correlates positively with 
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commitment to collective action. On the one hand, members who perceive more control might 
fear some punishment from the cooperative if they side sell. On the other hand, hierarchy 
control can support farmers by giving security, because in this way they know what to expect 
from the cooperative. 
Democracy governance mechanisms correlate positively with commitment to collective action 
as Österberg and Nilsson (2009) have found. Voice giving procedures and the perception of 
ownership, which relate to democratic decision and income rights, lead to greater level of 
commitment, as posed by Fenwick (2005) and Harrison and Freeman (2004). No correlation 
was found with commitment to customer orientation though. 
Community governance mechanisms correlate positively, as expected, with commitment to 
collective action. Involvement with the cooperative can maintain member commitment even 
when the cooperative is applying more hierarchical control over member transactions. 
Community building practices have the function of sharing knowledge and values. By 
creating social space for the members’ families to participate in activities and training courses 
(e.g. about leadership, household management and cooperative principles), the cooperative is 
building and strengthening the community. When members and their family are involved, 
they realize that the cooperative also has an important social function: keeping and increasing 
social cohesion. This could explain the willingness to sacrifice short term economic gains, as 
higher prices from alternative buyers, and to make an effort towards the cooperative’s long-
term success. In fact, an important framework for strengthening social capital in cooperative 
firms are different sets of cooperative principles, such as the Rochdale principles (Barton, 
1989), which contain a clearly discernible element of ideology even though these principles 
can also be argued to have an economic rationale (Nilsson et al., 2012). Nevertheless, no 
correlation was found with commitment to customer orientation.  
Members who perceive greater frequency and informality of information exchange on quality 
improvements are more committed to customer orientation. Trechter et al. (2002) had found 
that good communication was positively related with commitment. The rationale is that good 
communication means an opportunity for member input and constant access to accessible and 
current information. Although Trechter et al. (2002) had objective measures for 
communication, such as the number of newsletters and press releases per year, website, 
member survey, communication with managers and employees, the authors did not 
disentangle commitment. Because communication was considered a community element our 
results are contrary to what we expected, in the sense that community was expected to 
positively correlate with collective action but negatively to customer orientation. 
Communication on quality improvement might not be a community element as involvement 
is. In contrast with horizontal communication, which can be seen as a community element, 
vertical communication (between the processing firm and its suppliers) could be considered a 
hierarchy element instead (Kogut and Zander, 1996).  
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Although empirical studies (e.g., Trechter et al., 2002) showed a negative relationship 
between level of education and commitment, the theoretical expected relationship is not 
straightforward and it is reasonable that the higher level of education of members the more 
knowledgeable they will be about the industry context, the quality standards, consumer trends, 
and, therefore, the more likely they will commit to a more customer-oriented strategy as our 
results have shown. Size of farm has shown to be negatively correlated with commitment to 
collective action. Farmers with greater production capacity are likely to be less dependent on 
the cooperative for market access and, therefore, less willing to be loyal when they see short-
term economic benefits outside. Furthermore, they are more often considering exiting, 
because of their high threat potential (Ollila, 1985; Ollila et al., 2012). One productive activity 
is also correlated to commitment. Members who do not produce soybeans (in this case those 
who produce one or more of the following food products: vegetables, cassava, broiler, swine 
and milk) are more committed to collective action than members who produce soybeans. This 
might be because soybeans transactions are governed (in the transaction cost economics 
sense) by spot market, whereas the others are more strictly coordinated (Zylbersztajn and 
Farina, 1999). Members delivering soybeans decide on production and selling mainly on the 
basis of prices. As a result, they could be less willing to make an effort to invest in the 
cooperative. Note that these members’ characteristics, which served as a control, are 
heterogeneous. This might be affecting their preferences with respect to the intra-
organizational attributes of control and management (Kalogeras et al., 2009). 
3.6 Conclusions 
The bulk of research about agricultural cooperatives is based on economic theory. Recent 
theoretical frameworks for better understanding the nature of cooperatives are built upon 
transaction costs economics (Ménard, 2007). This perspective is limited because it does not 
go beyond the traditional notion of the discrete organization form and does not acknowledge 
the complementarity between formal and informal governance (Lazzarini, Miller and Zenger, 
2004), coordination and motivation (Kogut and Zander, 1996) and the intrinsic importance of 
democratic ‘voice’ (Fenwick, 2005).  
Following Österberg and Nilsson’s (2009) call to re-direct the study on cooperatives, this 
chapter took a sociopsychological and organizational theory perspective. The results suggest 
that members’ commitment can be affected by their perception about the various governance 
mechanisms besides the economic ones, such as those related to the social community, to 
democratic voice and degree of control over the transaction. We consider the agricultural 
cooperative as a multiple value system consisting of (at least) a normative (emphasizing 
traditions and symbols, internalization of an ideology and altruism) and a utilitarian system 
(economic rationality, maximization of profits, self-interest), (Albert and Whetten, 1985; 
Foreman and Whetten, 2002).  
Nilsson et al. (2012) suggest that a social capital theoretical framework might contribute to 
explain some cases of failures of large and complex traditionally organized agricultural 
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cooperatives during the last decades. Our approach inspired by Grandori and Furnari (2008), 
provides a basis for linking governance mechanisms to member commitment, and ultimately 
to performance of modern cooperatives. Because the agricultural cooperative is a hybrid 
identity (Albert and Whetten, 1985), or a multiple-identity organization (Foreman and 
Whetten, 2002), it is the members’ perception of the governance mechanisms that will affect 
commitment.  
Limitations 
This study has a number of caveats and limitations. The first limitation is a consequence of 
the cross-sectional analysis, which does not allow the understanding of the shifts in the 
relationship between governance mechanisms and commitment. Members’ psychological 
state varies over time during the relationship with the cooperative. The second limitation is 
that the cross-sectional analysis is undertaken among members of one cooperative only. 
Consequently, it is more difficult to generalize the links between governance mechanisms and 
commitment to other cooperatives.  
Managerial implications  
Our results can contribute to solving the managerial problem of how to strengthen 
commitment in such a complex organization as the agricultural cooperative. A first 
implication for managers and directors of an agricultural cooperative is that, if the cooperative 
has to vertically coordinate in high-value supply chains, rewarding farmers appropriately is 
important for maintaining commitment both to collective action and to customer orientation. 
A second implication is that giving “voice” and building a social community for members and 
their families are important. Involved members are more committed to collective action, that 
is, more willing to sacrifice short-term economic gains for the sake of the cooperative’s long 
term performance. This suggests that overcoming the traditional collective action dilemma is 
still important, especially if the cooperative has to vertically coordinate in high-value supply 
chains successfully. It is advised to combine at least the following organization practices: 
hierarchy control, market incentives, community involvement and democratic voice. Finally, 
communication is an important tool for enhancing farmers’ commitment to customer 
orientation.  
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4. MEMBERSHIP MOTIVATIONS AND PARTICIPATION 
BEHAVIOUR
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 A version of this chapter was published as Cechin, A.; Bijman, J.; Pascucci, S.; Zylbersztajn, D; Omta, O. 
‘Drivers of pro-active member participation in agricultural cooperatives: evidence from Brazil’. Annals of 
Public and Cooperative Economics, Volume 84, Issue 4, 2013. 
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4. Membership motivations and participation behaviour 
4.1 Introduction 
Heterogeneity of membership has been claimed to have a negative effect on the efficiency of 
the collective action organization. The more heterogeneous the membership the more difficult 
to achieve goal congruence and, thereby, the higher will be the decision-making costs 
(Hansmann, 1996; 1999). Membership heterogeneity raises even more relevant concerns in 
agricultural cooperatives, since every resource allocation decision becomes a potential source 
of decision-making costs (Pozzobon and Zylbersztajn, 2013), due to potentially conflicting 
members’ interests regarding the distribution of benefits (Sogaard, 1994). In addition, the 
more heterogeneous the membership the more members’ will attempt to informally, that is, 
outside meetings, influence board and management decisions (Cook, 1995; Iliopoulos and 
Cook, 1999; Milgrom and Roberts, 1988), thereby increasing influence costs. According to 
Milgrom and Roberts (1999: 80) “influence costs arise first because individuals and groups 
within the organization spend time, effort, and ingenuity in attempting to affect others’ 
decisions to their benefit and secondly because inefficient decisions result either directly from 
these influence activities or, less directly, from attempts to prevent or control them”.  
The problem of membership heterogeneity may become particularly problematic when 
cooperatives become larger and/or more diverse in their activities, and where different 
activities of the cooperative cater to different groups of members (Fulton and Giannakas, 
2001). The basic assumption in most of the literature on member heterogeneity and its adverse 
effect on the process and outcomes of decision-making is that farmers pursue individual or 
subgroup interests when participating in the decision-making of the cooperative.  
As cooperatives are organizations owned and controlled by the members (Dunn, 1988), active 
member involvement in cooperative decision-making is essential for its functioning and 
viability (Spear, 2004). Farmers, however, differ in their individual commitment to participate 
in the governance of the cooperative. Some farmers always attend the General Assembly 
(GA) and may even become involved in board activities, other farmers never or hardly ever 
show up at cooperative meetings. Obviously, farmers have different reasons to passively or 
actively participate.  
Few studies exist on the motivations of farmers to participate in the governance of the 
cooperative (with the exception of Birchall and Simmons (2004) for consumer cooperatives, 
Romero and Perez (2003) for worker cooperatives, and Barraud-Didier et al. (2012) for 
farmer cooperatives). Farmers participate because they obtain direct and indirect benefits, 
most of which will be realized at the farm level.  
Farmers make a variety of decisions related to their membership. The first decision is about 
membership itself; the farmer has particular reasons for becoming a member. These reasons 
are primarily economic. The second decision is about patronizing the cooperative. Not all 
members buy from or sell to the cooperative. In some countries and some cooperatives 
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patronizing is compulsory (particularly in single purpose marketing cooperatives), but in 
many countries and many multipurpose cooperatives farmers can choose to buy from and sell 
to the cooperative or to trade with non-cooperative firms. The third decision is about 
participating in the General Assembly and thus voting in elections and for major decisions. 
The fourth decision is about actively participating in the decision-making bodies of the 
cooperative, such as in the board of directors, the board of supervisors, or specialized 
committees. 
If members primarily pursue individual economic interests, there may be a relationship 
between the economic reasons for becoming a member (and maintaining membership) and the 
motivation to participate in the governance of the cooperative. In a diversified cooperative 
even if members attribute the same importance to a certain economic motivation for their 
association, such as better prices, this already means a potential conflict in decision-making 
because different products will have different price policies and different margins for internal 
adjustments. Members producing different commodities might also dispute over the procedure 
of patronage refund distribution and the allocation of budget for technical assistance to 
member farms. To meet the assumption that members pursue individual interests when 
participating in the governance, there should be an empirically observable correlation between 
economic motivation for association and participation in the governance. 
The objective of this chapter is to explore whether a large cooperative with diverse activities 
is necessarily incurring inefficiencies in the process and outcomes of decision-making. More 
specifically, the paper contends the assumption that farmers are pursuing individual or 
subgroup interests when participating in the decision-making of the cooperative. To meet this 
commonly held assumption, there should be an empirically observable correlation between 
economic motivation for association and participation in the governance. Thus, the specific 
research question this chapter wants to answer is: How do farmers’ economic motivations for 
continued membership
4
 in a cooperative affect the likelihood of them participating pro-
actively in the governance? In order to do such an assessment we developed a typology of 
member participation with four categories: passive, occasional supporter, involved and pro-
active. This chapter presents a case study of a large, diversified multi-purpose cooperative 
from the South of Brazil. We use primary data on the motivations of farmers to maintain their 
membership as well as on their participation at different levels in the governance of the 
cooperative. 
This chapter is divided in four sections. Section 4.2 presents the different ways of 
participating in the governance and explains the categories. Section 4.3 presents the factors 
affecting participation and the hypotheses to be tested. Section 4.4 describes the background 
of the study, the data gathering process, the measuring of the concepts and the empirical 
                                                 
4
 We use motivations for continued membership instead of motivations for becoming a member because our 
respondents were incumbent members, most for many years, and we were interested in current motivations not 
past motivations. 
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strategy. Results are presented in Section 4.5 and the discussion and implications in Section 
4.6, before the conclusion in Section 4.7. 
4.2 From passive to pro-active participation 
All around the world, internal decision-making structures of cooperatives consist of a General 
Assembly (GA) and a Board of Directors (Henrij, 2005). Historically the chairman of the 
Board of Directors (BoD) was also the manager of the cooperative. In some countries the 
chairman of the BoD continues to carry out the task of the CEO (Bialoskorski Neto, 2003; 
Costa et al., 2013). In other countries, and particularly in large cooperatives, management has 
been delegated to professionals who are appointed by the BoD. The role of the professional 
management, where it exists, has been to carry out what the BoD had decided (Liang and 
Hendrikse, 2013a). 
It is possible to distinguish between two types of participation in the governance of the 
cooperative; one type consists of participating in the GA and the other type consists of 
occupying a position in a board or committee. A member can exert his formal decision rights 
by participating in the GA, which usually takes place once a year. Voting in the GA is an 
essential part of the democratic character of decision making in cooperatives, and most 
cooperatives apply the principle of “one-member-one-vote”. In the GA, members elect the 
members of the BoD, vote on major strategic decisions, and approve the annual financial 
report of the cooperative. Cooperative decision making process is based on representative 
democracy, as most decisions are taken by the elected BoD. The control of the GA over the 
decisions of the BoD usually is ex-post, although cooperatives’ bylaws may include the right 
of prior approval by the GA of major decisions by the BoD (Bijman et al., 2012). The choice 
of decision initiatives to be implemented by the BoD and the measuring of performance lays 
with the members in GA. Furthermore, besides exercising their formal decision power 
through voting, members of a cooperative participate in the GA to become informed, to 
express their opinions to share experiences and information. It is the main platform for 
discussions and for members to show their dissatisfaction with any policy. 
In addition to participating in the GA, members can increase their role in decision-making by 
taking part in diverse committees and boards (Barraud-Didier et al., 2012), such as the BoD 
and the Supervisory Board (SB). This way a member has an opportunity to directly influence 
strategies, policies and projects of the cooperative. The generation of proposals for resource 
utilization and the execution of ratified decisions are the responsibility of the BoD (Minguez-
Vera et al., 2010). The SB, which is appointed by the GA, is responsible for by looking after 
the interests of the company as a whole, not just the interests of members, by controlling ex-
ante the activities and decisions of the BoD (Bijman et al., 2012). 
In terms of participation in the governance of the cooperative, Birchall and Simmons (2004) 
proposed that members can be grouped into (1) ‘believers’ who are potential board members; 
(2) the ‘supporters’ who participate by attending annual meetings and social events; and (3) 
the members who do not participate, but are loyal suppliers and are satisfied if they are kept 
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informed. Although Birchall and Simmons’ (2004) categories are based on the strength of 
members’ beliefs, it is a useful point of departure for the categorization of members on the 
extent of their participation in the governance of the cooperative.  
In this chapter, we jointly analyze two forms of participation in the governance of the 
cooperative, by combining both frequency of participation in the GA and occupation of 
management or representative position. For this, we propose the following typology of 
member participation: (1) Passive, who has merely an economic relationship with the 
cooperative, since this member is not interested in getting involved in decision making in any 
way; (2) Occasional supporter, who will sometimes vote in the GA, eventually on strategic 
decisions that affects him or her directly; (3) Involved, who will always vote in the GA, 
therefore is more involved in democratic decision making. Having a voice is intrinsically 
important for the involved member; (4) Pro-active, who believes he or she can influence the 
cooperative’s performance in anyway, and who will, therefore, occupy positions at any board 
or committee at various levels exercising either managing functions or representative 
functions or both. They have been or are the potential leaders of the cooperative. 
4.3 Theoretical Framework 
Variance in members’ age, in educational levels, and farm size are all sources of 
heterogeneity and therefore of influence and decision making costs. Variance in member’ age 
means different preferences regarding long and short-term investments. Crucial business 
decisions require members’ consensus and a large gap in education levels could threaten it. 
Finally, differences between members in terms of farm size have also been shown to be a 
major source of conflict of interests within cooperatives (Iliopoulos and Cook, 1999). 
However, in one cooperative with a heterogeneous membership, how do these factors relate to 
participation in the decision-making? 
Since we are interested both in participating in the GA and in direct decision making of a 
democratic member organization, we base our working hypotheses on political theory. In their 
empirical analysis of participation in political parties, Whiteley and Seyd (1996) combined 
individual endowments, rational choice and social psychological factors as factors explaining 
participatory behavior. We expect that these general factors are also able to explain the 
categories of participation behaviour of members of a cooperative. We adapt, however, this 
general framework to agricultural cooperatives by separating the drivers into endowments, 
economic motivations for continued association and ideological motivation for continued 
association.  
4.3.1 Endowments  
It has been shown in political theory that people must have sufficient resources to be able to 
participate effectively in civic activities. Individuals with high levels of education and income 
are more likely to participate than those who lack these resources (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 
1980; Verba et al., 1993). Whiteley and Seyd (1996) refer to explanations that rely on 
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individual endowments (or resources) as a supply-side model of participation, where 
individuals who possess high levels of education, income and socio-economic status, will 
‘supply’ higher levels of participation than individuals who do not have these characteristics. 
In agricultural cooperatives, farmers might have different attitudes towards the cooperative 
and participation behavior depending on their age, education, or the size of the farm under 
their responsibility (Hansen et al. 2002; Österberg and Nilsson 2009).  
Duration of membership is likely to influence commitment
5
 to the cooperative (Trechter et al., 
2002). We expect that there is a positive relationship between duration of membership and 
pro-active participation. Young farmers are less interested in committing themselves to the 
cooperative, especially to the democratic process within the cooperative (Hakelius, 1996, 
1999). Older farmers which have successors to take over the farm can devote more time and 
energy to non-farm activities. Becoming a director of the cooperative could be one of these 
non-farm activities. Farmers may also have personal ambitions to become politically active at 
local or regional level. Participation in the governance of the cooperative can be considered 
both a good training in decision-making in a democratic organisation and a vehicle for self-
promotion. Occupying a representative or management position in a board or committee is 
then an investment in developing a political career (Whiteley and Seyd, 1996). The link 
between duration of membership and participation in the GA, however, is not as clear. 
Therefore, we can only expect that the longer is the duration of membership, the higher the 
likelihood of a member being pro-active. 
When it comes to voting behavior, game-theoretic models suggest that those with a higher 
level of education have access to better information about candidates and issues, and therefore 
will vote in greater numbers (Feddersen, 2004). In fact, voter turnout has been shown to be 
empirically correlated with education and income levels (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).  
Although Trechter et al. (2002) have shown that as the level of formal education of a member 
increases, the commitment level declines, the theoretical expected relationship with pro-active 
participation in the decision making of cooperatives could be a positive one. Members with a 
higher formal education level are likely to have better information on the (market) 
environment in which the cooperative operates and therefore to participate more frequently in 
General Assemblies, and more importantly, to feel more confident in pursuing a position in a 
board or committee. Farmers with greater human capital have a higher probability to obtain 
authority, economic benefits, or political benefits. In China, the education level of 
chairpersons was significantly higher than the average education level of farmers (Liang and 
Hendrikse, 2013b). Romero and Perez (2003) found that differences in the formal education 
level do affect the possibilities of participation. The least educated individuals perceived not 
                                                 
5
 This paper is not about commitment, which is different from what we are calling pro-active participation. 
However, due to a relative lack of theoretical guidance to build hypotheses, we borrowed from empirical studies 
on member commitment in agricultural cooperatives. Overcoming the free-rider problem is at the core of the 
cooperative’s collective action dilemma, and the ‘glue’ of commitment (Fulton, 1999) mitigates this problem. 
Because commitment incorporates a willingness to make a sacrifice to contribute to the organization’s success 
(Solinger et al., 2008), we expect some coincidence between the drivers of commitment and those of pro-active 
participation. 
70 
 
having any influence on the governance, felt deprived of information and perceived a lower 
level of participation. Therefore, we expect that the higher the level of education, the more 
likely that a member will be involved or pro-active. We expect that the lower the level of 
education the more likely that a member will be an occasional supporter.  
Finally, farms with larger production capacity are likely to be less dependent on the 
cooperative for market access and, therefore, less willing to be loyal when they see short-term 
economic benefits outside (Ollila et al., 2012). Furthermore, they are more often considering 
exiting (Ollila et al., 2012). However, the same rationale that is used for loyalty is not 
necessarily applicable to participation. If farm size is taken as a proxy for number of 
employees, than we would expect that large farms are more likely to have the farmer in a full-
time management position, which may give him or her more opportunity to participate in the 
governance of the cooperative. There is some evidence showing that usually it is larger 
farmers who set up cooperatives in the first place and later occupy a position in the Board. In 
the United States, for example, most one-member-one vote cooperatives prefer to elect 
directors from among the relatively largest farmers in their membership (Reynolds, 2004). 
About 63% of one member-one vote cooperatives elect directors who are among the largest 
half of farm operating size in the membership. Also evidence from China shows that farmers 
with large farms are the one that establish new cooperatives and become member of the BoD 
(Bijman and Hu, 2011). We expect that the larger the size of the farm, the more likely that a 
member will be pro-active.  
The link between farm size and participation in the GA, however, is not as clear. In one-
member-one-vote cooperatives, large farmers have the same voting power in the GA as a 
farmer with an economically insignificant contribution to the cooperative. On the one hand, 
this could work as a disincentive for the large farmer to be involved. On the other hand, large 
farmers are keen on networking and the GA is an important platform for this, so we could also 
expect larger farmers to participate in the GA. Therefore, we would expect the larger the farm 
size the more likely a member will be an occasional supporter who will attend the GA only in 
occasions of major strategic decisions that affect him or her more directly. 
4.3.2 Economic motivations  
As farmers are economic actors, their first motivation to be a member of a cooperative is gain 
economic benefits. Typical economic motivations for association
6
 are improved bargaining 
power, reduced uncertainty related to input and output market access, reduced marketing 
costs, and the provision of technical assistance and credit. Also protecting specific 
                                                 
6
 The reason we use ‘motivation for continued association’ instead of the original motivation for joining the 
cooperative in the first place, is that we are interested in farmers who are already members, most for many years, 
and in current motivations not past motivations. Some of the motivations for joining a cooperative such as 
reduction of marketing costs and a secure market access are not likely to continue as motivations for continued 
membership. Furthermore, if members have joined a cooperative many years ago, the link between the 
motivations on that occasion and their current participation behavior in the decision making process is rather 
weak. 
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investments at the farm level has been claimed as a major reason for farmer to become 
members of a cooperative (Borgen, 2004), particularly in the dairy industry (Staatz, 1987).  
Farmers’ decision to participate in the governance of a cooperative implies direct and indirect 
costs (opportunity costs), by allocating time to stay informed, engage in decision-making 
processes and control managers (Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Bontemps and Fulton, 2009). These 
costs are only limited when participating in the GA is concerned but may be substantial when 
the member occupies a position in the cooperative governance. In return, there might be 
individual pecuniary or non-pecuniary advantages of being part of the core of members who 
make decisions (Hwang, 2005). By occupying a position in a board or committee, members 
access strategic information that can be used for the benefit of their own farm. Also they have 
a higher degree of influence on the strategy and policies of the cooperative, which may 
indirectly benefit their own farming activities (Bialoskorski Neto, 2006). To some extent, 
some economic motivations for continued association could affect both member participation 
in the GA and occupation of a management or representative position in the cooperative. We 
elected four economic motivations which might be related to participation, and they are lack 
of credible alternatives, better prices, technical assistance and patronage refunds. 
Farmers need cooperatives particularly in a situation of uncompetitive markets (monopsony, 
monopoly, missing markets), since they allow farmers to build countervailing market power. 
This is a major reason to set up cooperatives. From a farmer’s perspective, the lack of credible 
alternatives might be an important reason to join and to continue as a member of a 
cooperative. The degree of choice varies among farmers. Some farmers might prefer to 
transact with a cooperative for a number of reasons, whereas others might see in the 
cooperative their only alternative to a secure market access, due to their very lower 
technological level and scale which make them vulnerable, or to distance, for example. It is 
likely that the member who continues its association due to a lack of credible alternatives will 
not be interested in decision making once secure market access through the cooperative has 
been attained. Therefore we expect a negative relationship between lack of credible 
alternatives and participation. The lower is the importance of this motivation for continued 
association the more likely a member will be involved or pro-active.  
It is reasonable to say that better prices for farm products is an ubiquitous economic 
motivation for continued association among farmers of a cooperative. Once the farmer has 
made specific investments at the farm level, he or she will try to reduce the risk of hold-up 
(Sykuta and Cook, 2001; Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002) by the cooperative firm. Therefore it 
is reasonable to expect that members will demand, at least, that prices are not compressed. 
Trying to influence the price paid for farm products is particularly important in a multi-
product cooperative. Different products have different price policies and, therefore, different 
margins of maneuver. Prices for some commodities depend heavily on the international 
market environment, while for other products there is room for internal adjustments. The odds 
of affecting prices by voting in the GA are very small, but members who are not satisfied with 
the prices received for their products might attempt to influence managers and representatives 
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during the GA meetings. Therefore we expect that better prices as an important motivation for 
continued association will increase the likelihood of being an involved member. Moreover, 
there might be some room for affecting prices at higher level of decision making. Therefore, 
we also expect that better prices as an important motivation for continued association will 
increase the likelihood of being a pro-active member. 
On the other hand, technical assistance and patronage refunds are more subject to members’ 
influence particularly at higher levels of decision making. At the BoD and SB levels 
consensus norms facilitates the dialogue which involves several points of view (Reynolds, 
1997; 2000). If the cooperative increases quality requirements from its suppliers, the 
members, it should also provide them with more technical assistance (Cechin et al., 2013b). 
Because the cooperative as a firm could be reluctant to provide any extra technical assistance, 
farmers might informally attempt to influence the provision of technical assistance to their 
individual benefit, through participating more in the GA meetings. Particularly in a multi-
product cooperative, with different demands on quality, farmers who have made investments 
in improving quality at the farm level are likely to demand more assistance. Moreover, by 
occupying a representative or management position a farmer might try to influence the 
decision on the provision of technical assistance to benefit the whole group of farmers that the 
member is part of. Therefore, we expect that technical assistance as an important motivation 
for continued association will increase the likelihood of being an involved or a pro-active 
member. In this case, since budget allocated to technical assistance is of strategic interest and 
is more subject to members’ influence, it might be a sufficient reason for the occasional 
supporters to participate. We expect, therefore, that technical assistance as an important 
motivation for continued association will also increase the likelihood of being an occasional 
supporter. 
Patronage refund concerns the distribution of profits both in absolute and in relative terms. 
There is the decision on how much of the profit will be distributed as patronage refunds and 
how much will be re-invested in the cooperative, and the decision on what is the procedure to 
distribute profit among members. Influencing rent distribution (Bontems and Fulton, 2009) 
might be an important reason to participate both in the GA and at higher levels of decision 
making. We expect, therefore, that members who consider patronage refunds as an important 
motivation for their continued association will be more likely to participate frequently in the 
GA and to have occupied a position, that is, it increases the likelihood of being an involved or 
pro-active member. Moreover, because in extra ordinary occasions the cooperative might 
need to change the proportion of profit that is distributed as patronage refund and this must be 
voted upon in the GA, we also expect that the higher is the importance attributed to patronage 
refunds as a motivation for continued association, the higher the likelihood of being an 
occasional supporter. This type of member only participates in the GA when there is some 
major decision on issues that affect them more directly.  
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4.3.3 Ideology  
Since people are embedded in a network of social norms, values and beliefs, there are also 
socio-psychological factors affecting the choice of participation. There is considerable 
evidence that voters are motivated to vote by a sense of civic duty (Blais, 2000). Furthermore, 
it has been shown that voters base their choice on overall social assessments (Kinder and 
Kiewiet, 1979; Markus, 1988), motivated by altruistic or ethical concerns for the welfare of 
others rather than narrowly defined self-interest (Feddersen, 2004). These socio-psychological 
motivations can be understood as ideology.  As Parsons defined it, “ideologies are the shared 
framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide both an 
interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be 
structured” (1951: 24).  
From a socio-psychological perspective, ideologies may function as pre-packaged units of 
interpretation that spread because of basic human motives to understand the world, avoid 
existential threat, and maintain valued interpersonal relationships (Jost et al., 2008). Ideology 
as a motivation for pro-active involvement cannot be seen as maximizing net individualistic 
benefits for farmers since is not the outcome of some utility calculus (Whiteley and Seyd, 
1996). 
Cooperative ideology refers to the set of ideas and values as expressed by cooperative 
principles (for instance the ones by the ICA), which are guidelines for how to put ideals and 
values into practice. Two principles are of special interest in understanding member pro-
active participation in the governance: democratic member control and concern for 
community. The principle of democratic member control defines the way in which members 
will make decisions. It assumes that members will participate in setting policy and giving 
broad direction to cooperative activities in a way in which no member has more "voice" than 
any other member. Grounded in the values of social responsibility and caring for others, the 
principle of concern for community refers to providing for all members and making 
contributions to a better society at large.  
Fulton (1999) argues that historically cooperative ideology is the very source of farmers’ 
commitment
7
 to the cooperative. Cooperatives are more needed in uncompetitive markets 
(monopsony, monopoly, missing markets), since they allow farmers to build countervailing 
market power. In competitive markets, however, there might be less need for cooperatives. 
Therefore, those who decide to continue as committed members, and particularly those who 
participate pro-actively in the decision making are likely to have cooperative ideology as an 
important motivation for their continued association. Hakelius (1996, 1999) found that 
fairness and solidarity were the top ranking reasons to participate in the cooperative’s 
democratic process, at least for older farmers. 
                                                 
7
 See footnote n. 2 on page 5. 
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We expect that the more important cooperative ideology as a motivation for continued 
association, the more likely a member will be involved or pro-active. Members who have 
incorporated cooperative ideology are less likely to omit themselves form the decision making 
process, and the more likely to participate in the GA and even serve as a representative. If 
cooperative ideology is not an important reason for continuing the association, it is more 
likely that the member will be passive or an occasional supporter.  
In Table 1 we summarize the expected relationships (and strength) between factors and our 
categories of participation in the governance of the cooperative.  
 
Table 4.1 Drivers of member participation 
Factors affecting 
participation 
Dimensions 
Occasional 
supporter 
Involved Pro-active 
Endowments 
 
 
Duration of membership 
Level of Education 
Total farm size 
 
(+/-) 
(-) 
(+) 
 
(+/-) 
(+) 
(+/-) 
 
(++) 
(++) 
(++) 
 
Economic motivations 
for continued 
association 
 
 
Lack of alternatives 
Better price 
Technical assistance 
Patronage refund 
(+/-) 
(+/-) 
(+) 
(+) 
(--) 
(+) 
(+) 
(+) 
(--) 
(++) 
 (++) 
(++) 
Ideological motivation 
for continued 
association 
 
Cooperative ideology 
 
(-) (+) (++) 
Source: own elaboration 
 
As a control we use members’ farm products. In a multi-product cooperative the specific farm 
product a member delivers or the fact of being specialized rather than diversified at the farm 
level could be an important driver of participation. 
4.4 Methods and data 
In Brazil, ownership rights are defined by federal law 5764/71, which closely follows 
traditional cooperative principles. Costa et al. (2013) have found that only 8% of their sample 
of Brazilian agricultural cooperatives had complete separation of decision control from 
decision management functions, following a model that is common in North America, 
northern Europe, and Oceania (Chaddad & Iliopoulos, 2013). Only farmer-members compose 
the board, and, in most cases, the direct administration of the cooperative is also done by the 
Chairman of the Board, who is usually a farmer-member. The Chairman of the Board has the 
functions of CEO in Brazilian cooperatives, including the civil responsibilities of this 
position. The supervisory board (SB) is also composed by members only, who may not be 
members of the BoD (and vice versa). The main role of the SB is internal auditing (Chaddad 
and Iliopoulos, 2013). It is also common that agricultural cooperatives from southern Brazil 
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have the so-called Educational Committee, which has the function of advising the 
administration board and informing the membership (Bialoskorski Neto, 2003; 2006).  
The cooperative in the case study is Lar, a large multi-product processing agricultural 
cooperative, with 6,779 members distributed among eleven towns in the state of Paraná. Most 
of them are soybeans producers. About half of the membership has at least one extra farm 
product besides soybeans, such as swine, broilers, vegetables, cassava or milk (Lar, 2008; 
Marschall, 2009). Like most cooperatives in that state, Lar was founded in the 1960’s initially 
by a very small number of farmers. Lar was ranked in 1990 for the first time among the 500 
biggest companies in terms of turnover in the country. By the end of the 1990’s Lar became 
definitely a food producer, with its own brand for frozen poultry meat (Marschall, 2009), and 
the turnover jumped from US$ 55 million to US$ 900 million over a period of sixteen years 
(1995-2011). The most important businesses within the cooperative in terms of turnover share 
are soybeans (24%) and broiler (19%), (Lar, 2011). 
About 600 members attended the General Assembly in 2011, which aimed to approve the 
balance sheets of that year and the allocation of the surplus (US$ 4.7 million) between 
investment (US$ 2.8 million) and patronage refund (US$ 1.9 million) to the members 
according to the volume of their transactions with the cooperative (Lar, 2011).  
In cooperative Lar, the structure in which a member can occupy a position is divided into 
several boards and committees. Besides the BoD and its executive directory, there is a 
supervisory board, different advisory boards (legal, education, and internal audit) and several 
committees (education, mothers, youth). Finally, in every town there is a cooperative unit for 
general purposes, such as for pre-assembly and committee meetings, selling inputs, mainly for 
soybean production and serving also as a base for the technicians.  
4.4.1  Data collection 
A survey method was used to collect data on participation and motivation. A questionnaire 
using a five-point Likert scale (anchored between “Not important at all” and “Very 
important”) items for motivation, three-point scale (“never”, “sometimes” and “always”) 
items for participation in GAs, and a dichotomous scale (“yes” or “no”) for occupying a 
position in the decision making structure, was distributed among members of the analyzed 
cooperative between December of 2010 and April of 2011. A disproportionate stratified 
sample was taken from members in seven (of the eleven) towns. The total sample of 148 
producers consisted of vegetable, broiler, soybeans, cassava, milk, and swine producers. 
Approximately half of this sample are diversified producers (more than one farm product), 
which reflects the proportion within the total membership population (Marschall, 2009).  
4.4.2  Measurements 
The two original dependent variables were 1) Participation in General Assemblies 
(“never”=0; “sometimes”=1; “always”=2), and 2) Occupying a position at any board of 
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committee (No=0; Yes=1). Merging attendance in GA with occupation in a position, by 
summing the scores (see Table 2), resulted in five combinations of member types: the 
passives, who never participate in GAs and have never occupied any function, the supporters 
who sometimes participate in GAs and have never occupied a position (occasional 
supporters), those who sometimes participate in GAs and have occupied a position, the 
supporters who always participate in GAs and have never occupied a position (involved), and 
the pro-actives, members who always participate in GAs and have occupied a position. Those 
who sometimes participate in GAs and have occupied a position were considered pro-active 
members. It is reasonable that occupying a position more than compensates the fact of 
participating “sometimes” instead of “always”, in terms of pro-activeness. So in the end we 
had four categories. 
Table 4.2 Measuring Pro-activeness 
 Passive 
Occasional 
supporter 
Involved Pro-active 
 
“Have you ever occupied a position in a 
board or committee (as representative or 
manager at any level)?” (Yes or No) (0;1) 
0 0 0 1 
 
“How often do you vote in General 
Assemblies?” (Never/Sometimes/Always) 
(0;1;2) 
0 1 2 1 or 2 
 
Final score 
0 1 2 3 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Endowments were measured with three variables: 1) length of membership (number of years 
of membership); 2) level of education (where (i) no formal education; (ii) incomplete primary; 
(iii) complete primary; (iv) complete high school; (v) technical school; (vi) college); and 3) 
size of farm (size of own farmland plus rented farmland in hectares). 
Economic motivations for continued association were measured with six variables: 1) lack of 
alternatives, 2) better prices for farm products, 3) technical assistance, and 4) patronage 
refunds. In the questionnaire members were posed the question “What is the importance of 
(...) as a motivation for your continued association?” (Five-point scale of importance from 
“Not important at all” to “Very important”). 
For Ideology, members were posed the question “What is the importance of Cooperative 
ideology as a motivation for your continued association?” (Five-point scale of importance 
from “Not important at all” to “Very important”). 
For the member’s farm product, our control, we had two dummies. One indicating whether a 
member is a specialized soy producer and another dummy indicating whether a member is a 
poultry producer (not necessarily specialized). This means our omitted variable for the type of 
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production includes non-specialized soybeans producers (which might have also cassava, milk 
or swine) and vegetable producers. 
 
4.4.3  Empirical strategy 
A multinomial logit regression was undertaken for the new variable that combines both types 
of participation into four categories of pro-activeness.  
PARTj = β1 + β2*ENDOWj + β3*ECONj + β4*IDEOj + β5*PRODj + εj   (1) 
Where PART j represents all of four categories of participation (or pro-activeness), ENDOWj 
represents the endowments (size of farm, duration of membership, level of education), ECONj 
represents the economic motivations for continued association, IDEOj represents cooperative 
ideology as a motivation for continued association, and PRODj represents the control dummy 
variables (specialized soy, broiler), with j = 1...148. 
The goodness of fit and prediction was examined by examining McFadden’s pseudo-R2. 
Importantly, we control for the case of errors being clustered. If observations within each 
town are correlated due to some common unobserved factor, standard errors could be inflated 
leading to incorrect inference. For this reason, the errors of observations from the same town 
were modelled as correlated with each other. 
4.5 Results  
First, the frequencies of the two components – participation in GAs and occupation of a 
position – and the resulting dependent variable – pro-activeness - are presented. Second, we 
present the frequencies of endowments variables. Third, the explanatory variables that are 
dependent on members’ perceptions – economic motivations for continued association - are 
presented in Table 3. Finally, the results of the multinomial logit are presented. 
The number of members who “never” attends GAs was 15 (10.1%), those who attend 
“sometimes” were 70 (47.3%), and 63 (42.6%) members said they “always” participate. From 
our sample, 23% of members had occupied a position in the decision-making structure of the 
cooperative. After adding the two variables, fifteen members were passive, 65 were 
occasional supporters, 36 were involved and 32 were pro-active members. That is, 18.5% of 
the members are pro-active in the sense that they always (or sometimes
8
) participate in GAs 
and have occupied a position in the decision-making structure.  
From our sample, 47 members (31.7%) are specialized soy producers and 58 (39.2%) are 
broiler. The remaining 43 members are either vegetable producers or non-specialized soy 
                                                 
8 Five members had occupied a position and attend GAs “sometimes” instead of always. They were, nonetheless, 
considered pro-active members. 
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producer (besides soy, one or more of the following activities: swine, milk or cassava). The 
minimum farm size was two hectares, the maximum size was 580 hectares, and the average 
size was 36 hectares (standard deviation of 66 hectares). Regarding duration of membership, 
some farmers had joined that year (2010) while some had been members for 40 years (since 
1970). The average length of membership was seventeen years (standard deviation of ten 
years). The cooperative was founded in 1964. The level of education of the members in our 
sample was distributed in the following way: 0.7% had no formal education, 30.4% had 
incomplete primary school, 29.1% had complete primary school, 29.7% had high school, 
2.7% had technical school, and 7.4% had been to college (for the table with descriptive 
statistics, see Appendix 5). 
Table 3 shows the explanatory variables that are dependent on members’ perceptions –
motivations for continued association - where the degrees of importance of each motivation 
for continued association are related to the percentage of members who attributed that score. 
Table 4.3 Frequencies of ‘Motivation for continued association’ (being a member) 
responses  
 Coop ideology Better prices Lack of 
alternative  
Technical 
assistance 
Patron 
refund 
Percent 
Not important at all 5.4 0.7 21.6 1.4 4.8 
Not important 6.8 6.1 35.8 4.1 6.8 
Neutral 12.8 12.8 12.2 2.0 7.4 
Important 48.6 48.0 20.9 48.6 43.2 
Very Important 26.4 32.4 9.5 43.9 37.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: own elaboration 
  
A Hausman-McFadden (1984) test statistic has been proposed to test this assumption of 
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), that is, membership in one category cannot be 
related to the membership of another category (i.e., the dependent variable). The test statistic 
is a chi-square and significant values would indicate that the IIA assumption has been 
violated. All the four P values were non-significant. 
Multi-collinearity was checked using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and the Condition 
Index. The individual VIF values are lower than 10 and the average is not substantially 
greater than 1, none of the values for the Tolerance statistics were below 0.2 (Field, 2005), 
and the condition index is smaller than 30 (see Appendix 6), which means multi-collinearity is 
not a serious concern. Pair-wise correlations were also not relevant since the highest one was 
of -0.4, between duration of membership and education. 
Table 4 shows the variables that correlate with the different categories of member 
participation in the governance of the cooperative. The longer was the duration of 
membership, the higher the likelihood of being an involved (β = 0.084) or pro-active (β = 
0.172) member. The lower is the level of formal education obtained by a member of this 
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cooperative, the higher the likelihood of being an occasional supporter (β = -0.929). The more 
important are better prices as a motivation for continued association, the higher the likelihood 
of being an occasional supporter (β = 0.510) or an involved member (β = 0.617). The more 
important is technical assistance as a motivation for continued association, the higher the 
likelihood of being an occasional supporter (β = 0.516) or an involved member (β = 0.540). 
Finally, the more important is cooperative ideology as a motivation for continued association, 
the higher the likelihood of being a pro-active member (β = 1.312). Our control variables 
were positively related to participation. Being a specialized soy producer or a broiler producer 
increases the likelihood of a member being in any of the three categories that have some 
degree of participation. 
 
Table 4.4 Pro-activeness
9
 
 Occasional supporters Involved Pro-active 
 Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
Duration of membership  0.050 0.043 0.084** 0.036     0.172∗∗∗ 0.022 
Level of Education  -0.929∗ 0.476    -0.572 0.408       0.288 0.489 
Farm size  -0.003 0.002    -0.007 0.006      -0.001 0.009 
Lack of alternatives  -0.170 0.131    -0.371 0.249      -0.636 0.387 
Better price  0.510∗ 0.263  0.617** 0.313       1.000 0.686 
Technical assistance  0.516∗ 0.282     0.540* 0.307       1.073 0.655 
Patronage refunding 0.186 0.286    -0.003 0.265      -0.119 0.482 
Coop ideology -0.074 0.338     0.450 0.394  1.312∗∗ 0.568 
Specialized Soy 3.242∗∗ 1.315 3.289** 1.546  2.970∗∗ 1.488 
Broiler 1.148∗∗ 0.555     0.753 0.561  1.191∗∗ 0.548 
Constant -0.864 2.471 -4.073** 1.968 -15.485∗∗∗ 4.435 
 
Number of obs. 148 
Log pseudo-likelihood -142.245 
Pseudo R2       0.24 
∗ p < 0.1 ; ∗∗ p < 0.05. ; ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. 
 
For logistic regressions, the value of the pseudo-R2 between 0.2 and 0.4 represents a good fit 
(McFadden, 1979: 307). 
4.6 Discussion  
The objective of this chapter was to explore whether a large cooperative with diverse 
activities is necessarily experiencing inefficiencies in the process and outcomes of decision-
making, by contesting the common assumption that farmers are pursuing individual or 
subgroup interests when participating in the decision-making of the cooperative. The chapter 
attempted to answer how farmers’ economic motivations for continued membership in a 
cooperative affect the likelihood of them participating pro-actively in the governance of the 
cooperative. We evaluated four economic motivations – lack of alternatives, better prices, 
                                                 
9 Passive is the base outcome, that is, the comparison group. 
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technical assistance and patronage refunds - that could be a source of decision-making costs 
in a heterogeneous multi-product cooperative. Two of these economic motivations - better 
prices and technical assistance - affected positively the likelihood of participating in the GA, 
but not of being pro-active in boards and committees. Duration of membership and 
cooperative ideology seem to be more important drivers of pro-active participation than the 
economic motivations for continued association. 
Endowments 
The longer was the duration of membership, the higher the likelihood of a member being 
involved or participating pro-actively. Although we did not measure the age of the farmer, the 
duration of membership is probably highly related to it. Older members often can afford to 
spend time on non-farm activities such as participating in the governance of the cooperative. 
The fact that some members as they get older seek to pursue political careers might explain 
why duration of membership increased the likelihood of being pro-active by occupying a 
position. Older members might see greater value in networking in the GA, which would help 
explain why duration of membership also increased the likelihood of always participating in 
the GA.  
That the likelihood of farmers to be in boards or committees is higher when their association 
has lasted longer is not surprising. However, there is no reason to expect this relationship to 
be linear across the membership. It is more likely that pro-active members are a specific 
subset of the membership. In addition, several interesting observations can be made on the 
possible implications of members’ age for the influence costs problem. Age is usually 
associated with particular psychological predispositions. On the one hand, passivity, risk 
aversion and reluctance to change of older directors may result in low monitoring activity and 
decreased cooperative performance. On the other hand, older board members tend to seek 
greater amounts of information when making a decision and to estimate the value of 
information more accurately (Taylor, 1975; Cook and Burress, 2011). This might produce less 
volatility in returns (Child, 1974), and, more importantly, older members have higher ability 
to resist being ethically bent by political pressure (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Therefore, if 
members who occupy positions in boards and committees are older, then, it is likely that they 
will be less flexible towards influence activities and they might even find it easier to take 
“necessary but painful decisions” (Iliopoulos and Hendrikse, 2008).  
Although the education level did not predict the likelihood of a member being pro-active, the 
lower was the education level, the higher was the likelihood of being an occasional supporter, 
as we expected. Members with a low education level might perceive themselves as less 
knowledgeable about technology, strategy and marketing. This is in line with Romero and 
Perez (2003), who found that a high percentage of members of workers’ cooperatives with 
only basic and elementary education perceived having a lower level of participation than 
those with higher education.  
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Economic motivations 
The same two economic motivations - better prices and technical assistance - increased the 
likelihood of participating in the GA, that is, both of a member being an occasional supporter 
and an involved member. However, they did not increase the likelihood of a member being 
pro-active. Membership motivations are often predominantly economic. Economic 
motivations for association might be drivers of members’ voting and even influencing 
activities in the GA. In a heterogeneous multi-product cooperative this might lead to 
additional decision making costs at the GA level, what Pozzobon and Zylberstajn (2013) 
called democratic costs. When farmers are already members of a cooperative they might still 
decide to participate in the democratic process because they expect the cooperative will 
increase their economic benefits at farm level. On one hand, the more homogeneous is the 
membership the more these economic motivations have characteristics of public goods, since 
demanding better prices or higher proportion of budget allocated to technical assistance will 
affect the whole membership in a similar fashion. On the other hand, these are benefits the 
individual member expects at the farm level and in a multiproduct cooperative, economic 
decisions might favor one subgroup and disfavor another group. Here lies the potential for 
influence activities by the members. This might not necessarily be costly, though, if members 
are motivated to participate in the GA by a sense of civic duty and driven by overall social 
assessments concerning the membership’s welfare. Furthermore, membership heterogeneity 
might not necessarily be a source of inefficiency if the organizational goal is precisely to 
satisfy diverse members’ interests.  
Finally, if cooperative ideology is important and economic motivations are not important 
drivers for the member who participates pro-actively in the governance by occupying 
positions in boards and committees, decision-making costs at the Board level might not be 
relevant. Although out of our scope in this study, personal or political ambitions might also be 
important drivers of pro-active participation.  
Cooperative ideology 
Regarding cooperative ideology, the more a member considers it as an important motivation 
for continued association, the more likely she is a pro-active member. Cooperative ideology 
as a motivation for continued association, in contrast, increased the likelihood of being pro-
active, but not the likelihood of being an occasional supporter or an involved member. Indeed, 
participating in any committee or board is more demanding for an individual member than 
attending the General Assembly, and might coincide with a stronger ideological motivation 
for continued association. This relationship might mean that cooperative ideology, as 
expressed by the ICA principles of democratic member control and concern for community, 
has become the broad mission statement for individual members who participate pro-actively 
in the governance, who had the opportunity to directly influence strategies, policies and 
projects of the cooperative. As a result, pro-active member might have a pro-social behavior 
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or act as stewards (Davis et al., 1997) of the cooperative community instead of pursuing their 
own private benefits.  
4.7 Conclusion 
Most conceptualizations of decision-making problems and influence costs derive from 
organizational economics, where agency theory has been quite influential. Agency theory 
makes assumptions that people are fully rational, behave according to stable risk preferences, 
and maximize their self-interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). It has been employed in the 
analysis of cooperatives to understand some of the “costs of ownership” that are incurred 
when farmer-suppliers are the joint owners of the firm (Hansmann 1999). From an agency 
theory perspective, the full membership of the cooperative (as principals) delegates authority 
to the boards and committees (the agents), and the welfare of the membership as a whole is 
affected by the choices of those who effectively make decisions. The influence cost problem 
occurs when different groups of members with opposing interests engage in internal lobby 
activities to promote their own selfish interests. The common assumption in the literature on 
corporate governance is that “individuals at subordinate levels are motivated solely by 
concern for their expected money incomes and that decision makers in the organization seek 
to maximize the organization’s profits” (Milgrom and Roberts, 1988) and that within 
organizations there is goal conflict among members. Milgrom and Roberts (1988) explicitly 
say that there is no room in their assumptions for decision-makers at higher levels to act in a 
fashion inconsonant with the organizational goal, which is profit maximization.  
That is why, when the reasoning is applied to cooperatives, a heterogeneous membership 
would also increase influence and decision-making costs: individual members who participate 
in high level decision-making are doing so to pursue indirect individual benefits at the farm 
level or by seeking benefits of all sorts the rank-and-file member would attempt to influence 
managers and board, who, in turn, would have the objective of maximizing the cooperative’s 
net returns. Either one or the other situation would result in a loss of efficiency for the 
cooperative as a whole. It is argued that this is the reason why most agricultural cooperatives 
have restricted their areas of business to a particular type of product.  
While agency theory is useful for structuring and informing an analysis of the influence of 
members (the principals) over the representatives and managers (agents) in democratic 
member organizations (Spear, 2004), its relevancy might be questioned particularly when 
management is undertaken by members, which is the case in most Brazilian cooperatives 
(Costa et al., 2013), when cooperative success depends more on satisfying diverse members’ 
interests than on maximizing net returns and when cooperative ideology has been successfully 
incorporated into the organizational culture. Members typically have diverse economic 
interests, and consensus is the process of building cohesiveness and incentives for members to 
support the decision (Reynolds, 1997). The survival of agricultural cooperatives most likely 
depends on their capability of satisfying and maintaining their base of farmer members 
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(Hernández-Espallardo et al., 2012) rather than maximizing aggregate patron surplus, which 
do not necessarily coincide. 
Current thinking on member-cooperative relationships may put too much emphasis on 
heterogeneity as a source of inefficiency, by assuming opportunism and misalignment 
between individual motives and organizational objectives. Organizational economics has 
prescribed solutions as tightening control through more hierarchical structures or pay for 
performance, to align individual motives and organizational objectives (Lazear and Shaw, 
2007). However, these prescriptions might increase costs without guaranteeing the expected 
efficiency (Frey and Osterloh, 1999). More importantly, this type of solution increases the 
distance between membership and management and might crowd out intrinsic motivations 
(Frey and Jegen, 2001) of those who have representative or management positions in the 
cooperative. Behavioural and experimental economics have renewed the interest in the 
motivational side of organizations (e.g. Charness and Rabin, 2002; DellaVigna, 2009). Both 
laboratory and field experiments indicate that individuals often show concern for the welfare 
of others in their decision-making, and that intrinsically motivated individuals are less likely 
to free-ride on the delivery of public goods (Degli Antoni, 2009). Although opportunism is a 
potential obstacle to the alignment of individual and collective objectives, theory development 
on these relationships may have to start from the assumption that members who occupy 
representative and managing functions are intrinsically motivated, allegiant to the 
organization, genuinely seeking to further organizational goals rather than to follow private 
motives (Muth and Donaldson, 1998), that the organizational goal is satisfying diverse 
members’ interests rather than maximizing net returns (Cyert and March, 1963), and that the 
members are more likely to have a user mentality than an investor mentality (Borgen 2004) 
Although the model presented a good fit (pseudo-R2 of 0.24), its independent variables can 
only partly explain members’ pro-activeness. An alternative explanation is that their attitude 
towards the cooperative and participation behaviour varies in time and with the ability of the 
cooperative to generate and distribute surplus. The dynamics of the cooperative’s economic 
success is likely to affect member participation in the General Assembly and in Boards and 
Committees. Furthermore, this relationship is likely to be negative; that is, if the cooperative’s 
economic results were bad in the previous period, the members might want to actively 
participate in the decision making. 
Limitations  
This study has a number of caveats and limitations. The first limitation is that conclusions 
based on correlations result in a lower degree of internal validity than conclusions drawn on 
the basis of direct manipulation of independent variables. It is likely that experiments as those 
used by behavioural economics would lead to a higher degree of internal validity, particularly 
in explaining participation behaviour in terms of cause and effect relationships. The second 
limitation is a consequence of the cross-sectional analysis, which does not allow the 
understanding of the shifts in the relationship between cooperative ideology, economic 
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motivations for continued association and participation in the governance. Members’ 
psychological state varies over time during the relationship with the cooperative. The third 
limitation is that the cross-sectional analysis is undertaken among members of one 
cooperative only. Consequently, it is more difficult to generalize the links between 
endowments, economic motivations, cooperative ideology and participation to other 
cooperatives. 
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5. Cooperative versus Investor-Owned Firm:  Quality Relationships in the 
Broiler Industry 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The coexistence of different governance structures for the same kind of transaction is 
common in agricultural markets throughout the world (Hendrikse, 2007). In the broiler 
industry, investor-owned firms (IOFs) and farmer-owned cooperatives coexist using the same 
contractual arrangements and being subject to the same quality requirements from buyers. The 
key distinction between an IOF and a cooperative is that the owners of the processing and 
marketing cooperative are also the suppliers of the raw material. In fact, farmers have a 
threefold relationship with their cooperative (Barton, 1989): a transaction relationship, an 
ownership relationship and a control relationship. While the transaction relationship is an 
individual one, where each farmer-member delivers his own farm products to the cooperative, 
the ownership and control rights are held collectively. These rights are exercised in a 
democratic decision-making process usually adhering to the one-member-one-vote principle. 
Farmers delivering to an IOF have only a transaction relationship with the processing firm. 
This chapter focuses on the individual farmer’s delivery to the processing firm, since the 
supplier-buyer relationship is a reality for both farmers supplying to a cooperative and those 
supplying to an IOF; farmer control and ownership are not an issue within the IOF. 
The organizational structure of a cooperative has implications for its quality management 
(Hanf and Kühl, 2005). As a cooperative decides on its strategy in a democratic (and often 
consensus-oriented) decision-making process, the outcome in terms of quality standards is 
likely to be lower than the standards that an IOF imposes on its suppliers. The standards an 
IOF applies are decided upon unilaterally, mainly on the basis of a profit objective function. A 
cooperative, however, is not a profit-driven organization, as its main objective is to provide 
the best service to its members. A cooperative is more likely to accept low quality deliveries 
than an IOF because it has a statutory obligation to accept and find a market for all deliveries 
of its members. In addition, a cooperative is set up to support farmers and will not easily 
dismiss members that do not comply to quality standards. As a result, relative to an IOF 
processor, a cooperative processor is more likely to receive a heterogeneous supply of raw 
material. This poses major challenges for a cooperative in a competitive environment that 
increasingly demands close quality coordination in the supply chain (Bijman, 2009; Hanf, 
2009). 
Most of the organizational economics literature considers the cooperative as an inherently less 
efficient form when compared to an IOF, mainly due to a number of property rights 
constraints (Cook, 1995; Fulton, 1995). Exploring the implications of these constraints for 
maintaining and improving product quality, Mérel et al. (2009) found a number of 
disadvantages of the cooperative. First, cooperatives face a horizon problem. This means that 
members as owners are more likely to pursue short term goals at the expense of long term 
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investments. Second, as selective terms of delivery cannot, in principle, be enforced by 
cooperatives, members can deliver all the commodities which alternative buyers do not 
accept. Third, the pooling practices of cooperatives often fail to adequately reward producers 
of the highest quality products, causing an adverse selection problem with reductions in 
product quality and/or the exit of the high-quality producers from the cooperative. Fourth, 
cooperatives are not likely to exclude ‘marginal’ members. Thus, many cooperatives have 
problems to be competitive in an environment where quality requirements of final customers 
(e.g., retailers) are becoming stricter. 
Although Fulton (1995) questions whether cooperatives can adapt to a rapidly changing 
environment characterized by technological change and industrialization of agriculture, Hanf 
and Schweickert (2003) suggest that by grouping members into homogeneous clusters 
cooperatives may be able to successfully master the quality and quantity demands of the 
retailers. In order to achieve this, a larger degree of centralized decision-making is needed 
than what cooperatives traditionally apply. Central or hierarchical decision-making enables 
cooperatives to define and effectively apply quality norms for their supply, to control the 
quality of delivered products, to monitor members’ production processes and, on the limit, to 
exclude a member of further deliveries. Thus, cooperatives may be mimicking IOFs in 
applying more hierarchical coordination mechanisms. Other authors, however, have posed 
that cooperatives have unique organizational characteristics that could provide them with 
competitive advantage. For instance, Sykuta and Cook (2001) have argued that agricultural 
cooperatives may use the tight relationship between members and cooperative as a 
competitive differential since it may enable less costly coordination of the transaction. 
In the Brazilian broiler industry, suppliers delivering to a cooperative are performing better in 
terms of quality than suppliers delivering to an IOF. If a cooperative’s formal arrangement 
with its suppliers is the same as in an IOF, that is, cooperative and IOF have the same 
incentive and control mechanisms for production efficiency and high-quality chicken meat, 
what then could explain the cooperative’s advantage over the IOF in terms of suppliers’ 
quality performance? Our conjecture is that the difference in terms of product quality between 
the cooperative and the IOF is influenced by the characteristics of the supplier-buyer 
relationship and their effect on transaction costs.  
The chapter is structured in 7 sections. Section 5.2 describes the broiler industry in Brazil, 
emphasizing our region of study, Paraná, and the main characteristics of broiler production 
and the contractual arrangements applied between slaughterhouses and producers. Section 5.3 
reviews the literature on relationship characteristics and their impact on transaction costs. It 
also elaborates on the implication of relationship characteristics for the production and 
delivery of high-quality products, when comparing cooperatives and IOFs, and formulates 
hypotheses. Section 5.4 explains the measures and the methods for data collection and 
analysis. We present our results in Section 5.5 and discuss the implications of our findings in 
Section 5.6. Finally, in Section 5.7 we conclude and provide a number of suggestions for 
further research. 
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5.2 The broiler industry in Brazil 
Broiler production in Brazil has grown substantially in the last decades, with exporting 
following the same trend, which led the country to be the world’s largest exporter. Large 
integrators making contracts with several individual producers are present in the Brazilian 
broiler business, which has made remarkable technological and organizational improvements 
in the last two decades. 
5.2.1 Broiler production  
The Brazilian production of chicken meat had a rapid development and increased Brazil's 
position as a leading world producer, from about 2 million tons in 1989 to over almost 11 
million tons in 2009, right after the USA and China (Abef, 2009). In terms of exports, Brazil 
is in the first position, exporting 3.6 million tons in 2009. The production of chicken meat is 
highly concentrated in the states of southern Brazil and in São Paulo. The state of Paraná has 
historically been highlighted as a major producer and exporter of broiler in Brazil. In 2002, 
the state assumes the absolute leadership in production, and in 2009, the state of Paraná 
exported 954,653 tons of chicken meat, 26% of Brazil’s exports (Abef, 2009).  
The existing market structure at the national level is characterized by a competitive oligopoly 
both for the whole chicken (either frozen or fresh) and for special cuts (leg, wing, breast), and 
companies compete primarily through price since there are not many ways to differentiate the 
product (Silva, 2003). From a list of 25 largest chicken meat exporters in 2009, the first 4 had 
a combined share of more than 70% of exports. From these 25 largest exporters, 6 of them 
were cooperatives, of which 4 from the state of Paraná (Abef, 2009). There is also a 
significant concentration in the broiler industry of Paraná, with a higher participation of 
cooperatives among the largest slaughterhouses. In 2002, the eight largest slaughterhouses 
(including three cooperatives) did approximately 75% of the slaughtering from a total of 27 
companies in Parana. Two important IOFs had 47% of the activity in this state (Ipardes, 
2002).  In 2004, cooperatives’ participation in broiler production in the state of Paraná was of 
approximately 23%. 
In the broiler industry, quality requirements concern conforming both to meat quality 
standards, i.e., quality that is intrinsic to the product, and to sanitary and animal welfare 
standards, i.e., quality of the production processes (Aramyan et al., 2006). Both the European 
Union and Japan, two large importers from Brazil, set requirements demanding Brazil to 
adapt to European quality standards regarding animal welfare and environmental 
responsibility. Performance on these requirements depend to some extent on the management 
of broiler litter (Moura et al., 2010). Other standards, such as avoiding chicken feet callus in 
order to export to China, for instance, also require specific management techniques at the 
farm level.  
Processing companies that are exporting chicken feet to China and/or are supplying 
McDonalds, for example, need to avoid receiving broilers with lesions on the feet, either 
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because these animals cannot be sold or because of animal welfare standards for which the 
companies are audited. Foot pad dermatitis (FPD), also known as foot callus, is influenced by 
a number of practices. The single largest factor is wet or damp bedding; several studies have 
shown that high moisture litter alone was enough to cause foot callus in birds (e.g., 
Pagazaurtundua and Warris, 2006). The quality of the litter and the equipment used (i.e., 
technology level) also influence the incidence of callus, to a lower extent though.  
As most farmers consider chicken feet as a waste product, the actual incidence of foot callus 
in the batch often goes unnoticed. If foot callus is reported, the information is only about the 
number of injured animals and will not distinguish between large or small lesions, or give an 
indication of the depth of lesions. The key approach to minimizing the potential welfare 
problems associated with foot callus is through high levels of bedding management, for 
instance by regularly topping up all bedding to keep it dry (a minimum of once a week is 
recommended) and checking drinkers to make sure they are not leaking and that birds are not 
spilling water (Basset, 2009).  
5.2.2 Broiler contracts  
Coordination needs are high in the broiler industry due to safety and quality requirements, but 
also due to specific production risks. The producer bears a production risk since the relation 
between output and inputs is affected both by chicken raising techniques and by unexpected 
factors such as diseases. Part of the production risk affects only a single producer and part of 
it is affecting many producers (Knoeber and Thurman, 1995). Production is organized by 
large integrator companies that provide chicks, feed, veterinary services and technical advice, 
and they have contracts with producers to raise the chicks. Being vertically integrated into 
breeding and feed production, most of the major processors directly control the genetics of the 
chicks (Martinez, 1999) as well as the feed given to the chicks. This enables them to lower 
and standardize the risk associated with production. 
Specific contractual arrangements are applied to address transactional risks related to the fact 
that producers do not pay for the feed or for the chicks. Producers provide the chicken houses 
and labor, and their main job is to raise the animals in a controlled environment. Neither 
cooperative suppliers nor IOF suppliers can deliver occasionally to the IOF since they have a 
production contract determining that the inputs are provided and owned by the slaughtering 
firm. There is a clause in the contract which explicitly states that in case outside delivery 
before the time of agreed delivering or private use of inputs is discovered by the slaughtering 
firm, the producer is subject to administrative penalties and will have to refund the processor. 
Administrative penalties range from suspension of production for a given period to the final 
sanction of termination of the contract.   
The contractual arrangement is a production contract with a payment formula that links the 
remuneration of the farmer to his production efficiency observed in the batch of chickens 
supplied (Knoeber and Thurman, 1995) and on the compliance with the quality requirements. 
The larger the average weights and survival of the batch and the lower the age of slaughter of 
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birds and the feed conversion ratio (amount of feed converted into chicken meat), the greater 
the compensation received by the producer. The total number of kilograms is multiplied by 
the price of meat at the day of delivery (Ipardes, 2002).  
If the feed conversion ratio is higher for one individual producer than for the average of the 
producers supplying to the integrator company, the individual producer will get a lower price 
per kilogram of meat. Therefore, no individual producer bears that part of production risk that 
is common to all producers. In line with the practices in other parts of the world (Knoeber and 
Thurman, 1995), producers bear only the idiosyncratic part of production risk, while the 
common part of the risk is shifted from individual producers to the integrator company. In 
addition, contracts specify the discount schemes for low quality. Incentive clauses like these 
control moral hazard by deterring shirking behavior and giving incentives for improved 
production practices (Martinez, 1999). Contracts generally provide management services and 
may require each farm to apply the same equipment. Producers are further trained in proper 
management practices.  
In terms of the specific quality attribute “chicken feet with no callus”, if the percentage for 
one producer is higher than the target percentage, that is, the tolerated proportional amount of 
chicken feet in a batch with the incidence of callus, the producer will get discounted. In 2011, 
suppliers of the analyzed cooperative were allowed a maximum of 6% of their broiler batch 
with feet callus without being discounted for low quality. Suppliers delivering to the IOFs 
were allowed to have up to 15% of the batch with feet callus without being discounted. This 
means the cooperative is stricter than the IOFs in terms of controlling chicken feet callus. 
Quality targets are usually fixed a priori in terms of a percentage. Since the processing 
company will not get the maximum value if its supply has quality defections, the producers 
face discounts. Getting discounted means, therefore, not being able to comply fully with the 
quality requirements of the processing company. 
In sum, large integrators are strictly monitoring the production processes and providing 
information and assistance to the contracted individual producers. Monitoring takes place not 
only to measure and keep track of production efficiency but also to assure compliance to 
quality requirements. We found that suppliers delivering broilers to the cooperative have a 
higher quality performance than suppliers delivering to the IOFs since the former had a 
proportionally lower amount of discounts due to feet callus than the latter. What could explain 
these differences? 
5.3 Theoretical framework 
Relationship Characteristics and Transaction Costs  
Quality performance may be influenced by relationship characteristics, through their effect on 
transaction costs (Lu et al., 2009; Coronado et al., 2010). Transaction costs can be 
distinguished into transactional risks and coordination costs (Grover and Malhotra, 2003). 
Transactional risks, or exchange hazards, relate to the potential opportunistic behavior of the 
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contract parties. Coordination costs arise when actors are unaware that their actions are 
interdependent and when there is uncertainty about the others’ actions (Gulati et al, 2005). 
Coordination costs relate particularly to information exchange between the contract parties. 
Particular governance mechanisms enhance transactional efficiency as they reduce both 
transaction risks and coordination costs (Mesquita and Brusch, 2008). 
Early Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) focused almost exclusively on the minimization of 
transactional risks. The main solution to high transactional risks is, according to TCE, 
choosing a hierarchical governance structure for the transaction (Williamson, 1991). More 
recent studies showed that repeated bilateral transactions have as important consequence the 
development of trust and increased knowledge about the partners’ reliability and competences 
(Lazzarini, Miller and Zenger, 2004; Sporleder and Wu, 2006). Thus, reduced coordination 
costs through relationship development is now considered an important source of 
transactional efficiency.  
A similar development can be found in the organizational economics literature on agricultural 
cooperatives. The traditional argument is that increases in the specificity of assets in 
agricultural transactions will require more vertically integrated systems. As the open 
membership policy and the lack of individualized rewards for farmers impede a more 
hierarchical relationship between cooperative and members, the cooperative would ultimately 
loose its coordination role in the sector (Fulton, 1995). However, economic and managerial 
research on cooperatives has largely ignored that the cooperative, besides being an enterprise, 
is also a social community (Borgen, 2004; Valentinov, 2004; Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009). 
Being a community should give the cooperative, at least in theory, an advantage over 
investor-owned firms in terms of trust development and increased knowledge about the 
partners’ reliability and competences. In other words, particular characteristics of the farmer-
cooperative relationship have the potential to counterbalance the claimed coordination 
disadvantage (Mérel et al., 2009).  
The following subsections will elaborate on relationship characteristics that are likely to differ 
when comparing cooperatives with IOFs and which may have an implication for quality. For 
each relationship characteristic there is a hypothesis comparing IOF and cooperative.  
Investment requirements 
Distinctive techno-economic characteristics of broiler production require investments specific 
to this industry, not necessarily to one buyer. If two buyers require the same quality 
characteristics there is, in principle, a relation between the required investments at the farm 
level and the quality delivered. It would be reasonable to expect that the level of on-farm 
investments required by the buyer is the same for suppliers of different firms (Dorward, 
2001). Nevertheless, cooperative suppliers may make lower on-farm investments than IOF 
suppliers for at least two reasons. First, being an organization that aims to provide benefit to 
its members, the cooperative could be more willing than the IOF to make particular 
investments (such as in sorting equipment) at the processing unit, thereby reducing the need 
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for investments at the farm level. Second, the cooperative is likely to be more tolerant 
regarding required investments at the farm level because of its open membership and member 
orientation. For instance because it takes into account the history of the producer, who may 
have been a pioneer in the establishment of the cooperative, long time before the cooperative 
firm engaged in the broiler business.  
H1. The degree of investments required is likely to be higher for IOF suppliers than for 
cooperative suppliers.  
Dependence 
Dependencies are asymmetrically distributed in most transactions (Loader, 1997). In agrifood 
transactions, this unbalance in the mutual dependencies usually disfavors farmers. Suppliers 
that perceive themselves as more dependent are more likely to behave less opportunistically 
due to the expectation of continuity (Coronado et al., 2010), the fear of losing the only buyer 
or the fear of losing indispensable services. That is, if the current exchange partner is 
providing better services than an alternative exchange partner, this increases dependence and 
the costs of switching (Heide and John, 1988). The implication for quality, when comparing 
cooperatives and IOFs, is that (more) dependent suppliers are likely to shirk less in terms of 
delivering quality. 
Cooperative suppliers are likely to be more dependent on their buyer than IOF suppliers 
because of specific services offered by the cooperative that are not offered by the IOF and/or 
because of ownership reasons. Members of the cooperative, which own assets at two stages of 
the supply chain (at farm and processing firm level), face higher switching costs than farmers 
delivering to an IOF.  
H2. Buyer dependence is likely to be higher for producers supplying to a cooperative than for 
suppliers of an IOF.  
Communication  
Coordination costs can be reduced through communication (Paulraj et al, 2008; Coronado et 
al., 2010). Frequency of information exchange on quality requirements is expected to reduce 
coordination costs. Thus, a more frequent communication of the processing firm’s managers 
and technicians with the suppliers is likely to result in the latter’s higher awareness of the 
quality requirements and the associated farm management techniques. Communication is a 
powerful coordination mechanism precisely because in most situations it is the quickest 
means of establishing the necessary shared knowledge among those who wish to coordinate 
their actions to each other (Gulati and Puranam, 2011). Better communication with farmers is 
considered as one of the managerial advantages of the cooperative, especially in the case of 
small and medium-sized cooperatives (Briscoe and Ward, 2006). Therefore a more frequent 
communication on quality improvement between producers and their cooperative (when 
93 
 
compared to communication between IOF suppliers and the IOF) is expected to result in a 
higher quality. 
H3. Communication on quality improvement is likely to be more frequent in supplier-
cooperative relationships than in supplier-IOF relationships. 
Uncertainty 
If producers perceive that it is easy for buyers to distort facts to their own interests, that is, if 
they do not trust the buyer’s good faith, this can have a negative impact on their own effort 
and on the commitment to the relationship. Behavioral uncertainty may increase suppliers’ 
propensity to shirk in terms of quality. Contracting is likely to be less costly with producers 
supplying to their own cooperative for the advantage of cooperatives in reducing transactional 
risks resides, in principle, in their tendency to involve lower information asymmetries and 
greater trust in their relationships with farmers than would be the case with IOFs (Sykuta and 
Cook, 2001). If behavioral uncertainty is lower for cooperative suppliers, this may increase 
their rate of compliance with quality requirements. 
H4. Uncertainty regarding buyer’s behavior is likely to be lower for cooperative suppliers 
than for IOF suppliers. 
Market risk  
Reducing farmers’ market risk has been a traditional role of agricultural cooperatives. The 
member’s objective function is normally multidimensional, but the overall objective of a 
member as a user is to secure market access over time, at best possible product prices. In fact, 
the underlying motivation for a member to enter a mutually binding agreement with a 
cooperative is to reduce uncertainty related to market access (Borgen, 2004). If prices are 
volatile, a processing cooperative is able to adjust the producer price afterwards using 
patronage refunds, whereas an IOF would attempt to pass the risk to producers. We can 
hypothesize that even if the broiler transaction is the same and the contractual arrangement is 
similar, a cooperative will bear a larger share of market risk than an IOF would do, for 
instance, by paying the same price to producers even in times of crisis. Lower market risk for 
cooperative producers may lead to higher producer commitment. Since cooperative members 
are less worried about losing value due to market fluctuations, they are likely to be more 
committed to improving process quality such as animal welfare, whereas IOF suppliers may 
ignore animal welfare in their effort to maximize output. 
H5. A cooperative is likely to reduce market risk for producers more than an IOF.  
Adaptation support 
With a more direct implication for quality, the technical support given by buyers to producers 
in adapting their production processes to new quality requirements is likely to be higher in a 
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cooperative since it is a member-oriented organization. Adaptation support involves 
intensifying information exchange and technical assistance in order for producers to adapt to a 
specific quality requirement. Balbach (1998) suggested that since sugar beet growers owned 
the processing plants, producers could adopt the most accurate method of measuring sucrose 
content because their ownership reduced information and monitoring costs. In doing so, they 
could also provide economic incentives for producers to supply sugar beets with greater 
sucrose content.  
Quality requirements may change suddenly with a change in consumer preferences. A 
cooperative is likely to have an advantage in terms of communicating consumer preferences 
back to farmers and training them to comply with different or higher quality standards (Mérel 
et al., 2009). Cooperatives often have decentralized committees which organize information 
meetings about specific farm management techniques, in order to help members to improve 
the quality of their production processes and the quality of the delivered products.  
H6. Suppliers delivering to a cooperative are likely to receive more technical support from 
their buyer for adapting to new quality requirements than IOF suppliers. 
5.4 Methods and data 
To analyze the role of relationship characteristics in broiler suppliers’ compliance with quality 
requirements, a survey of broiler producers was carried out over the period December 2010 
and June 2011. This survey was preceded by qualitative research during the period March 
2010 to October 2010, which included in-depth interviews with producers and managers of 
the cooperative. This methods and data section is divided in three parts. First we describe our 
variables. Second we provide a description of the data collection procedure. Finally, we 
explain how we have analyzed our data. 
5.4.1 Measures  
Our criteria for performance both in terms of production efficiency and quality are based on 
commercial criteria used by the slaughterhouses.  
Production efficiency performance - Producers’ revenue is determined by a formula which 
takes into account the average weight, the survival rate, the feed conversion ratio and the age 
of the batch at the time of delivery. If a producer has a higher than average rate of rejection 
due to injuries and/or diseases, or if the feed conversion ratio is higher than the average for all 
producers, he will get a lower price per kilogram. When the producer’s batch is discounted it 
means that he had a higher than average feed conversion and/or rejections. In other words, 
discounted batches indicate a lower than average production efficiency performance. Our 
indicator for production efficiency is the proportion of transactions discounted for rejection, 
mortality and/or high food conversion. Thus, we measure production efficiency by dividing 
the number of delivered batches that had discounts due to one or more of the above causes by 
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the total number of delivered batches. The unit of measurement here is a ratio from zero to 
one. 
Quality performance - If the amount of feet callus from a sample is higher than the level 
tolerated by the slaughterhouse, producers are discounted for lower quality. Our indicator for 
quality performance is the proportion of transactions discounted due to chicken feet callus. 
The proportion is defined as the number of delivered batches that had discounts due to 
chicken feet callus divided by the total number of delivered batches. As with production 
efficiency, the measure for quality performance is a ratio from zero to one. The lower the 
ratio, the higher is the quality. 
The relationship characteristics were measured on the basis of producers’ perception, ranging 
from (1) totally agree to (5) totally disagree. Required investments – The extent to which the 
producer was required to make investments in order to start/continue delivering to current 
buyer. Dependence – The extent to which the producer depends on the current buyer. 
Communication – Since we wanted to capture communication frequency subjectively, we 
measured the extent to which the producer is regularly informed about how to improve the 
quality of his broilers. Behavioral uncertainty – We measured the producer’s perception of 
the easiness of opportunistic behavior from the buyer, through the extent to which it is easy 
for the buyer to distort facts to his advantage. Market risk reduction - The extent to which 
the buyer maintains the price paid to producers even in times of crisis. Adaptation support - 
The extent to which the buyer technically supports the producer in adapting to specific quality 
requirements. Past experience - Finally, as an objective measure of relationship characteristic 
we measured the producers’ past experience delivering to the same buyer in number of years. 
Prices would have been used as a control variable if we had access to this information. 
However, in Brazil, as in the rest of the world, prices paid by the slaughterhouses to the 
broiler producers are determined by the former and are not disclosed. 
5.4.2 Data collection 
Our study is based on a comparison between broiler producers supplying either to a 
cooperative or to an IOF, in the west of the state of Paraná, Brazil. The selected cooperative – 
Lar - is a multi-product cooperative, processing and/or marketing broiler, pork, soybeans, and 
vegetables. The cooperative has 6,779 members which are located in eleven different 
municipalities. There is no IOF slaughterhouse in any of the 11 municipalities. Still, some 
broiler producers within this region are delivering to an IOF, either to Sadia or to Globoaves.  
Sadia is one of the largest food processors in Brazil. In 2008, it had 21 processing plants, 
5,496 integrated broiler producers and 54,000 employees. In the 1950’s Sadia experimentally 
launched the integration raising system (the slaughtering company provides the farmers with 
young animals and feed) which soon became essential for business growth in the broiler 
industry. As a result, the experiment was implemented all over Brazil, even among Sadia’s 
competitors. Currently, the integrated raising system accounts for 90% of Brazil’s broiler 
production (Miranda et al., 2009). Globoaves was founded in 1974, in Paraná. The company 
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has experienced significant growth in terms of exports. Among the top 250 exporters of Brazil 
in 2011 there are eight IOFs and four cooperatives that partially or fully concentrate on 
marketing of chicken meat. Globoaves is one of the three companies that increased their 
export turnover with more than 40% from 2010 to 2011. Both the IOFs and the cooperative 
are among the twelve largest chicken meat exporters and are subject to the same quality 
requirements from foreign customers.  
A survey method was used to collect data on the difference between the cooperative (from 
here on “Coop”) and the IOF in their relationship with producers. A questionnaire using a 5 
point Likert scale (anchored between “Totally disagree” and “Totally Agree”) items was 
distributed among broiler producers that are members of the Coop and broiler producers that 
supply to an IOF, both in the state of Paraná - Brazil. We had access to a list of IOF broiler 
suppliers in the west region of Paraná through the regional syndicate of farmers. In order to 
delineate the population of broiler producers supplying to an IOF, the producers had to be 
located in one of the same municipalities where the cooperative is operating, and they had to 
be delivering to an IOF subject to the same quality requirements as the Coop. The Paraná 
association of broiler processors (Sindiavipar, 2009) classifies them according to the 
following licenses: (1) licensed to export; (2) licensed to export to China; (3) licensed to 
export to the European Union; and (4) Halal slaughtering method. After selecting the proper 
municipalities and the IOFs with the proper licenses, the resulting list constituted the 
sampling frame. 
There are a total 53 broiler producers located in the same municipalities where the Coop is 
located and supplying to one or more of the IOFs that have the same export licenses as the 
Coop. For practical reasons, six suppliers in a distant municipality were not surveyed. In 
addition, some farmers in the list had ceased to be suppliers of broilers. Eventually, the 
questionnaire was applied, between April and June 2011, among 42 broiler producers that 
supply either of the two IOFs. There are 474 broiler producers delivering to the Coop which 
operates in 11 municipalities of this region. From the eleven we surveyed the eight most 
representative locations (one town plus one district) in terms of broiler production, and a non-
proportionate stratified sample was taken from each municipality (either ten or five 
producers). Those municipalities that had more than 10% participation in the total Coop’s 
broiler production had ten producers surveyed, while those between five and 10% had five 
producers surveyed. The surveyed producers from each of the eight locations were randomly 
selected from a list with all broiler producers per municipality delivering to the cooperative. 
We surveyed 55 Coop broiler producers between December of 2010 and April of 2011. The 
total number of surveyed broiler producers was 97; 55 Coop suppliers and 42 IOF suppliers. 
5.4.3 Data analysis  
To compare means of the two groups we would have used independent t-tests if the data were 
normally distributed, which was not the case (all variables had significant Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk test statistics). Therefore, we had to use nonparametric tests to 
97 
 
compare the conditions: being an IOF or a Coop supplier. The nonparametric equivalents to 
the independent t-test are the Mann-Whitney and the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests (Field, 2005: 
522). The Mann-Whitney test relies on scores being ranked from lowest to highest. 
The group with the highest mean rank should have a greater number of high scores within it, 
which is useful in order to interpret a significant result. When samples are small or the data is 
poorly distributed, there are more accurate methods for analyzing the significance of these 
tests than the asymptotic method. The most accurate is to ask SPSS for an exact test, which 
calculates the significance of the Kruskal-Wallis test exactly. 
For each group of variables we organized the output in two parts. The first part of the output 
summarizes the descriptive statistics and the mean rank. The group with the highest mean 
rank is the group with the largest number of higher scores in it. From this we can ascertain 
which group had the highest scores. The second part of the output provides the actual test 
statistics for the Mann-Whitney test, the Wilcoxon procedure and the corresponding Z score. 
Since predictions have been made we need to look at the one-tailed probability. 
5.5 Results 
Although the mean proportion of efficiency discounts is higher for IOF suppliers (34% > 23%; 
Table 1), the Mann-Whitney test indicates that both groups of producers – IOF and 
cooperative - report statistically comparable (p=0.316; Table 2) proportions of efficiency 
discounts, that is, discounted transactions due to rejections and high feed conversion. This 
proportion is related directly to the production efficiency formula upon which all producers’ 
payment is based. That is to say, the higher the food conversion and the number of rejections, 
the lower will be the producer’s share of the total production. Therefore, producers have a 
strong incentive for staying as close as possible to the efficiency frontier, minimizing these 
direct economic loss factors, regardless whether they are Coop or IOF suppliers. Furthermore, 
production efficiency is likely to be highly dependent on technology applied at the broiler 
house. The level of technology varies among producers, which might be reflected in the high 
standard deviation (compared to the mean) both within the IOF and Coop group. 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Performance 
Variables 
Mean Std. Deviation N Mean Rank 
Coop 
 
IOF Coop IOF Coop IOF Coop IOF 
Efficiency 
discounts 
.23 .34 .26 .40 55 42 47.84 47.84 
Quality discounts .31 .42 .28 .26 55 42 42.96 56.90 
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Table 5.2 Summary of non-Parametric Tests 
Performance Variables Mann-Whitney U Wilcoxon W Z Exact Sig. (1-tailed) 
Efficiency discounts  1091.000 2631.000 -.482 .316 
Quality discounts  823.000 2363.000 -2.433 .007 
 
On the other hand, the proportion of quality discounts, i.e., transactions that had discounts due 
to callus, was significantly higher for IOF suppliers (p=0.07, Table 2 and Mean Rank 56.90  > 
42.96, Table 1). While the mean indicates that the average proportion of quality discounts was 
31% for Coop suppliers versus 42% for IOF suppliers, the value of the mean rankings 
indicates that IOF suppliers had the greatest number of higher scores (considering the 0-1 
ratio) (Table 1). Thus, producers that deliver to the Coop have on average higher quality 
performance regarding the avoidance of chicken feet callus. 
Table 5.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Relationship 
Characteristics 
    Mean Std. Deviation        N Mean Rank 
Coop 
 
IOF Coop IOF Coop IOF Coop IOF 
Required 
investment 
3.74 4.83 1.231 .377 55 42 37.22 63.00 
Dependence  4.18 3.67 .925 1.162 55 42 54.41 41.92 
Communication 
frequency 
4.45 4.24 .603 .932 55 42 50.62 46.88 
Behaviour 
uncertainty 
3.09 3.45 1.191 1.292 55 42 45.33 53.81 
Market risk 
reduction 
4.05 3.00 1.079 1.325 55 42 58.13 37.05 
Adaptation support 3.89 3.64 1.133 1.055 55 42 52.45 44.49 
Past experience 8.47 14.88 2.93 9.16 55 42 41.80 58.43 
 
Table 5.4 Non Parametric Tests 
Relationship Characteristics Mann-Whitney 
U 
Wilcoxon W Z Exact Sig. (1-
tailed) 
Required investment 525.000 2010.000 -5.016 .000 
Dependence 857.500 1760.500 -2.320 .010 
Communication frequency 1066.000 1969.000 -.725 .228 
Behavioural uncertainty 953.000 2493.000 -1.521 .065 
Market risk reduction 653.000 1556.000 -3.833 .000 
Adaptation support 965.500 1868.500 -1.482 .071 
Past experience 759.000 2299.000 -2.903 .002 
 
 
We found that Coop suppliers on average (mean higher than 3) agree that they were required 
to make investments in order to sell to their current buyer. Nevertheless, IOF suppliers 
perceive a significantly higher (p=0.00, Table 4 and Mean Rank 63.00> 37.22, Table 3) 
degree of investment requirements at the farm level than Coop suppliers do. It is important to 
note that the standard deviation within the Coop group was almost 4 times higher than in the 
IOF group (Std. Deviation 1.231 > 0.377, Table 3). This shows heterogeneity among Coop 
producers, which could mean that some producers might have made the required investments 
while others have not. 
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Our results show that the supplier’s perceived dependence on the buyer is significantly higher 
for Coop suppliers than for IOF suppliers (p=0.01, Table 4 and Mean Rank 54.41 > 41.92, 
Table 3). Communication frequency did not show statistically significant differences between 
the two groups of suppliers, but behavioral uncertainty did. IOF suppliers had a significantly 
higher score on the uncertainty of buyer’s behavior variable, the one regarding suppliers’ 
perception of the easiness of buyers distorting facts to their own advantage (p=0.065, Table 4 
and Mean Rank 53.81 > 45.33, Table 3). 
Market risk reduction showed to be significantly higher for Coop suppliers (p=0.00, Table 4 
and Mean Rank 58.13 > 37.05, Table 3). Adaptation support also showed to be significantly 
higher for Coop suppliers (p=0.71, Table 4 and Mean Rank 52.45 > 44.49, Table 3). Finally, 
past experience showed to be higher for IOF suppliers. IOF suppliers have been delivering to 
the same buyer for a longer period than Coop suppliers (14 years versus 8 years, on average). 
 
Table 5.5 Summary of Results 
Hypothesis 
 
Support? Significance 
H1. The degree of investment required is likely to be higher for IOF 
suppliers than for cooperative suppliers. 
 
YES *** 
H2. Buyer dependence is likely to be higher for producers supplying 
to a cooperative than for suppliers of an IOF. 
 
YES ** 
H3. Communication on quality improvement is likely to be more 
frequent in supplier-cooperative relationships than in supplier-IOF 
relationships. 
 
NO --- 
H4. Uncertainty regarding buyer’s behaviour is likely to be lower for 
cooperative suppliers than for IOF suppliers. 
 
YES * 
H5. A cooperative is likely to reduce market risk for producers more 
than an IOF. 
 
YES *** 
H6. Suppliers delivering to a cooperative are likely to receive more 
technical support from their buyer for adapting to new quality 
requirements than IOF suppliers. 
YES * 
*Significant at a 10% level, ** significant at a 5% level, *** significant at a 1% level. 
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5.6  Discussion 
The results for each of the hypotheses are presented in Table 5. We will now discuss each of 
these results, including possible explanations for the findings that did not support what was 
expected on the basis of theory or previous empirical research. 
Required Investment 
When quality improvements require investments in broiler production processes one would 
expect that farmers who did invest more would have a higher quality performance. Our results 
showed exactly the opposite. Those who had a higher degree of investments required (IOF 
suppliers) had a lower quality performance, that is, a higher rate of discounts due to feet callus 
(pododermatitis). Although on-farm quality management is not explicitly looked into in this 
chapter, from our results we can interpret that quality is more dependent on management than 
on facilities and equipment. In fact, it is known from poultry production literature that the 
single largest factor influencing foot callus is wet or damp bedding and that the key approach 
to minimizing the animal welfare problems associated with foot callus is through high levels 
of bedding management, for instance, by keeping the bedding dry and regularly checking 
whether the drinkers are working properly.  
IOF suppliers showed a higher level of required investments, but cooperative suppliers were 
more heterogeneous in the required investments (standard deviation 4 times higher than 
within IOF suppliers). While some cooperative producers have made on-farm investments 
specific for the buyer of their broilers, others have not. Although the quality control system in 
the cooperative seeks to standardize the measurement, the absence of specific technology in 
the broiler houses is more tolerated by the cooperative than by the IOF. Therefore, the higher 
degree of required investments for IOF suppliers and the higher heterogeneity among 
cooperative suppliers can be interpreted as a higher level of tolerance by the cooperative. By 
tolerating different levels of investment at the farm level, the cooperative’s quality control is 
likely to be influenced by the relationship between farmers and the cooperative, such as the 
farmers’ ties with technical assistants, quality managers and production managers.  
Dependence 
The fact that cooperative members jointly own assets at the processing stage of the supply 
chain creates interdependence between the parties of this transaction, which is reflected in 
relational contract agreements with no termination date. IOF suppliers, in contrast, have 
contract only for two years. Farmers owning assets at the processing stage have higher 
switching costs, hence higher dependence, than farmers delivering to an IOF. Farmers that 
value the quality of services and market risk reduction are probably more dependent because 
these services and guarantees would probably not be available outside the cooperative. Heide 
and John (1988) already found that in case of high dependence the threat of switching to 
another buyer to induce-non-opportunistic behavior is not that credible for the supplier. In the 
case of a cooperative, the mutual dependence is more balanced. Not only the member is 
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dependent on the cooperative buyer, also the cooperative depends on member patronage and 
loyalty. 
Communication  
The IOFs and the cooperative are communicating information on quality improvements with 
the same frequency, contrary to what we expected. Although communication is a powerful 
coordination mechanism, when shared knowledge already exists, communication becomes 
less necessary. The theoretically superior knowledge transfer properties of a cooperative when 
compared to an IOF are conceptually not inconsistent with the equal levels of information 
sharing (in terms of frequency) to coordinate quality improvement. If cooperatives, because 
they are also social communities, possess unique advantages in creating and maintaining a 
shared cognitive framework (Kogut and Zander, 1996), this common ground may eliminate 
the need for information flows in coordinating specialized activities (Gulati and Puranam, 
2011). 
Behavioral uncertainty 
The hypothesis that uncertainty regarding buyer’s behavior is lower for members of the 
cooperative than for suppliers to the IOF was corroborated. Cooperative suppliers do not 
perceive that it is easy for their buyer to distort facts. This result can be explained in terms of 
trust and lower information asymmetry (Sykuta and Cook, 2001). Cooperatives can improve 
transparency by providing information that would otherwise be unavailable or insufficient. 
Cooperative suppliers may trust the intentions of the buyer more than IOF suppliers do and 
are probably more aware of the relevant information that guide the cooperative’s strategic and 
operational decision making. Cooperative suppliers perceive themselves as more dependent 
than IOF suppliers, thus trust in the exchange partner is crucial for them. Trust, or the lower 
behavioral uncertainty that results from it, may be mitigating producers’ shirking on quality.  
Market Risk reduction  
As expected, the cooperative reduces market risk for producers more than the IOF does, by 
maintaining prices even in times of crisis, that is, when market prices for chicken meat 
fluctuate substantially. One possible link between market risk reduction and quality 
performance is that by feeling relatively safe in terms of market risks, producers can commit 
more to quality improvements such as avoiding feet callus. IOF suppliers, who have to bear 
more market risk, will be putting more effort in maximizing output even at the expense of 
animal welfare, since they never know if prices will suddenly be reduced. 
Adaptation support 
The results showed that cooperative suppliers are receiving more technical support from their 
buyer in order to adapt to specific quality requirements. The technical support cooperatives 
give to their members in terms of adapting to a specific quality requirement through its 
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decentralized committee meetings may counterbalance adverse selection, a traditional 
problem in agricultural cooperatives. A cooperative may have a strict quality control and may 
even exclude members from the business branch if the member performs badly. However, 
what seems to be important here is that although starting with greater heterogeneity in terms 
of producers’ capacity to produce high-quality products, the cooperative may allocate 
resources in providing training to the lower quality producers so as to raise quality to a higher 
and more uniform level.  
 
5.7 Conclusion  
What could explain the delivery of higher quality by cooperative suppliers when compared to 
suppliers to an IOF? In seeking an answer to this question, we focused on a number of seller-
buyer relationship characteristics. By using this focus our study is mainly explorative, without 
aiming to provide final answers on what explains differences in quality. As the literature on 
this issue is rather thin, and theories point into different directions, we did not seek to 
establish causality between governance structure or relationship characteristics and quality 
performance. 
Still, our results show that there are some important differences regarding relationship 
characteristics that could account for this higher performance. Despite the investment 
requirements being lower for cooperative than for IOF suppliers, cooperative farmers’ 
production practices are resulting in a higher rate of compliance and higher average quality. 
Relationship characteristics which result in producers’ higher commitment and competence 
explain the advantage of the cooperative over the IOF in terms of quality performance. 
Dependence on current buyer, which is higher for cooperative members, uncertainty regarding 
buyer’s behavior, which is lower for cooperative members, and market risk reduction by the 
buyer, which is higher for cooperative members, can help explain the higher rate of 
compliance to the “feet callus” quality standard. These three features of the supplier-
cooperative relationship are likely to prevent suppliers from shirking behavior and to induce 
commitment. Moreover, cooperative suppliers receive more technical support from their 
buyer for adapting to new quality requirements than IOF suppliers do; this is likely to 
positively affect farmers’ competence in complying with quality standards. 
On the basis of the discussion of our results we suggest a research agenda on issues that have 
received little attention in studies on agricultural cooperatives. First, it is worth studying the 
multiple causes of suppliers’ dependence on their buyer and the potential benefit for the 
supplier, with a special emphasis on comparing whether the causes are different between 
cooperative and IOF. Contrary to what is argued in TCE, dependence does not have to lead to 
a hold-up situation where part of the value can be appropriated by one of the parties. 
Asymmetric dependence arising from asset specificity is different from the mutual 
dependence associated with higher exchange performance (Heide and John, 1988), 
particularly if the buyer provides specific services like technical support, market risk 
reduction, and guaranteed market access. That is, dependence may be due to “negative” 
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factors as lack of alternatives but also to “positive” factors as good services and ownership of 
assets at the downstream level of the supply chain. Dependence per se does not lead to 
commitment, especially if the only cause is a “negative” one. However, when the suppliers 
own the assets of the processing firm, as in a cooperative, and benefit from the provision of 
services by that processing firm, the balanced mutual dependence has a positive impact 
coordination and thereby on quality performance.  
A second future research topic is the potential advantage of agricultural cooperatives over 
IOFs in delivering credence quality attributes. Credence attributes are those for which even 
the consumption does not bring information on the real quality. They include diverse issues 
like animal welfare and environmental concerns, but also food safety issues like the use of 
antibiotics and hormones. The agency problem with credence attributes is that the supplier has 
an information advantage and may gain from withholding this information. According to 
Barzel (2000), when attributes are non-observable or costly to measure the transaction will be 
efficiently governed internally by a firm or by a long term buyer-seller relationship where 
relational norms play an important role. It is worth investigating whether the member-
cooperative relationship characteristics are able to mitigate agency problems related to 
information asymmetry in the production of credence quality attributes in the agrifood sector. 
Finally, much has been said about the weaknesses of cooperatives in terms of producing 
higher quality products (Hanf and Kühl, 2005; Hanf 2009). One of these weaknesses relate 
the adverse selection problem resulting in reduced product quality and/or the exit of the high-
quality producers from the cooperative (Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002). However, cooperative 
mechanisms for supporting the adaptation of members to specific quality requirements need 
to be understood better, especially as they can counterbalance the adverse selection problem. 
What seems to be an important future research topic is the cooperative’s choice to allocate 
resources to training the lower quality producers in order to raise product quality to a higher 
level. That is, despite starting with larger heterogeneity in terms of producers’ capacity to 
produce high-quality products, cooperatives may achieve high quality products through 
superior coordination and adaptation support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
This last chapter of the thesis discusses the overall findings and their implications for 
management and policy and provides suggestions for further research. In Section 6.1 the 
empirical basis of the thesis is discussed. The overall conclusions are presented in Section 6.2 
in order to assess the added value of putting the different research topics together. To do so, 
the research problem that forms the basis of this thesis is addressed. Section 6.3 presents the 
theoretical contributions of this thesis. Section 6.4 discusses some limitations of the approach 
taken by this thesis. Management and policy implications are presented in Section 6.5. 
Finally, Section 6.6 suggests a number of topics for further research.  
6.1 Empirical basis 
The empirical base of this thesis was a survey among members of one cooperative, Lar. This 
cooperative has 6,779 members distributed among eleven towns in the west of the state of 
Parana, Brazil. Most of them are soybean producers. About half of the membership has at 
least one extra activity
11
 besides grain agriculture (particularly soybeans), such as swine, 
broilers, vegetables, cassava, or milk. The most important business activities within the 
cooperative in terms of turnover share are soybeans (24%) and broiler (19%), (Lar, 2011). In 
the broiler, vegetables and soy businesses, Lar operates in all stages of the supply chain, 
coordinating production and selling of inputs, crop and animal production at the farm level, 
processing and distribution in wholesale and retail. Therefore, the sampling strategy was, first, 
to include members that are involved in these three businesses.  
There were 474 broiler producers and 40 vegetable producers spread among these eleven 
towns (Lar, 2008). The decision was to survey the most representative towns in terms of 
membership, but simultaneously in terms of broiler and vegetable production. Seven towns 
(out of the eleven) plus a district of one of them were chosen. A non-proportional 
stratification (Kumar, 2005) of soy and broiler producers was done for each of the seven 
towns (eight locations). From a list with all broiler and soy producers per municipality 
delivering to the cooperative, either five or ten of broiler producers, and either five or ten of 
soy producers were randomly selected (Kumar, 2005) from each of the eight locations. 
Regarding the vegetable producers, the strategy was to sample them all, since they were few, 
but especially because they are relatively more diversified in productive activities. This would 
ensure that the sample had a considerable number of diversified members.  
Based on this sampling strategy, the final number of surveyed members was of 148 producers. 
From the sample, 47 members (31.7%) were specialized soy producers, 58 (39.2%) were 
broiler producers and 27 members (18.2%) were vegetable producers. Broiler and vegetable 
producers were not necessarily specialized. Instead, some also produced cassava, swine 
and/or milk. The remaining 16 members were non-specialized soy producer (besides soy, one 
                                                 
11
 Activity is different from crop. The Cooperative considers the following as different activities (with these 
exact names): broiler, swine, cassava, milk, vegetables (carrots, broccoli, cauliflower, sweet corn) and 
agriculture (soybeans, wheat and maize). 
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or more of the following activities: swine, milk or cassava). Approximately half of the sample 
were diversified producers (more than one farm production activity), which reflects the 
proportion within the total membership population (Marschall, 2009). In terms of farm size, 
the average in the sample was larger than that of the population (36 > 22), however the range 
of size was rather similar, where the minimum farm size was two hectares, the maximum size 
was 580 hectares, and the standard deviation was of 66 hectares in the sample
12
. The sample 
can, nonetheless, be said to be representative of the population of members. It is difficult to 
sample such a diversified cooperative, in which some members are specialized in one product, 
some are specialized in other products, and most members are diversified at the farm level. 
Moreover, among those who are diversified, there are many possible combinations of 
productive activities. The choice in this thesis was to filter this complex population of 
members and businesses based on whether the cooperative operated in all stages of the supply 
chain. Even if the particular agreements with members were different when comparing soy, 
vegetable and broiler, the “institutional structure of production” (Coase, 1992) was very much 
alike. 
6.2 Conclusions  
To properly assess the added value of this collection of chapters, the research problem which 
forms the basis of this thesis must be addressed. The problem, as stated in the Introduction of 
this thesis, is: In the face of stricter quality requirements and stronger interdependencies in the 
food value chain, what are the governance mechanisms that can be used by the cooperative to 
strengthen the member-cooperative relationship, and what are the implications of the different 
governance mechanisms for the coordination of members’ adjustments to higher quality 
levels? 
In the face of the quality requirements from downstream customers, the cooperative has the 
potential to adjust to higher quality levels more efficiently than Investor-Owned Firms (IOF’s) 
because of its direct relationship with its suppliers (Chapter 5). The enhancement of 
commitment to customer orientation is likely to play an important role in the member’s 
willingness to adjust to higher quality standards. Democracy and community turned out not to 
be relevant in explaining this type of commitment whereas market and hierarchy were. On the 
one hand, this means that in face of strict quality requirements cooperatives need to strengthen 
monetary incentives related to quality, productivity and effort, as well as strengthen input 
control and on-farm monitoring to assure members’ compliance. On the other hand, democracy 
and community do have an important role in enhancing commitment to collective action which 
is a sine qua non condition for the viability of the cooperative (Chapter 3). Therefore, the 
overall conclusion is that all four mechanisms are needed by cooperatives in face of vertical 
coordination in the food value chain.  
                                                 
12
 Regarding the population of members, 19.0% have up to 10 hectares, 31% have between 11 and 20 hectares, 
those 19% have between 21 and 30 hectares, 16% have between 31 to 60 hectares, 5% have between 61 and 100 
hectares, 8% have between 101 and 500 hectares, and 2% have more than 500. 
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The thesis emphasized the role of the often neglected governance mechanisms democracy and 
community in motivating and coordinating members’ production and marketing decisions. 
Moreover, besides the role of social mechanisms in enhancing commitment to collective 
action, there seems to be a role of social mechanisms in enhancing members’ control of their 
cooperative (Chapter 4). Members who participate in boards or committees are not actuated to 
participate by the same economic motivations that drive their association to the cooperative. 
Cooperative ideology, in turn, appears to be an important motivation for them to actively 
participate.  
6.3 Theoretical contributions 
The main contributions this thesis provides to organizational economic theories on 
cooperatives concern the relationship between members and cooperative, and the governance 
of this relationship. The point of departure for the approach to the relationship between 
members and cooperative organization has been that of Dunn (1988), who divided this 
relationship into three dimensions: ownership (or financing), control (or decision-making), 
and use (or transaction). This has been used to differentiate cooperatives from investor-owned 
firms (IOFs) since members of cooperatives are simultaneously users, owners and decision-
makers of the organization. Feng and Hendrikse (2008) differentiate agricultural cooperatives 
from IOFs by the attribute that the cooperative owners are also its input suppliers. According 
to Feng and Hendrikse (2008: 16), “this transaction attribute is one of the fundamental 
elements distinguishing a cooperative from an IOF”.   
On the one hand, this thesis is in line with Feng and Hendrikse (2008) in approaching the 
parties involved in an agricultural cooperative (members and downstream enterprise) as 
“legally distinct entities”. That is, the member-cooperative relationship is a form of inter-
organizational relationship. On the other hand, this thesis does not consider the relationship to 
be as loose as posed by Feng and Hendrikse (2008: 16), when they say that the relationship 
between members and cooperative is even looser than that between franchisor and franchise, 
since “in cooperatives only the products of the downstream cooperative use the brand name, 
while the products of the member farms do not”. While this looseness might be true in terms 
of the economic transaction, it is probably not in terms of social ties. 
The bulk of research about agricultural cooperatives is based on economic (organisation) 
theory. An influential theoretical framework for better understanding the nature of 
cooperatives is built upon Transaction Costs Economics (TCE), (Ménard, 2007). TCE’s 
characterization of a cooperative as a ‘hybrid’ governance structure (Ménard, 2007) conceals 
the coexistent governance mechanisms within the cooperative (Chaddad, 2012). Moreover, 
this perspective is limited because it does not go beyond the traditional notion of the discrete 
organizational form and does not acknowledge the complementarity between formal and 
informal governance (Lazzarini et al., 2004), coordination and motivation (Kogut and Zander, 
1996) and the intrinsic importance of democratic voice (Fenwick, 2005).  
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The first and main scientific contribution of this thesis is the use of the ‘chemistry of 
organizations’ framework proposed by Grandori and Furnari (2008) in seeking a better 
understanding of the governance of the member-cooperative relationship (Chapter 2 and 3). 
By adopting that framework the thesis addressed in an integrated way the role of social capital 
(Ostrom, 1999) and community governance (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Hayami, 2009) in 
facilitating collective action, and the role of relational contracts (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; 
Lazzarini, Miller and Zenger, 2004) in assuring commitment from parties in a transaction. 
Furthermore, with that framework, the thesis addressed the cognitive role of governance 
mechanisms, such as knowledge exchange (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996) and 
competence enhancing (Nooteboom, 2004). 
It is true that other organizational forms also use the four mechanisms proposed by Grandori 
and Furnari (2008) which are market, hierarchy, community and democracy. However, 
agricultural cooperatives most likely present an advantage over other inter-firm arrangements 
(Davis and Bialoskorski, 2010) regarding the role of democracy and community mechanisms 
in facilitating both ‘cooperation and coordination’ (Gulati et al., 2012).  
Cooperation can be facilitated in cooperative by enhancing member commitment as it has 
already been posed in the literature (Fulton, 1995; Nilsson et al., 2012). The contribution of 
this thesis to the theory on member commitment in cooperatives is the disentangling of two 
dimensions (Chapter 2 and 3). This thesis found that member commitment in agricultural 
cooperatives can be disentangled conceptually and empirically into two types: commitment to 
collective action and commitment to customer orientation. Commitment to collective action is 
related to Fulton’s (1995) definition: the willingness to patronize a cooperative even when the 
cooperative’s price or service is not as good as that provided by an IOF. It is an attitude that 
precedes loyal behaviour; it is the making of a sacrifice or an effort in the name of the 
relationship and the success of the organization. Commitment to customer orientation, in turn, 
is the willingness to give up a part of the autonomy at the farm level for the sake of the 
cooperative’s compliance with the requirements from downstream customers. It is a positive 
attitude of members towards the re-orientation of the cooperative and is related to Borgen’s 
(2001) view on commitment.  
When it comes to decision-making problems and influence costs, most conceptualizations 
derive from Agency Theory, which makes assumptions that people are fully rational, behave 
according to stable risk preferences (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), are motivated solely by 
concern for their expected money incomes at subordinate levels, that the organization’s goal 
is to maximize profits and that within organizations there is goal conflict among members 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1988). These assumptions are the basis of the argument that 
membership heterogeneity can lead to inefficient results. An alternative theory of corporate 
governance is Stewardship theory, which departs from different assumptions (Davis et al., 
1997; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). If applied to cooperative governance, members who 
occupy representative and managing functions might have a pro-social behavior or act as 
stewards of the cooperative community instead of pursuing their own private benefits. The 
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contribution of this thesis is to question (empirically) the assumptions from Agency Theory, 
presenting a different perspective on membership heterogeneity. Heterogeneity might not be a 
source of inefficiency in decision-making if the organizational goal is precisely to satisfy 
diverse members’ interests, and if members who occupy representative and managing 
functions are genuinely seeking to further organizational goals rather than to follow private 
motives (Chapter 4).  
On a general level, this thesis makes a contribution to the literature on the implications of the 
organization of the food value chain for food quality, by presenting a different perspective on 
heterogeneity as a source of overall low product quality in cooperatives and contributing to 
the theory of adverse selection applied to cooperatives. The literature on the implications of 
the cooperative structure for quality management (Hanf and Kühl, 2005; Mérel et al., 2009) 
emphasizes that cooperatives often fail to adequately reward the highest quality producers, 
often causing the reductions in product quality and/or the exit of the high-quality producers 
from the cooperative. However, this thesis found that despite starting with larger 
heterogeneity in terms of producers’ capacity to produce high-quality products, cooperatives 
may achieve high quality products through superior coordination and adaptation support 
(Chapter 5).  
The cooperative’s potential superior coordination lies in the relationship characteristics which 
eventually result in producers’ higher commitment and competence. In fact, as established in 
the literature, repeated bilateral transactions have as important consequence the development 
of trust and increased knowledge about the partners’ reliability and competences 
(Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1997; Lazzarini et al., 2004; Sporleder and Wu, 2006). The findings 
of this thesis are also in line with other empirical studies outside the domain of cooperatives 
that found that quality performance may be influenced by relationship characteristics, through 
their effect on transaction costs (Lu et al., 2009; Coronado et al., 2010).  
6.4 Limitations  
Since it is a case study of one cooperative in Brazil, there are important limitations when it 
comes to generalizing the conclusions. The degree to which the conclusions of this thesis 
would hold for cooperatives in other countries with a different cultural and socioeconomic 
background, is hard to assess. Farmers embedded in different cultures are likely to have 
different motivations and perceptions. Moreover, socioeconomic factors or even climate and 
geographical factors might influence the farmers’ economic vulnerability and thereby 
commitment. We assume that our conclusions can be extended to similar cooperatives (i.e., 
large, multiproduct cooperatives), in similar socio-economic and cultural conditions. Thus, 
other cooperatives in the South of Brazil, but also cooperatives in other Latin American 
countries and in Southern Europe, may experience the same issues regarding member 
commitment (Chapter 3) and participation (Chapter 4). There are at least two groups of 
agricultural cooperative that are quite distinct from the cooperative investigated in this case 
study, and for which our results may not apply. The first group consists of the cooperatives 
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from North America, North-West Europe and Oceania, who commonly apply the governance 
model of complete separation between decision control and decision management (Chaddad 
and Iliopoulos, 2013). In these cooperatives, management of the cooperative firm has been 
delegated to professionals who are then controlled by the Board of Directors. However, in 
Brazil as well as in most Southern European countries, cooperatives usually have the CEO 
function exercised by the president of Board. The second group consists of the cooperatives in 
the North of Brazil, but also in Africa and many other parts of the world, where very few 
farmers have the capabilities to pro-actively participate in the cooperative, and cooperatives 
often receive substantial outside support. In this group, commitment could be a necessity 
rather than an option, due to the extreme economic vulnerability of individual farmers 
coupled with very restrict options for accessing markets.  
Regarding the internal validity of our findings, causal relations between the variables in this 
thesis are not fully demonstrated since the ‘cause’ does not precede the ‘effect’ in time. That 
is, this thesis could not observe and measure temporal precedence since it relies on a cross 
sectional survey. Two out of three empirical studies in this thesis found significant 
correlations between variables that were considered ‘cause’ and ‘effect’. However, there 
might be alternative explanations for the observed correlations. It is, therefore, worthwhile 
mentioning that other phenomena might help to explain the findings, even if they were not 
considered in this thesis. The dynamics of the cooperative’s economic success is likely to 
affect members’ commitment, that is, their willingness to sacrifice short-term economic gains 
for the sake of the relationship (Chapter 3). Members’ attitude towards the cooperative most 
likely varies in time and with the ability of the cooperative to generate and distribute surplus 
as patronage refunds. A similar causality is likely to happen with members’ participation in 
the General Assembly and in Boards and Committees (Chapter 4). The dynamics of the 
cooperative’s economic success is likely to affect member participation in the decision-
making. Furthermore, this relationship is likely to be negative; that is, if the cooperative’s 
economic results were bad in the previous period, the members are more likely to want to 
actively participate in the decision making. The alignment or divergence of business interests 
between farmer and cooperative firm is also likely to be important in explaining participation 
behavior. Finally, unobserved technological differences between Cooperative and IOF 
suppliers might explain some of the difference in quality performance (Chapter 5). 
In sum, there are some limitations to the external validity of this thesis, and the conclusions 
based on correlations result in a lower degree of internal validity than if the conclusions were 
drawn on the basis of direct manipulation of the independent variables. On the one hand, it is 
likely that experiments as those used by behavioural economics would lead to a higher degree 
of internal validity, particularly in explaining participation behaviour and commitment. On the 
other hand the approach taken by this thesis presents a new way of relating and 
operationalizing concepts like governance mechanism, commitment and participation.  
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6.5 Management and policy implications 
Even if the management and policy relevance of the findings were not tested, at least three 
issues related to broader societal debates arise from this thesis.  
First, rewarding farmers appropriately and controlling and monitoring delivery and production 
processes are important for enhancing commitment both to collective action and to customer 
orientation. Giving “voice” and building a social community for members and their families 
are important for enhancing commitment to collective action, since these mechanisms are 
likely to prevent members’ free-riding and selling “outside”. The implication for managers of 
cooperatives is that to successfully engage in vertical coordination in food value chains, it is 
advised to combine at least the following governance mechanisms: hierarchy control, market 
incentives, community involvement, communication and democratic voice.  
Second, cooperatives can participate in high-quality value chains and be as efficient and 
effective as other organizational arrangements in the agri-food sector. More importantly, 
cooperatives might even have an advantage in the production and marketing of goods with 
credence attributes, such as animal welfare, organic and fair trade. Therefore, policies aiming 
to promote sustainable food production may target cooperatives, as this organisational form is 
more effective in lowering the risks associated with farmer’ opportunistic behavior.  
Third, the findings might imply the inclusion of the intangible social assets in any 
performance analysis of collective action organizations. The seven principles of cooperative 
identity, developed by the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) - voluntary and open 
membership; democratic member control; member economic participation; autonomy and 
independence; education, training and information sharing; cooperation  among cooperatives; 
and concern for community – might serve as guidelines for other performance criteria. 
Member participation, commitment, satisfaction with leadership and with the cooperative’s 
strategy are just a few examples of what could be additional performance criteria besides 
reported profits, which taken alone could be misleading. An important implication for 
cooperative managers and rural development policy-makers relates to the fact that the 
cooperative’s objectives are beyond the economic viability of the collective enterprise, since 
they include its ability in promoting the sustainable development of the communities in a 
particular territory (Birchall and Ketilson, 2009). Therefore, the intangible social assets 
should be assessed in order to evaluate the performance of the cooperative, and thereby to 
compare cooperatives with investor-owned firms and among cooperatives themselves. 
6.6 Recommendations for further research 
An approach to the governance of the member-cooperative relationship which looks at the four 
mechanisms and their effect on commitment and cognition opens at least three veins for further 
research. First, future research might focus on the evolution of the relative importance of each 
mechanism. How does the mix of governance mechanisms evolve to adapt to changing market 
circumstances? How does the evolving mix of governance mechanisms affect commitment and 
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cognition through time? This thesis did not address the interaction among governance 
mechanisms, and the effect of their interplay on members’ adjustment to higher quality levels. 
This can only be done if (i) a score is given to the strength of each mechanism used within the 
cooperative, and (ii) a comparison between cooperatives is made, so that the effect of 
particular combinations can be assessed.  
Second, an underexplored topic in general, and particularly in cooperative studies, is 
crowding effects. Cooperative members’ compliance with an agreement regarding a specific 
transaction has to be managed in a way that the required commitment is not crowded out. If 
commitment, understood as an attitude, is open to management (Osterloh and Frey, 2000) as 
motivation is, it might be crowded in or out (Frey, 1997), depending on the mix of governance 
mechanisms and how members perceive each mechanism. More control and incentives do not 
necessarily align interests and make individuals respond with more motivation to cooperative 
and less motivation to free ride, shirk or breach a contract. They might even have the opposite 
effect if they crowd-out intrinsic motivation (Frey and Jegen, 2001). For further empirical 
studies, we suggest the dynamics of the interaction between governance mechanisms and the 
non-linear effects of these interactions on commitment.  
Third, the role of governance mechanisms used by the cooperative in promoting innovation 
and learning of individual farmers and of the collective enterprise deserves more attention. 
What is the effect of the four governance mechanisms – market, hierarchy, community and 
democracy - on innovation performance? This is an important direction for future empirical 
research on cooperative innovation and collective entrepreneurship (Cook and Plunkett, 2006; 
Bijman and Doorneweert, 2010).  
The ability of the cooperative to support the adaptation of members to specific quality 
requirements deserves more attention. What needs to be better understood is the cooperative’s 
choice to allocate resources to provide training to the lower quality producers in order to raise 
product quality to a higher level. This fourth recommendation for further research is important 
since the cooperative’s potentially superior coordination and adaptation support might 
counterbalance the “adverse selection” problem, which would otherwise lead to reductions in 
product quality and/or the exit of the high-quality producers (Mérel et al., 2009).  
Finally, a fifth future research topic is the potential advantage of agricultural cooperatives 
over IOFs in delivering credence quality attributes. Credence attributes are those for which 
even the consumption does not bring information on the real quality. It is worth investigating 
whether there are characteristics of the member-cooperative relationship characteristics which 
are able to mitigate agency problems related to information asymmetry in the transaction of 
credence quality attributes in the agri-food sector. 
As a more general suggestion, future studies in cooperatives could benefit from opening the 
black box of the governance structure and borrowing more from economic sociology, social 
psychology and organization theory, as does the literature on inter-firm networks (Gulati and 
Singh 1998; Gulati et al., 2005; Gulati and Puranam, 2011; Gulati et al., 2012; Grandori, 
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1997; Grandori and Soda, 1995; Grandori and Furnari, 2008; Nooteboom, 2000; Nooteboom, 
2004; Nooteboom et al., 2007). 
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Summary 
Recent events in the agri-food sector increased the demand for quality attributes, from healthy 
and safe products to sustainable agricultural practices (Grunert, 2005). Particularly 
challenging is the connectedness of transactions between farmers, traders, processors, retailers 
and final customers in order to comply with quality requirements, which implies a need for 
value chain coordination. Combined with increased consumer demand for variety and 
convenience, these changes in sector have led to stronger sequential interdependencies, in 
which the output of one part is the input for another part. The increasing connectedness 
between transactions demands more vertical coordination. A major challenge for the 
agricultural cooperative is to combine horizontal coordination among the members with 
vertical coordination in the value chain (Bijman 2009; Hanf, 2009). Since they are member-
oriented, agricultural cooperatives traditionally buy the farm products of its members 
regardless of its quality. Increasingly, however, cooperatives need to guarantee product 
quality towards their customers, and thus assure that members supply products of the right 
quality.  
The objective of this thesis is to disentangle the governance mechanisms that can be used by 
the cooperative to strengthen the member-cooperative relationship, and to assess the impact of 
the different governance mechanisms on the coordination of members’ adjustments to higher 
quality levels. The attempt to organize the participating farmers and firms along the food 
value chain generates transactional risks and coordination costs in the relationship between 
agricultural cooperative and farmer-member. This leads to the first research question of this 
thesis.  
R.Q. (1): What are the mechanisms for governing the member-cooperative relationship, and 
how do they affect transactional risks and coordination costs?  
This thesis (Chapter 2) poses that four governance mechanisms - market, hierarchy, 
community and democracy affect coordination costs and transactional risks through their 
effect on member commitment and cognitive heterogeneity. It is important that members of 
an agricultural cooperative are committed to customer orientation; otherwise the involved 
transactional risks would make vertical coordination more costly. It is necessary to 
disentangle two types of commitment: to collective action and to customer orientation. 
Member commitment to collective action prevents side selling, in particular, and free-riding 
behaviour in general. This leads to the second research question of this thesis. 
R.Q. (2): How do the four governance mechanisms - market, hierarchy, community and 
democracy - affect both types of commitment?  
One of the conclusions stemming from this thesis was that, on the one hand, a cooperative may 
assure members’ compliance in a less costly way if market incentives related to quality, 
productivity and effort are strengthened, as well as (hierarchy) input control and on-farm 
monitoring, since these mechanisms are positively related to commitment to customer 
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orientation. On the other hand, democracy and community mechanisms do have an important 
role in enhancing commitment to collective action which is a sine qua non condition for the 
viability of the cooperative (Chapter 3).  
A large multi-product cooperative in which different activities of the cooperative cater to 
different groups of members, as the case that was chosen as the empirical basis of this thesis, 
may face problems related to membership heterogeneity (Hansmann, 1996; Fulton and 
Giannakas, 2001). The basic assumption in most of the literature on the impact of member 
heterogeneity on the process and outcomes of decision-making is that farmers pursue 
individual or subgroup interests when participating in the decision-making of the cooperative. 
If members primarily pursue individual economic interests, there might be a relationship 
between the economic reasons for becoming a member (and maintaining membership) and the 
motivation to participate in the governance of the cooperative. This leads to the third research 
question of this thesis. 
R.Q. (3): How do economic motivations for association affect members’ participation in the 
governance of a cooperative? 
The conclusion of this thesis, regarding this research question, was that besides the role of 
social mechanisms in enhancing commitment to collective action, there seems to be a role of 
social mechanisms in enhancing members’ control of their cooperative. Members who 
participate in boards or committees are not actuated to participate by the same economic 
motivations that drive their association to the cooperative. Cooperative ideology, in turn, 
appears to be an important motivation for them to actively participate (Chapter 4).  
The ability of cooperatives to adapt to a rapidly changing environment characterized by 
technological change and industrialization of agriculture has been questioned Fulton (1995). 
The organizational structure of the cooperative is said to have negative implications for its 
quality management (Mérel et al., 2009). On the one hand, cooperatives may be mimicking 
Investor-Owned Firms (IOFs) in applying more hierarchical mechanisms which enable them 
to define and effectively apply quality norms for their supply, control the quality of delivered 
products and monitor members’ production processes. On the other hand, cooperatives have 
unique organizational characteristics that could provide them with competitive advantage, 
such as the tight relationship between members and cooperative, which may enable less costly 
coordination of the transaction (Sykuta and Cook, 2001). This leads to the fourth and last 
research question of this thesis. 
R.Q. (4): What are the differences in quality performance between a cooperative and an IOF, 
and can these differences be explained by relationship characteristics? 
In the Brazilian broiler industry, suppliers delivering to a cooperative are performing better in 
terms of quality than suppliers delivering to an IOF. Cooperative and IOF have the same 
incentive and control mechanisms for production efficiency and high-quality chicken meat. 
The cooperative’s advantage over the IOF in terms of suppliers’ quality performance could be 
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influenced by the characteristics of the supplier-buyer relationship. This thesis shows 
(Chapter 5) that there are some important differences regarding relationship characteristics 
that could account for this higher performance. Dependence on current buyer, which is higher 
for cooperative members, uncertainty regarding buyer’s behavior, which is lower for 
cooperative members, and market risk reduction by the buyer, which is higher for cooperative 
members, can help explain the higher rate of compliance to the “feet callus” quality standard. 
These three features of the supplier-cooperative relationship are likely to prevent suppliers 
from shirking behavior and to induce commitment. Moreover, cooperative suppliers receive 
more technical support from their buyer for adapting to new quality requirements than IOF 
suppliers do; this is likely to positively affect farmers’ competence in complying with quality 
standards. 
The main methodological approach of this thesis is quantitative. Qualitative data were 
collected through semi-structured interviews with professional managers of the industrial 
division, directors and farmers in order to guide the design of the questionnaire. The data that 
is analyzed in this thesis were collected by using a survey questionnaire applied among 148 
farmers, all members of the same multi-product cooperative in Brazil, and 42 broiler suppliers 
of two major buyers in the same region. 
This thesis makes several theoretical contributions, which can be listed as follows: 
(1) Member commitment in agricultural cooperatives can be disentangled conceptually and 
empirically into two types. Commitment to collective action is related to Fulton’s (1995) 
definition: the willingness to patronize a cooperative even when the cooperative’s price or 
service is not as good as that provided by an IOF. It is an attitude that precedes loyal 
behaviour; it is the making of a sacrifice or an effort in the name of the relationship and the 
success of the organization. Commitment to customer orientation, in turn, is the willingness to 
give up a part of the autonomy at the farm level for the sake of the cooperative’s compliance 
with the requirements from downstream customers. It is a positive attitude of members 
towards the re-orientation of the cooperative and is related to Borgen’s (2001) view on 
commitment. 
(2) Membership heterogeneity might not be a source of inefficiency in decision-making if the 
organizational goal is precisely to satisfy diverse members’ interests, and if members who 
occupy representative and managing functions are genuinely seeking to further organizational 
goals rather than to follow private motives. Most conceptualizations of decision-making 
problems and influence costs derive from organizational economics, where agency theory has 
been quite influential. The findings of this thesis (Chapter 4) suggest that assumptions from 
agency theory, which are often adopted by cooperative studies, could better be treated as an 
empirical matter.  
(3) This thesis presents a different perspective on the comparative advantage of the 
cooperative in producing food products with higher quality attributes. The literature on the 
implications of the cooperative structure for quality management (Mérel et al., 2009) 
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emphasizes that cooperatives often fail to adequately reward the highest quality producers, 
often causing the problem of “adverse selection”. However, despite starting with larger 
heterogeneity in terms of producers’ capacity to produce high-quality products, cooperatives 
may achieve high quality products through superior coordination and adaptation support. The 
findings of this thesis are in line with other empirical studies outside the domain of 
cooperatives that found that quality performance may be influenced by relationship 
characteristics, through their effect on transaction costs (Lu et al., 2009; Coronado et al., 
2010). 
(4) Overall, the main scientific contribution of this thesis is the use of the ‘chemistry of 
organizations’ framework proposed by Grandori and Furnari (2008) in seeking a better 
understanding of the governance of cooperatives. By adopting that framework the thesis 
addressed in an integrated way the role of social capital (Ostrom, 1999) and community 
governance (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Hayami, 2009) in facilitating collective action, and the 
role of relational contracts (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Lazzarini, Miller and Zenger, 2004) in 
assuring commitment from parties in a transaction. Furthermore, with that framework, the 
thesis addressed the cognitive role of governance mechanisms, such as knowledge exchange 
(Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996) and competence enhancing (Nooteboom, 2004). 
The implications of this thesis for management and policy are listed in the three following 
groups: 
(1) Rewarding farmers appropriately and controlling and monitoring delivery and production 
processes are important for enhancing commitment both to collective action and to customer 
orientation. Giving “voice” and building a social community for members and their families 
are important to prevent members’ free-riding and selling “outside”. It is advised to combine 
at least the following governance mechanisms: hierarchy control, market incentives, 
community involvement and democratic voice. Finally, communication is an important tool 
for enhancing farmers’ commitment to customer orientation. 
(2) Cooperatives can participate in high-quality value chains and be as efficient and effective 
as other organizational arrangements in the agri-food sector. More importantly, cooperatives 
might even have an advantage in the production and marketing of goods with credence 
attributes, such as animal welfare, organic and fair trade. Therefore, policies aiming to 
promote sustainable food production may target cooperatives, as this organisational form is 
more effective in lowering the risks associated with farmer’ opportunistic behavior.  
(3) Member participation, commitment, satisfaction with leadership and with the 
cooperative’s strategy are examples of what could be additional performance criteria besides 
reported profits, which taken alone could be misleading. Because the cooperative’s objectives 
are beyond the economic viability of the collective enterprise, (Birchall and Ketilson, 2009), 
the intangible social assets should be assessed in order to evaluate the performance of the 
cooperative, and thereby to compare cooperatives with investor-owned firms and among 
cooperatives themselves. 
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Samenvatting (Dutch summary) 
Huidige ontwikkelingen in the agri-food sector verhogen de vraag naar kwaliteit van 
producten, van gezonde en veilige producten tot duurzame landbouwpraktijken (Grunert, 
2005). Voldoen aan kwaliteitseisen van consumenten, overheid en bedrijven, vraagt om  
versterking van de relaties tussen  boeren, handelaren, verwerkers, en retailers Met andere 
woorden, dit vraagt om ketencoördinatie, oftewel verticale coördinatie. Gecombineerd met 
een toegenomen consumentenvraag naar variatie en gemak hebben deze veranderingen geleid 
tot sterkere wederzijdse afhankelijkheid tussen opeenvolgende schakels van de keten, waarbij 
het eindproduct van de ene schakel het beginproduct voor de volgende vormt.  
Daarmee staat de landbouwcoöperatie staat voor de uitdaging om horizontale coördinatie 
tussen leden te combineren met verticale coördinatie in de keten (Bijman 2009; Hanf, 2009). 
Vanuit haar ledenoriëntatie koopt een landbouwcoöperatie van oudsher alle producten van 
haar leden ongeacht de kwaliteit. Echter, coöperaties moeten in toenemende mate de 
productkwaliteit garanderen richting klanten en moeten daarom zich ervan verzekeren dat 
haar leden de producten in de juiste kwaliteit aanleveren. 
De doelstelling van dit proefschrift is enerzijds om de sturingsmechanismen te ontrafelen die 
een coöperatie kan gebruiken om de relatie met haar leden te versterken en anderzijds om de 
impact van de verschillende sturingsmechanismen op kwaliteitsverbetering te analyseren. 
Elke transactie tussen verkopers en kopers, en dus ook tussen boeren en hun coöperatie, 
brengt transactierisico’s en coördinatiekosten met zich mee. Dit leidt tot de eerste 
onderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift. 
(1) Wat zijn de mechanismen voor sturing van de transactie tussen leden en de coöperatie en 
hoe beïnvloeden deze mechanismen transactierisico’s en coördinatiekosten? 
Hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift stelt dat de vier ideaaltypische sturingsmechanismen – markt, 
hiërarchie, gemeenschap en democratie – de  coördinatiekosten en transactierisico’s 
beïnvloeden via hun effect op betrokkenheid van leden en cognitieve heterogeniteit. Het is 
belangrijk dat leden van een landbouwcoöperatie zich committeren aan klantgerichtheid 
omdat anders de transactierisico’s te hoog worden. Het is noodzakelijk om twee typen 
betrokkenheid te onderscheiden, die bij collectieve actie en die bij een klantgerichte strategie. 
Betrokkenheid bij collectieve actie voorkomt verkoop buiten de coöperatie om en meer 
algemeen meelift-gedrag. Dit leidt tot de tweede onderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift. 
(2) Hoe beïnvloeden de vier sturingsmechanismen – markt, hiërarchie, gemeenschap en 
democratie – betrokkenheid bij collectieve actie en betrokkenheid bij een klantgerichte 
strategie? 
Een van de conclusies van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 3) is dat een coöperatie geen hoge 
kosten hoeft te maken om naleving door leden van kwaliteitsafspraken af te dwingen, omdat 
individuele economisch prikkels, het controleren van gebruik van inputs en het monitoren van 
activiteiten op de boerderij positief gerelateerd zijn aan ledenbetrokkenheid bij een 
klantgerichte strategie. Daarnaast, hebben de mechanismen van democratie en gemeenschap 
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een belangrijke rol in het bevorderen van betrokkenheid bij collectieve actie, een sine qua non 
voorwaarde voor de levensvatbaarheid van een coöperatie. 
Volgens de literatuur ondervindt een grote coöperatie die zich kenmerkt door meerdere 
producten en verschillende activiteiten gericht op verschillende groepen leden problemen 
gerelateerd aan de heterogeniteit van het ledenbestand (Hansmann, 1996; Fulton en 
Giannakas, 2001). Het uitgangspunt in de meeste literatuur over de invloed van heterogeniteit 
op het proces en de uitkomsten van de besluitvorming is dat boeren streven naar individuele 
of subgroepbelangen wanneer zij deelnemen aan de besluitvorming van de coöperatie. Als 
leden voornamelijk individuele economische belangen nastreven, is er mogelijk een verband 
tussen de economische motieven om lid te worden (en te blijven) en de motivatie om deel te 
nemen aan het bestuur van de coöperatie. Dit leidt tot de derde onderzoeksvraag van dit 
proefschrift. 
(3) Hoe beïnvloeden de economische drijfveren om te lid worden de deelname van de leden 
aan het besturen van een coöperatie? 
De conclusie van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 4), met betrekking tot deze onderzoeksvraag, was 
dat naast de rol van de sociale mechanismen bij het vergroten van betrokkenheid bij 
collectieve actie, er een rol lijkt te zijn voor  sociale mechanismen in het versterken van de 
controle van leden over hun coöperatie. Leden die deelnemen aan bestuur of commissies doen 
dit niet vanuit dezelfde economische motieven die hen lid maken van de coöperatie. 
Coöperatieve ideologie blijkt een belangrijke motivatie voor hen om actief deel te nemen aan 
besluitvorming. 
Het vermogen van coöperaties om zich aan te passen aan een snel veranderende omgeving die 
wordt gekenmerkt door technologische veranderingen en de industrialisatie van de landbouw 
is in twijfel getrokken door Fulton (1995). Aan de organisatiestructuur van de coöperatie 
worden negatieve gevolgen voor management van kwaliteit toegeschreven (Merel et al., 
2009). Aan de ene kant kunnen coöperaties de Investor-Owned Firms (IOFs) nabootsen in het 
toepassen van meer hiërarchische mechanismen die hen in staat stellen kwaliteitsnormen voor 
de productieprocessen van haar leden definiëren en effectief toe te passen op hun aanbod, de 
kwaliteit van de geleverde producten te controleren en te bewaken. Aan de andere kant, 
hebben coöperaties unieke organisatiekenmerken die mogelijk een concurrentievoordeel 
opleveren, zoals de nauwe relatie tussen de leden en de coöperatie, die minder kostbare 
coördinatie van de transactie vergt (Sykuta en Cook, 2001). Dit leidt tot de vierde en laatste 
onderzoeksvraag van dit proefschrift. 
(4) Wat zijn de verschillen in kwaliteit van de prestaties tussen een coöperatie en een IOF, en 
kunnen deze verschillen worden verklaard uit verschillen in relatiekenmerken? 
In de Braziliaanse vleeskuikenindustrie presteren boeren die leveren aan een coöperatie beter 
in termen van kwaliteit dan boeren die leveren aan een IOF. Coöperatie en IOF hanteren 
dezelfde economische prikkels en controlemechanismen voor de productie-efficiëntie van 
hoogwaardig kippenvlees. Het voordeel van de coöperatie ten opzichte van de IOF in termen 
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van kwaliteitsbevordering, is gelegen in de kenmerken van de leverancier-afnemer relatie. Dit 
proefschrift laat zien (hoofdstuk 5) dat er een aantal belangrijke verschillen met betrekking tot 
de relationele kenmerken zijn die verantwoordelijk zouden kunnen zijn voor deze hogere 
prestaties. De mate van afhankelijkheid van de koper, welke hoger is voor leden van de 
coöperatie dan voor de leveranciers van een IOF, de onzekerheid over het gedrag van de 
koper, welke lager is voor leden van de coöperatie, en de reductie van marktrisico van de 
koper, welke groter is voor leden van de coöperatie, helpen de hogere mate van naleving van 
de kwaliteitsnorm te verklaren. Deze drie kenmerken van de relatie tussen boer en coöperatie 
voorkomen waarschijnlijk lijntrek-gedrag door de boeren en vergoten betrokkenheid. 
Bovendien krijgen de boeren die leveren aan de coöperatie meer technische steun van hun 
koper voor aanpassing aan nieuwe kwaliteitseisen dan leveranciers aan de IOF. Dit heeft 
waarschijnlijk een positieve invloed op de deskundigheid van boeren bij het voldoen aan 
kwaliteitsnormen. 
De belangrijkste methodologische aanpak van dit proefschrift is kwantitatief; gegevens 
werden verzameld via een vragenlijst onder 148 boeren die allemaal lid zijn van dezelfde 
multi-product coöperatie in Brazilië, alsmede onder 42 vleeskuikenleveranciers van twee 
grote afnemers in dezelfde regio. Daarnaast werden kwalitatieve gegevens verzameld door 
middel van semi-gestructureerde interviews met professionele managers van de coöperatie, 
met bestuurders en met boeren om het ontwerp van de vragenlijst te begeleiden. 
Dit proefschrift maakt een aantal theoretische bijdragen, die als volgt kunnen worden 
opgesomd: 
(1) De betrokkenheid van boeren bij hun coöperatie kan conceptueel en empirisch ontrafelt 
worden in twee soorten. Betrokkenheid bij collectieve actie is, volgens de definitie van Fulton 
(1995): de bereidheid om bij de coöperatie te blijven, zelfs wanneer de prijs of de dienst van 
de coöperatie niet zo goed is als die van een IOF. Betrokkenheid is een houding die 
voorafgaat aan loyaliteit; het offer in naam van de relatie zelf en het succes van de organisatie. 
Echter, betrokkenheid bij een klantgerichte strategie betekent dat de boer de bereidheid heeft 
om een deel van de autonomie van het landbouwbedrijf op te geven in het belang van de 
naleving van de eisen van de klanten van de coöperatie. Het is een positieve houding van de 
leden ten aanzien van de heroriëntatie van de coöperatie. 
(2) Heterogeniteit van het ledenbestand zou geen bron van inefficiëntie in de besluitvorming 
hoeven zijn als het organisatorische doel juist is om de belangen van heterogene leden te 
behartigen, en als leden die representatieve en managementfuncties bezetten daadwerkelijk 
streven naar verbetering van organisatorische doelen in plaats van individuele doelen. De 
meeste conceptualiseringen van de besluitvormingsproblemen en invloedkosten zijn 
gebaseerd op economische organisatietheorie, waar de agency-theorie vrij invloedrijk is 
geweest. Uit de bevindingen van dit proefschrift (hoofdstuk 4) blijkt dat aannames van 
agency-theorie, die vaak in onderzoek naar coöperaties als aanname worden gebruikt, beter 
kunnen worden behandeld als een empirische kwestie. 
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(3) Dit proefschrift presenteert een ander perspectief op het comparatieve voordeel van de 
coöperatie in het produceren van voedingsmiddelen met hoogwaardige kwaliteitsattributen. 
De literatuur over de gevolgen van de coöperatieve structuur voor kwaliteitsmanagement 
(Merel et al., 2009) benadrukt dat coöperaties de producenten met de hoogste kwaliteit vaak 
niet adequaat belonen, wat vaak het probleem van averechtse selectie wordt genoemd. Echter, 
ondanks de grotere heterogeniteit in termen van de capaciteit van producenten om hoge 
kwaliteit te produceren, kunnen coöperaties producten van hoge kwaliteit bereiken door 
middel van superieure coördinatie en ondersteuning in de aanpassingen van haar leden. De 
bevindingen van dit proefschrift zijn in lijn met andere empirische studies buiten het domein 
van de coöperaties die vonden dat de kwaliteit van de prestaties kunnen worden beïnvloed 
door relatiekenmerken, en hun effect op de transactiekosten (Lu et al., 2009; Coronado et al., 
2010). 
(4) Samenvattend is de belangrijkste wetenschappelijke bijdrage van dit proefschrift het 
toepassen van het kader van 'chemie van organisaties’, van Grandori en Furnari (2008), bij het 
zoeken naar een beter begrip van de governance van coöperaties. Door het gebruiken van 
genoemd kader behandelt het proefschrift op geïntegreerde wijze de rol van sociaal kapitaal 
(Ostrom, 1999) en community governance (Bowles en Gintis, 2002; Hayami, 2009) in het 
stimuleren van collectieve actie, en de rol van relationele contracten (Poppo en Zenger , 2002; 
Lazzarini, Miller en Zenger, 2004) in het verzekeren van betrokkenheid van partijen in een 
transactie. Bovendien, met dat kader,  behandelt het proefschrift de cognitieve rol van 
sturingsmechanismen, zoals kennisuitwisseling (Conner en Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996) en 
competentieverhoging (Nooteboom, 2004). 
De implicaties van dit proefschrift voor het beheer en beleid van coöperaties kunnen worden 
samengevat in de volgende drie groepen: 
(1) Het adequaat belonen van boeren en het regelen en bewaken van leverings- en productie-
processen zijn belangrijk voor het verbeteren van betrokkenheid zowel bij collectieve actie als 
bij een klantgerichte strategie. Het geven van inspraak en het opbouwen van een sociale 
gemeenschap voor de leden en hun gezinnen zijn belangrijk om meeliftgedrag en het 
“verkopen-buiten-de-coöperatie-om” te voorkomen. Het wordt aangeraden om ten minste de 
volgende sturingsmechanismen te combineren: hiërarchische controle, economische prikkels, 
maatschappelijke betrokkenheid, en democratische inspraak. Tot slot, de communicatie is een 
belangrijk instrument voor het verbeteren van de betrokkenheid van de leden bij een 
klantgerichte strategie. 
(2) Coöperaties kunnen deelnemen aan hoogwaardige ketens en net zo efficiënt en effectief 
zijn als andere contractuele arrangementen in de agri-food sector. Wat nog belangrijker is, 
coöperaties kunnen zelfs een voordeel hebben in de productie en marketing van goederen met 
credence attributen, zoals dierenwelzijn, biologisch en fair trade. Daarom zou beleid gericht 
op duurzame voedselproductie zich kunnen richten op coöperaties, omdat deze 
organisatievorm effectiever is in het verlagen van de risico's van meeliftgedrag van boeren. 
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(3) Ledenparticipatie, betrokkenheid, tevredenheid met de leiding en met de strategie van de 
coöperatie zijn voorbeelden van extra prestatiecriteria naast gerapporteerde winst. Omdat de 
doelstellingen van de coöperatie verder reiken dan de economische levensvatbaarheid van de 
collectieve onderneming (Birchall en Ketilson, 2009), moeten de immateriële activa worden 
meegenomen om de prestatie van de coöperatie te evalueren, en daarmee coöperaties te 
vergelijken met IOF’s en met andere coöperaties onderling. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Independent variables 
              
N 
            
Minimum 
              
Maximum 
                            
Mean 
  Std.
Deviation 
Past experience 148 0 39 16.92 10.301 
Level of Education 148 1 6 3.26 1.165 
Size of (own) farm 148 2 580 36.00 66.069 
Participation in general assemblies 148 1 3 2.32 .652 
Participation of son in activities of youth committee  138 1 3 1.40 .730 
Participation of wife in activities of women committees  142 1 3 1.43 .748 
Perception of influence on coop's path when member participates 148 1 5 3.97 1.006 
Perception of influence on own economic benefits when  
member participates 
148 1 5 3.81 .985 
Perception that Strategic decisions are made by members 148 1 5 3.01 1.088 
Perception that Members can vote in every important decision 148 1 5 3.65 1.118 
Perception that Board of directors considers members interests  
in their decisions 
148 2 5 3.82 .847 
Acceptance of Board of directors deciding strategic issues without consulting 
members 
148 1 5 3.07 1.302 
Quality standard is determined in contract 148 1 5 3.61 1.281 
Deliverance in made in  pre-determined dates 148 1 5 3.64 1.433 
Agreements follow formal rules and procedures 148 1 5 4.10 1.093 
Perception of  being a co-owner of the cooperative 148 1 5 3.24 1.397 
Occupation of any function in the cooperative governance? 148 0 1 .23 .422 
Perception that received value depends on quality control of delivered product 148 2 5 4.65 .558 
Perception that the cooperative controls rigorously used inputs 148 1 5 4.34 .915 
Perception that the cooperative monitors rigorously productive activity on site 148 2 5 4.32 .875 
Perception of Autonomy to decide how much to produce 148 1 5 3.97 1.347 
Perception of Autonomy to choose technology 148 1 5 4.10 1.211 
Perception of Autonomy to choose variety 148 1 5 3.43 1.604 
Information exchange on quality improvement with the cooperative is frequent 148 2 5 4.39 .822 
Cooperative informs about expected quality in informal way 148 2 5 4.20 .814 
Cooperative informs about expected quality through written docs 148 1 5 3.29 1.406 
Perception that payment is proportional to effort 148 1 5 3.53 1.192 
Perception that received value depends on quality control of delivered product 148 1 5 4.54 .811 
Satisfaction with price the cooperative pays for the product 148 1 5 3.49 1.163 
Soybeans Producer_Yes 105 - - - - 
Broiler Producer_Yes 58 - - - - 
Vegetable Producer_Yes 
Dependent variables 
Perception that quality control will be increasingly important 
27 
 
148 
- 
 
2 
- 
 
5 
- 
 
4.70 
- 
 
.543 
Perception that shifting quality standards towards customer preferences is good 148 2 5 4.61 .668 
Perception that quality control will be increasingly important 148 2 5 4.55 .598 
Sells to the cooperative even if other firm offers better price 148 1 5 4.16 1.227 
Better price is better than relation with the cooperative (-) 148 1 5 3.34 1.117 
Willingness to invest if the cooperative requires 148 2 5 3.91 .940 
Willingness to receive lower price temporarily (-) 148 1 5 2.80 1.060 
Cooperative’s future as part of concerns 
 
148 1 5 4.60 .763 
Valid N (listwise) 148     
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Appendix 2. Total variance of ‘Commitment’ explained  
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
 
1 2,901 36,265 36,265 2,154 26,920 26,920 
2 1,184 14,797 51,062 1,931 24,142 51,062 
       
 
Appendix 3. Total variance of ‘Governance mechanisms’ explained  
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues   
 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total   % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 5,188 18,529 18,529 5,188 11,178 11,178 
2 3,831 13,683 32,212 3,831 10,743 21,921 
3 2,036 7,271 39,483 2,036 8,649 30,571 
4 1,870 6,679 46,162 1,870 7,847 38,418 
5 1,482 5,294 51,456 1,482 7,495 45,913 
6 1,392 4,970 56,426 1,392 7,274 53,187 
7 1,127 4,026 60,452 1,127 5,827 59,014 
8 1,103 3,940 64,392 1,103 5,378 64,392 
       
 
Appendix 4. Correlation Matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  12 
1  1_Farm size 1.000            
2_Past experience -.041 1.000           
3_Community 
Communication 
.038 -.025 1.000          
4_Market 
autonomy 
.043 -.070 -.128 1.000         
5_Market 
incentives 
.095 -.013 -.030 -.094 1.000        
6_Level of 
education 
-.022 -.421 -.013 .120 .088 1.000       
7_Hierarchy 
control 
-.196 .037 -.223 .002 -.079 .159 1.000      
8_Hierarchy 
formalization 
-.101 -.107 .042 .027 .068 .037 -.039 1.000     
9_Community 
involvement 
.086 .277 -.118 -.043 .064 -.269 .083 -.095 1.000    
10_Democracy 
representation& 
ownership 
.082 -.018 -.142 .046 -.360 -.025 -.264 -.074 -.302 1.000   
11_Soybeans 
production 
-.141 .211 .053 -.340 .092 .054 .050 .150 -.264 .011 1.000  
12_Broiler 
Production 
.210 .021 -.065 .447 .139 .000 -.217 -.391 -.049 .064 .066 1.000 
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Appendix 5. Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Pro-activeness 148     
(0)Passive  15     
(1)Occasional supporters 65     
(2)Involved 36     
(3)Pro-active 32     
Duration of membership 148 16.91892 10.30125 0 39 
Level of Education 148 3.256 1.16129 1 6 
(1) No formal  
    education  
1 
 
    
(2) Incomplete  
    primary 
45     
(3) Complete  
    primary 
43     
(4) Complete High School  44     
(5) Technical  
    school  
4     
(6) College  11     
Total farm size 148 36.189 65.91877 2 580 
Lack of alternatives 148 2.608 1.291706 1 5 
Better price 148 4.054 .8711849 1 5 
Technical assistance 148 4.297 .8119805 1 5 
Patronage refund 148 4.040 1.048993 1 5 
Coop ideology 148 3.838 1.063009 1 5 
Farm product 148     
-Specialized soy 47   0 1 
-Broiler 58   0 1 
-Vegetable 27   0 1 
-Soy + (cassava; milk; swine) 16   0 1 
 
 
Appendix 6. Collinearity Diagnostics 
                                            SQRT                         R- 
  Variable                          VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared 
---------------------------------------------------- 
Duration of membership    1.25    1.12    0.8000     0.2000 
Level of Education             1.29    1.13    0.7764     0.2236 
Total Farm size                  1.10    1.05    0.9070      0.0930 
Lack of alternatives           1.11    1.05    0.9028      0.0972 
Better price                        1.22    1.10    0.8230      0.1770 
Technical assistance          1.10    1.05    0.9089      0.0911 
Patronage refund               1.29    1.14    0.7725      0.2275 
Coop ideology                   1.28    1.13    0.7796       0.2204 
---------------------------------------------------- 
  Mean VIF      1.21; Condition Number        25.0496  
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Appendix 7. Questionnaire 
 
1. For how many years have you been a member of this cooperative? _______ 
2. Is any other family member also a member? 
3. What is your highest level of education? 
 
(1) No formal education; (2) Incomplete Primary ; (3) Complete primary ; (4) High School ; (5) Technical 
school; (6) College ; (7) Graduate Studies 
 
4. Do you own or rent the land you farm on? Own / rented /  both 
5. What is the area of own property? ______ What is the area of rented land? ______ 
6. If any, what is the area taken by forests on your property? ______ 
7. What is the distance from farm to closest Coop processing unit? ______  
 
8. In the last 12 months (01 de july de 2009 - 30 de June de 2010) which products did you deliver to the Coop?  
 N  Product Total delivered Dedicated area (ha) / Number of  
animals 
 1  Maize ________bushel _________Ha 
 2  Soy ________ bushel _________Ha 
 3  Carrot ________ bushel _________Ha 
 4  Brócolis ________ bushel _________Ha 
 5  Sweet corn ________ bushel _________Ha 
 6  Cowli flower ________ bushel _________Ha 
 7  Manioc ________ bushel _________Ha 
 8   Swine ________Units _________Units 
 9  broiler ________Units _________Units 
10  milk ________Liters            _________Units (cows) 
 
9. In case you have more than one activity (maize, soy, wheat are 1 activity = agriculture; broccolis, sweet corn e 
cauliflower are another activity = vegetables; all the others are individually separate activities) please indicate 
the level of agreement with the following sentences.  
 
N Diversification Totally  
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
 
Totally          
agree 
 
1 
 Diversification of your productive   
activity is crucial for the economic  
viability of your property 
     
 
2 
 The coop has/had a crucial role in 
the  diversification of your productive 
activity  
     
 
10. How important are the following motivations for you to be a member of the cooperative? 
 Reasons Not  
important 
Little 
importance 
Mediu
m 
Importan
t 
Very  important 
 
A  To obtain access to credit      
B  Cooperative ideology      
D  To get a better price for your 
products 
     
E
  
 You had no other way to sell your 
products. 
     
F  To get secured market for the 
products  that you produce. 
     
G  To get inputs timely and with fair 
price. 
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H  To get technical assistance and 
advisory services. 
     
I  To reduce your costs of marketing.      
J  To participate in economic results  
(profits) of the coop firm 
     
 
K 
 other      
 
11. Could you please respond what is your/family participation status in the following bodies of the cooperative?  
N  participation status 
Never 
(0) 
Sometimes 
(1) 
Always 
(2) 
1  General assembly    
 
2 
 Attending production committee 
meetings 
   
 
3 
 Your Son/daughter participates in 
the youth committee activities 
   
 
4 
 Your Wife participates in the women 
committee activities 
   
 
12. Perception of importance of Participation 
 
N 
 To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements 
Totally 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
 
Totally agree 
 
1 
 If members take part in their  
cooperative’s decision-making they 
can influence the path of the 
enterprise. 
     
 
2 
 If you take part in the decision-
making  of your cooperative, you can 
influence it in such a way that your 
own economic situation improves. 
     
 
3 
 It is important to you that as many 
members as possible participate in 
the decision-making in your 
cooperative 
     
 
13. Participation - Decentralization in decision making 
 
N 
 To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements 
 
Totally  
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Totally agree 
 
1 
 Associate producers participate in 
Strategic decisions-making  
     
 
2 
 Members can vote  on every major 
decision of the cooperative 
     
 
3 
 Your suggestions are taken seriously 
by the coop 
     
 
14. Trust 
 
N 
 To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements 
 
Totally 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Totally  agree 
1  There is corruption in the Coop      
2  When cooperative directors make 
decisions they take members’ 
interests into account  
     
3  You accept that the board of 
directors takes strategic decisions 
without consulting you 
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15. Formalization 
 
N 
 To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements 
Totally  
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Totally agree 
 
1 
 Quality standard is determined in 
your contract 
     
 
2 
 Deliverance of your produce is pre- 
determined 
     
 
3 
 Agreements between you and the 
coop follow  formal rules and 
procedures  
     
 
16. Identity 
 
N 
 To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements 
 
Totally  
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Totally agree 
 
1 
 You perceive yourself as co-owner 
of the cooperative 
     
 
2 
 The members of this coop share the 
same values 
     
 
3 
 You occupy/have occupied a 
function within the coop governance 
structure 
Yes No 
 
17.  Control  
 
N 
 To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements 
 
Totally  
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Totally agree 
 
1 
 Your current buyer strictly controls 
the quality of the products you 
deliver 
     
 
2 
 Your current buyer strictly controls 
the inputs you use for the products 
that he buys  
     
 
3 
 Your current buyer strictly monitors 
your activities on the farm. 
     
 
18. Production autonomy 
 
N 
 To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements 
 
Totally  
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Totally agree 
 
1 
 You are fully autonomous in 
deciding how much to produce 
     
 
2 
 You can choose the agricultural (or 
animal raising)technology you want 
on your farm 
     
 
3 
 Within each activity (soy, vegetables 
or poultry) you can choose the variety  
you want to produce 
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19. Information exchange  
 
N 
 To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements 
 
Totally  
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Totally agree 
 
1 
 Info exchange on how to improve 
quality is frequent 
     
 
2 
 The Coop informs you about the 
expected quality of products through 
Personal interaction in an informal 
way 
     
 
3 
 It is difficult for you to access 
information on quality requirements 
     
 
4 
 The Coop informs you about the 
expected quality of products through 
Written documents 
     
 
20. Market incentives 
 
N 
 To what extent do you agree with the 
following statements 
 
Totally  
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Totally agree 
 
1 
 The payment you receive is 
according to your effort 
     
 
2 
 The payment you receive depends on  
the quality of your product   
     
 
3 
 You are satisfied with the price paid 
by the Coop for your product  (soy, 
vegetables, or poultry) 
     
 
21.Commitment to quality strategy (customer orientation) 
 
N 
 To what extent do you agree with 
the following statements 
 
Totally 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
 
Totally agree 
 
1 
 Quality control will be increasingly 
important in the coming years  
     
 
2 
 It is positive that the cooperative 
strengthens its quality requirements 
according to shifts in consumer 
preferences 
     
 
4 
 It is positive that the cooperative 
increasingly monitors the quality of 
your production process. 
     
 
22. Loyalty 
 
N 
 To what extent do you agree with 
the following statements 
 
Totally 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
 
Totally agree 
 
1 
 You will sell to the coop even if 
another buyer offers a better price 
     
 
2 
 A high price for your product is 
more important than a long-term 
relationship with the buyer.  
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23. Activism  
 
N 
 To what extent do you agree with 
the following statements 
 
Totally 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
 
Totally agree 
 
1 
 You are willing to make 
adjustments on your farm in case the 
coop asks you to do so 
     
 
2 
 You are willing to receive a lower 
payment for your products, 
temporarily, if that helps the coop 
     
 
3 
 The future of the coop is also your 
concern 
     
 
PART 2 - If you are a broiler producer and delivers broiler to Coop Lar, please indicate the extent of your 
agreement with the following sentences. 
 
1. For how long have you been selling to the same broiler firm? ______ 
 
2. How many broiler houses do you have? _____     
 
3. How many people work with you in the broiler houses?______                                 
 
4. During the last year (July 2009 - July 2010), how many broiler batches did you deliver to this 
buyer?______                                                    
 
5. How many batches had discounts due to lower than standard quality (feet callus)?______                              
 
6. How many batches had a productivity lower than what was expected by the buyer (that is, how many 
batches did not reach the green level in the productivity classification by colours)?________                                     
  
 7. What do you prefer? 
 
    a) Receiving a higher price on average from the buyer even knowing that it can be temporary and in the 
near future you could be receiving considerably lower price (high price fluctuation) ?  
 
    b) Receiving a higher price on average from the buyer but with the certainty of stability (without or very 
low price fluctuation)   
       
 
8. Risk 
N  Totally 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
 
Totally agree 
1 Selling to your buyer reduces your 
marketing risks  
     
2 Your current buyer maintains prices 
even in times of crisis 
     
3 You bare the onus when an 
unexpected situation arises (Disease) 
     
4 In times of crisis your buyer helps 
you to maintain your income 
stability. 
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9. Dependence 
N  Totally 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
 
Totally agree 
1 It is easy for you to shift buyer       
2 Shifting buyer would be way too 
risky  
     
3 You strongly depend on your current 
buyer  
     
4 You had to make specific 
investments as a precondition to sell 
to your current buyer  
     
5 You had to acquire specific 
knowledge as a precondition to sell to 
your current buyer 
     
 
10. Behavior Uncertainty 
N  Totally 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
 
Totally agree 
1 It is easy for you to detect an unfair 
treatment by your buyer  
     
2  It is easy for your buyer to distort 
facts in order to get advantages  
     
3  Your buyer has strong motivations to 
take advantage of what is not written 
in the formal contract  
     
4 It requires a lot of effort to detect 
whether the buyer is offering a fair 
price  
     
5 It requires a lot of effort to detect 
whether the buyer is being fair in 
measuring quality  
     
 
11. Adaptation 
N  Totally 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
 
Totally agree 
1 You can quickly adapt the 
management of broiler production 
to new quality requirements  
     
2 Your buyer helps you to adapt to 
new quality requirements  
     
3 It has been difficult to adapt the 
management of broiler production 
to animal welfare requirements  
     
4 It has been difficult to adapt the 
management of broiler production 
to sanitary norms 
     
5  It has been difficult to adapt the 
management of broiler production 
to environmental norms 
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